# **Domestic Terrorism Identity Intelligence and HSI U.S.-Person Operations: Watchlist Pipelines, Investigative Architecture, and Constitutional Safeguards**
Inside the United States, terrorism identity intelligence and domestic criminal investigative authority intersect through two distinct but increasingly linked infrastructures: the federal watchlisting enterprise administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Threat Screening Center (TSC)—officially renamed from the Terrorist Screening Center in late March 2025—and the nationwide domestic investigative apparatus of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) [\[1\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/890/880944.pdf). As of August 26, 2024, the consolidated watchlist—officially the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS), housed within the FBI’s broader Threat Screening System (TSS)—held approximately 1.1 million persons, of whom fewer than 6,000 were confirmed U.S. citizens, nationals, or lawful permanent residents (LPRs), a share described by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) as roughly half of 1% and previously reported by Senate investigators as under 0.5% [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Although small relative to the master dataset, that U.S.-person segment propagates simultaneously across federal aviation screening, border lookouts, more than 18,000 state, local, county, tribal, and campus law enforcement agencies, 80 federally recognized fusion centers, and over 500 private-sector security forces [\[5\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf). Parallel to—and operationally woven into—this screening architecture, HSI fields over 6,950 special agents nationwide (including 5,844 Special Agent full-time equivalents in Domestic Investigations alone) across 237 to over 250 domestic offices alongside more than 4,000 task-force partners, enforcing over 400 federal statutes without a statutory domestic investigative charter comparable to the Attorney General’s Guidelines binding the FBI [\[7\]](https://www.ice.gov/hsi/careers).
Evaluated against the U.S. Army’s Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize (ODIN) network-targeting framework, HSI’s domestic non-immigration operations expose a pronounced gap between broad institutional reach and verified operational execution. Operating largely "hidden in plain sight" outside public debate over civil deportation enforcement, HSI serves as a major domestic force multiplier: according to HSI National Security Investigations Division leadership and congressional testimony, despite supplying roughly 3% of Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) personnel, HSI participates in over 89% of JTTF investigations and leads 45% to 50% of annual JTTF disruptions by deploying collateral customs, financial, export-control, and fraud authorities where pure terrorism charges are unattainable—though exact multi-agency JTTF staffing and disruption totals remain largely classified or unpublished in independent audits [\[12\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). Between 2025 and late 2026, HSI’s domestic U.S.-person operations expanded into protest infiltration, union and nonprofit financial tracing, voter-roll probes, nihilistic violent extremism, cartel material-support prosecutions, and domestic terrorism network mapping under the September 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum 7 (NSPM-7), backed by Palantir case-management modernization, Clearview AI facial recognition, covert managed-attribution browsing, and commercial data brokers [\[15\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). At the same time, federal audits document severe internal friction: a post-January 2025 immigration-enforcement diversion drove HSI’s immigration hours up by more than 800% while cutting fentanyl seizures by 39%, HSI’s \$150 million RAVEn analytics platform collapsed into decommissioning after three years, and roughly half of interviewed nonfederal police agencies report inconsistent terrorist watchlist encounter handling [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf).
This report prioritizes verified documentary records—Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (OIG) audits, PCLOB reviews, DHS Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), federal judicial opinions, court filings, and FOIA-released or leaked agency manuals—over analytical inference, attributing secondary press or civil-society analyses explicitly and noting where primary data remain redacted or unavailable. Routine civil immigration enforcement by ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) is excluded except where statutory authority lines, shared databases, or FY 2025–2026 agent diversions directly reshape HSI’s non-immigration U.S.-person operations or downstream screening consequences. Across 2025–2026, the central structural development is not merely the scale of domestic identity fusion and AI-enabled surveillance, but the simultaneous hollowing-out of independent and internal oversight—including the loss of a PCLOB quorum, mass workforce cuts at DHS civil-rights and ombudsman watchdogs, and the termination of DHS privacy advisory committees—precisely as HSI’s domestic U.S.-person reach expands [\[22\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/).
## **1\. The U.S.-Person Watchlist Architecture, Handling Codes, and Legal Boundaries**
### **Dual-Source Nomination Pipelines and the \<0.5% U.S.-Person Segment**
The consolidated U.S. terrorist watchlist—formerly the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) and currently the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS)—has no organic statutory charter; it derives from executive authority inaugurated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6, September 2003\) and resides inside the FBI-managed Threat Screening System (TSS), which also houses non-terrorism national security threat actor datasets established under President Trump’s first-term National Security Presidential Memorandum 7 (October 4, 2017\) [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Accurate measurement requires separating *records* (since aliases and identity updates generate multiple entries per individual) from distinct *persons* and tracking data vintage carefully. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) reported in December 2023 that consolidated watchlist *records* grew from approximately 150,000 in 2004 (and 724,442 in April 2007 per DOJ OIG Audit 07-41) to roughly 1.8 million records by November 2022 [\[5\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf). PCLOB’s January 2025 unclassified report provides the latest verified person-level baseline: as of August 26, 2024, TSDS contained approximately 1.1 million *persons*, with fewer than 6,000 confirmed U.S. persons (roughly half of 1%, consistent with HSGAC’s 2019 figure of less than 0.5%) [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf).
Terrorism identity intelligence enters TSDS through a strictly bifurcated pipeline governed by whether the subject has an international or purely domestic nexus. For individuals with an asserted **international terrorism nexus**, intelligence agencies and law enforcement components—including DHS entities such as CBP, TSA, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I\&A), and ICE/HSI—submit nominations to the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) classified Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), mandated by Executive Order 13354 and Section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). FBI international-nexus nominations travel via Form FD-930 through TSC’s Terrorist Review and Examinations Unit (TREX) to NCTC [\[30\]](https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf). Because TIDE retains broader classified derogatory intelligence and records that do not satisfy screening export criteria, it is substantially larger than TSDS: NCTC fact sheets reported approximately 1.6 million individuals in TIDE as of February 2017 (roughly 16,000 U.S. persons, or 1.0%) and approximately 2.5 million as of October 2020 (less than 1% U.S. persons), even after NCTC deleted over 228,000 records in the six years prior to 2017 and roughly 100,000 in the five years prior to October 2020 [\[33\]](https://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingScience/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf). NCTC analysts vet nominations daily and export an unclassified-but-sensitive (U//FOUO) identifier subset to TSC in near real time [\[30\]](https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf).
By contrast, where a U.S. person has a nexus **solely to domestic terrorism** with no international link, the FBI is the sole federal agency authorized to investigate and nominate that individual to the watchlist [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Underlying derogatory case files are excluded from TIDE and stored inside the FBI’s **Sentinel** case management system; TREX extracts the unclassified identifiers of purely domestic known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) and transmits them directly to TSC [\[30\]](https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf). When an FBI investigation closes without establishing a terrorism nexus, FBI policy directs the agency to request TSDS removal [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf).
TSC serves as the sole final arbiter for adding, modifying, or removing TSDS records under the interagency *2023 Watchlisting Guidance*—the fourth revision since July 2010—coordinated by the informal Watchlisting Advisory Council (WLAC) [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Standard inclusion requires "sufficient identifying information" plus **reasonable suspicion**: articulable intelligence or information, evaluated under the totality of the circumstances including substantive mitigating facts, warranting reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged, has been engaged, or intends to engage in terrorism or terrorist activities [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Yet GAO, PCLOB, and HSGAC confirm that TSDS also maintains **Watchlist Exceptions**—categories of individuals who do *not* meet the reasonable-suspicion threshold, such as relatives or associates of KSTs, alongside narrow undisclosed exceptions—which can nonetheless cause U.S. citizens to lose TSA PreCheck eligibility or subject LPRs to enhanced immigration and transportation vetting [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Historical DOJ OIG audits exposed deep data-integrity flaws: Audit 07-41 (2007) found 38% of tested records contained inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent, or outdated data, and Audit 09-25 (2009) confirmed FBI policy allowed nominations even absent an open terrorism investigation [\[36\]](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038&context=mlr). Although TSC presumes U.S.-person protections whenever citizenship status is unconfirmed and conducts quality-control reviews of U.S.-person records three times per year, GAO’s March 2025 restricted audit (summarized in GAO-25-108349, August 2025\) issued 24 recommendations to seven agencies—23 still open as of August 2025, with only DHS I\&A’s redress monitoring recommendation closed in April 2025—calling on NCTC to implement an annual review of U.S.-person nominations and requiring TSC to monitor biannual review time frames [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf).
### **NCIC Handling Codes Versus Aviation Screening Subsets**
Public commentary and civil litigation frequently conflate the **five NCIC Threat Screening Center File Handling Codes** governing street-level police encounters with TSA’s **aviation screening subsets** (No Fly, Selectee, and Expanded Selectee). Although both draw from TSDS, they operate under different technical rules and legal authorities. Whenever a state or local officer runs a routine wanted-person check through the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the query automatically searches the TSC File (formerly the KST File) and returns one of five Handling Codes whose mandatory caveat texts were standardized in FBI CJIS Technical and Operational Update (TOU) 19-1 (November 2019\) and incorporated into state law enforcement operating manuals [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4).
| Classification Layer | Code / Subset | Documentary Inclusion Criteria | Officer / Screener Directive & Legal Constraints | Verified Distribution / Operational Impact |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **NCIC TSC File** | **Handling Code 1** | Terrorism association with an active arrest warrant (warrant may not surface via searched identifiers alone) [\[43\]](https://www.wsp.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Chapter-30-Threat-Screening-Center-TSC-File.pdf). | WARNING \- APPROACH WITH CAUTION; updated TOU 19-1 and state manual caveats instruct DO NOT DETAIN OR ARREST THIS INDIVIDUAL BASED ON THIS NOTICE, DO NOT ADVISE... ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST, and contact TSC to verify warrant/authorization [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4). | Combined with HC 2, comprised just **318 of 109,849** audited records (**0.29%**) in DOJ OIG 05-27 (2005); no recent public breakdown released [\[44\]](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf). |
| **NCIC TSC File** | **Handling Code 2** | Active terrorism investigative interest; a DHS detainer or administrative warrant may exist [\[43\]](https://www.wsp.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Chapter-30-Threat-Screening-Center-TSC-File.pdf). | WARNING \- APPROACH WITH CAUTION; contact TSC immediately (Border Patrol officers must immediately call NTC; state telecommunicator manuals flag potential detention/detainer verification); do not disclose watchlist status [\[42\]](https://www.openfox.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/TOU_19-1_replacement.pdf). | Small fraction (within the 0.29% HC 1–2 tier in 2005 DOJ OIG audit); triggers immediate federal coordination [\[44\]](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf). |
| **NCIC TSC File** | **Handling Code 3** | POSSIBLE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION MEMBER \- CAUTION (no arrest warrant or detainer on file) [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4). | DO NOT DETAIN OR ARREST THIS INDIVIDUAL BASED ON THIS NOTICE; DO NOT ADVISE... ON A TERRORIST WATCHLIST; call TSC during encounter, or immediately thereafter **if calling would extend the scope or duration of the encounter** [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4). | Accounted for **\~22%** of audited records in DOJ OIG 05-27 (2005); standard street-encounter KST alert [\[44\]](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf). |
| **NCIC TSC File** | **Handling Code 4** | POSSIBLE PERSON OF INTEREST \- CAUTION — sparse identifiers, associates of KSTs, or legacy Military Detainee records [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4). | DO NOT DETAIN OR ARREST...; DO NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY MAY BE CONSIDERED A PERSON WHO MAY BE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST (or PERSON OF INTEREST); call FBI/TSC (Border Patrol calls NTC) [\[40\]](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4). | Accounted for **\~75%** of audited records in DOJ OIG 05-27 (2005; HC 3 \+ HC 4 ≈ **97%**), sweeping in associates who may pose no direct threat [\[44\]](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf). |
| **NCIC TSC File** | **Handling Code 5** | POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT \- CAUTION (post-2017 NSPM-7 / TSS expansion beyond terrorism, e.g., transnational organized crime) [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). | APPROACH WITH CAUTION; contact TSC (1-866-872-9001 in Washington State Patrol exemplar) for identity confirmation and instructions [\[43\]](https://www.wsp.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Chapter-30-Threat-Screening-Center-TSC-File.pdf). | Exact share undisclosed; supersedes a single erroneous legacy TIPOFF "code 5" noted in 2005 [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). |
| **TSA Aviation Subsets** | **No Fly List** | Reasonable suspicion plus specific threat of terrorism against civil aviation, the homeland (18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)), or U.S. facilities/personnel abroad [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Absolute prohibition on boarding commercial aircraft arriving in, departing from, flying within, or overflying U.S. airspace; eligible for post-2015 DHS TRIP status disclosure and multi-tier review for U.S. persons [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Sensitive Security Information (SSI); U.S. citizen count cited at roughly \~800 in prior legal literature, current total unpublished [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). |
| **TSA Aviation Subsets** | **Selectee & Expanded Selectee Lists** | Selectee: reasonable suspicion \+ heightened sensitive criteria; Expanded Selectee: TSDS KSTs with full name and DOB not meeting full Selectee criteria [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Mandatory secondary airport screening (SSSS), full patdowns, chemical explosive swabbing, luggage/device inspection, and possible Federal Air Marshal coverage; **no** DHS TRIP status confirmation [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Exported directly from TSDS to TSA Secure Flight; subjects U.S. citizens to repeated scrutiny without official notice [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). |
Two institutional guardrails in the NCIC TSC File manual shape how watchlist hits function domestically. First, NCIC TSC File entries carry an **unlimited retention period**, remaining active indefinitely until TSC modifies or cancels them, checked only through monthly TSDS batch validations and an annual CJIS audit giving TSC 90 days to revalidate unverified entries [\[41\]](https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NCIC-KST.pdf). Second, the manual stipulates that watchlist status is federal property of TSC and **may not be disclosed, disseminated, or used in any proceeding without advance TSC authorization** [\[41\]](https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NCIC-KST.pdf). Notably, civil litigants in *Targeted Justice*—whose complaints federal courts dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—incorrectly asserted that Handling Codes 1 and 2 are the No Fly and Selectee lists and framed Handling Codes 3 and 4 as a secret "non-terrorist blacklist" [\[49\]](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-91/319662/20240723150546748_Targeted%20Jusice%20Appx%20E%20FILE%20Jul%2023%2024.pdf). Official NCIC manuals and DOJ OIG 05-27 clarify the actual structure: Handling Codes 3 and 4 represented roughly 97% of audited 2005 records primarily because most watchlisted subjects lack an active criminal arrest warrant or DHS detainer, yet Handling Code 4’s explicit inclusion of sparsely documented identities and associates creates tangible Fourth Amendment detention risks whenever street officers overlook the prohibition against extending a stop [\[41\]](https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NCIC-KST.pdf).
### **Domestic Encounter Pipelines and GAO-26-108650 Reporting Gaps**
Once exported from TSDS, U.S.-person terrorism identity intelligence flows across five domestic screening vectors, each marked by documented transparency and compliance gaps.
At the street policing tier, **GAO-26-108650** (January 2026, the publicly releasable edition of sensitive August 2025 report GAO-25-107086SU) revealed that **2,198 nonfederal law enforcement entities**—including municipal police and county sheriff’s offices—across all 50 states reported positive terrorist watchlist encounters to the FBI from FY 2019 through FY 2024 [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). (The FBI redacted total annual encounter counts, U.S.-person citizenship shares, state-by-state distributions, and top-ten agency volumes as sensitive [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf).) Yet GAO’s structured interviews covering 55 nonfederal law enforcement entities across 26 interview sessions in California, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia uncovered pervasive operational breakdown: **12 of 26 interviewed entity groups** stated officers do not consistently report potential watchlist encounters where warranted; **12 of 26** said officers do not always call TSC as advised; **13 of 26** did not believe all their officers were prepared to handle a watchlist encounter; and **9 of 26** believed officers in their region failed to report consistently [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Because NCIC hit messages merely *advise* calling TSC rather than mandating it, patrol officers routinely make unilateral field judgments to clear hits as false positives, leaving the FBI with incomplete encounter data while FBI CJIS conducts no verification of whether states actually train NCIC users on watchlist handling rules and TSC lacks a formal outreach communication plan [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf).
At the regional intelligence layer, **80 federally recognized state and major urban area fusion centers** (authorized under Section 511 of the 9/11 Commission Act, 6 U.S.C. § 124h, and supported by over 130 embedded DHS I\&A Intelligence Officers) act as secondary multipliers for domestic encounters [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Appendix II of GAO-26-108650 documents that once a nonfederal officer reports a confirmed positive encounter, TSC transmits an alert to the relevant fusion center over DHS’s **Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)** detailing the encounter time, location, biographical identifiers, NCIC handling code, vehicle data, and encounter trigger (such as a traffic stop) [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Upon receiving a HSIN notification, **7 of 9** interviewed fusion centers query additional databases to assemble broader subject dossiers shared with DHS, the FBI, and state offices, and **4 of 9** aggregate encounters into analytical dashboards—yet **8 of 9** do not track whether local officers properly report or handle watchlist hits [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf).
Across **aviation and transportation credentialing**, TSA’s Secure Flight system screens domestic and international passenger manifests against the No Fly, Selectee, Expanded Selectee, and Watchlist Exceptions subsets, and TSA also queries TSDS when adjudicating Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) and Hazardous Materials Endorsements (HME) under 49 C.F.R. § 1572.107(a)(2) [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Senate HSGAC’s December 2023 investigation documented that U.S. travelers can be singled out for secondary screening for at least **22 distinct reasons**—at least 10 TSA mechanisms (including random selection and intelligence-driven rules such as Quiet Skies and Silent Partner), at least 10 CBP inspection triggers, and 2 external criteria—without either TSA or CBP tracking holistically whether U.S. citizens or Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities suffer repeated, overlapping scrutiny [\[5\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf).
At **U.S. borders**, DHS’s Watchlist Service (WLS) continuously feeds TSDS into CBP’s **Automated Targeting System (ATS)** and **TECS** platform to screen arriving, departing, and overflying travelers (including U.S. citizens) via Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) and Passenger Name Records (PNR), looping confirmed matches back into TSDS and TIDE [\[55\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1210_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf). Retention periods documented in DHS’s December 2024 ATS PIA Appendix Update show pronounced persistence: non-matches are purged after **7 days**, cleared *possible* watchlist matches stay in ATS for **7 years**, confirmed ATS watchlist matches stay for **15 years**, confirmed TECS watchlist lookouts persist for **75 years**, and records linked to national security or counterterrorism matters are retained for the **life of the matter** [\[55\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1210_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf). Critically, TSDS is not the sole route into TECS border lookouts: ICE’s **Investigative Case Management (ICM) Interface Hub** continuously publishes HSI-created Subject Records directly into CBP TECS as "on Primary" lookouts, meaning domestic HSI field entries on non-watchlisted U.S. citizens can trigger international border stops [\[59\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf). Finally, under HSPD-6’s mandate to share unclassified screening subsets with private-sector partners where warranted, Senate HSGAC documented in December 2023 that **over 500 private-sector entities**—including police and security forces of private universities, hospitals, and private prisons—have been granted access to a subset of federal terrorist watchlist data [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf).
### **Exact Statutory and Jurisdictional Boundaries: FBI Versus DHS/HSI**
The legal architecture dividing international terrorism from purely domestic terrorism creates sharp asymmetries in agency jurisdiction and surveillance authority. Neither the FBI’s domestic terrorism definition (**18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)**—acts dangerous to human life occurring primarily inside U.S. territory intended to intimidate a civilian population or coerce government policy) nor DHS’s homeland-security terrorism definition (**6 U.S.C. § 101(18)**—expressly adding acts potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources) creates a standalone federal criminal offense [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). Domestic terrorism prosecutions must instead rely on underlying Title 18 felonies such as arson, explosives, assault on federal officers, RICO, seditious conspiracy, or firearms statutes, whereas international terrorism prosecutions can invoke material support to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign).
By statute (18 U.S.C. § 2332b(f)), federal regulation (28 C.F.R.), and Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the FBI holds federal lead responsibility for counterterrorism investigations inside the United States and exclusive authority to investigate purely domestic terrorism and submit purely domestic TSDS nominations [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). The investigative toolkit splits cleanly along the same boundary: in **international terrorism (IT)** cases, the FBI may use **Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)** electronic surveillance and **National Security Letters (NSLs)**; in purely **domestic terrorism (DT)** investigations, **neither FISA nor NSLs are legally permitted**, confining investigators to criminal grand jury subpoenas and **Title III** probable-cause wiretaps [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf).
HSI’s internal *National Security Investigations Handbook* formally acknowledges the FBI’s lead coordinating role through JTTFs and defines a "Person of National Security Interest" around international terrorism, foreign espionage or sabotage, and foreign computer intrusions [\[64\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). HSI holds no independent authority to issue NSLs—only JTTF-assigned HSI agents may request that the FBI issue an NSL under FBI rules—yet HSI retains independent **administrative subpoena and summons** powers, **Title 19 customs and border search** authorities, **Title 8 immigration** authorities, and broad federal felony enforcement powers under **19 U.S.C. § 1589a** [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). In operational practice, three legal bridges carry HSI directly into domestic U.S.-person threats regardless of an international nexus. First, **JTTF integration and the second-term NSPM-7 (September 25, 2025, 90 FR 47225\)**—*Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence*, issued days after a September 22 executive order purporting to designate "Antifa" as a "domestic terrorist organization" (a category absent from federal statute)—and the Attorney General’s **December 4, 2025 implementing guidance** direct JTTFs (where HSI is a core partner) to map full domestic networks behind rioting, law-enforcement doxing, and anti-ICE interference, order all federal law enforcement agencies to audit and transfer Antifa-related files to the FBI within 14 days, launch **five-year retrospective JTTF investigations** into organizers and financial sponsors, and submit monthly lists of entities meeting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) to the Deputy Attorney General [\[19\]](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/). Second, **40 U.S.C. § 1315 cross-designations** authorize DHS to deploy HSI agents alongside the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to police domestic protests and investigate civil unrest near federal courthouses and ICE facilities, as executed in Portland in 2020 [\[68\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-04/OIG-21-31-Mar21.pdf). Third, **19 U.S.C. § 1589a’s full-range federal felony authority** combined with January 2025 FTO designations of Mexican cartels and Tren de Aragua allows HSI to prosecute U.S. citizens and domestic residents under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B material support, Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) child-exploitation statutes, export-control laws, and voter-fraud initiatives [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign).
## **2\. HSI’s Domestic Investigative Footprint, Task Forces, and Non-Immigration Cases**
### **Workforce Scale, Budget Structure, and the FY 2025–2026 Diversion Paradox**
Despite public framing as a transnational border agency, HSI is structurally a large domestic criminal investigative force. According to the **FY 2024 ICE Annual Report**, HSI employed more than **6,950 special agents**, over **1,800 criminal analysts and mission support staff**, and more than **700 Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU)** personnel across **237 U.S. cities** and **94 international offices in 56 countries** [\[9\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). (Wider DHS workforce summaries incorporating contractors report approximately **10,400 total personnel** and up to 7,100 special agents across over 250 domestic offices [\[7\]](https://www.ice.gov/hsi/careers), whereas a September 2025 DHS regional sheet cites more than 8,700 personnel [\[73\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0910_oslle_region-9-contact-sheet.pdf)—reflecting variations in whether contractors and embedded personnel are counted; a vendor rebranding case study separately lists 30 Special Agent in Charge \[SAC\] principal field offices and 253 domestic locations [\[74\]](https://netchannels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Netchannels-Case-Study-HSI_261008.pdf).) In FY 2024, HSI executed **32,608 criminal arrests**—targeting U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike, distinct from ERO’s 113,430 civil administrative arrests—while seizing over **\$886 million** in currency and assets, roughly **\$192 million** in virtual currency, and **41,351 weapons** (a 99% increase over FY 2023\) [\[9\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf).
Budget allocations in the **FY 2027 DHS Congressional Budget Justification (April 2026\)** confirm this domestic center of gravity. Out of HSI’s \$2.459 billion Operations and Support (O\&S) baseline in FY 2025 and FY 2026 (rising 6.22% to **\$2.612 billion** in the FY 2027 request), **Domestic Investigations accounts for 86.91%** (\$2.138 billion in FY 2025–2026; **\$2.270 billion** in FY 2027), supporting **7,967 positions and 7,965 FTE** (5,844 Special Agents and 2,121 operational and administrative staff), compared to \$230.4 million (8.82%) for International Operations and \$111.4 million (4.26%) for Intelligence [\[10\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf). While ERO’s annual O\&S appropriation (\$5.366 billion requested for FY 2027, down 3.64%) remains roughly twice HSI’s—and two mandatory congressional reconciliation bills, Public Law 119-21 (2025, allocating \$75 billion directly to ICE) and Public Law 119-98 (the June 2026 Secure America Act), left ICE with **\$91 billion** in unspent multi-year funding through September 2029 per American Immigration Council analysis of ICE SF-133 and OMB records [\[10\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf)—HSI’s criminal investigative mission underwent an abrupt internal reallocation beginning in January 2025\.
Section 4 of **Executive Order 14159** (January 20, 2025\) directed DHS to make Immigration and Nationality Act enforcement HSI’s primary mission [\[78\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). **DHS OIG-26-23** (August 20, 2026\) quantified the operational trade-off: in FY 2025, HSI hours logged to immigration enforcement surged by **more than 1.7 million hours (over 800%)**—reaching nearly 2 million hours according to PBS NewsHour reporting of the OIG chart—creating an "all hands-on deck" posture in 9 of 11 interviewed field offices, with one office devoting roughly **99%** of HSI capacity to immigration and another shrinking a seven-agent drug squad to two or three agents [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Simultaneously, HSI fentanyl investigative hours plunged **30% to 31%** (from 824,000 to under 570,000 hours), initiated fentanyl investigations fell **24%**, and HSI fentanyl seizures dropped **39.09%** (from 33,316 in FY 2024 to 20,292 in FY 2025—a 51.88% decline from FY 2023’s 42,166 seizures), even as DEA fentanyl powder seizures rose roughly 25% nationwide [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). *New York Times* reporting tracked by the Immigration Policy Tracking Project similarly recorded a late-2025 plunge of 73% in DHS weapons seizures and an 11% drop in narcotics arrests as immigration arrests jumped from about 5,000 to over 94,50078. Crucially, however, this reallocation did not withdraw HSI from U.S.-person domestic operations; rather, it shifted domestic non-immigration bandwidth away from traditional narcotics trafficking toward administration-prioritized protest surveillance, election investigations, NVE cyber cases, and FTO-designated cartel prosecutions [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign).
### **JTTF Integration, Fusion Centers, HSTF, and TFO Cross-Designations**
HSI amplifies its domestic footprint by embedding special agents and analysts across interagency task forces rather than operating solely under its own banner. Within **FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)**, HSI’s *National Security Investigations Handbook* identifies HSI as the largest non-FBI federal personnel contributor—supplying full-time, part-time, and liaison agents plus headquarters detailees to the FBI Counterterrorism Division, with SACs barred from cutting JTTF staffing without National Security Unit (NSU) Chief concurrence [\[64\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). In a Washington Institute policy lecture and House testimony, HSI NSID Deputy Assistant Director Louis Rodi and agency officials stated that while HSI represents roughly **3% of total JTTF manpower**, it participates in **over 89% of JTTF investigations** and leads **45% to 50% of annual JTTF disruptions** [\[12\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). Because DHS OIG-20-59 noted that detailed multi-agency JTTF staffing breakdowns are largely classified by the FBI and exact FY 2015–2019 case-metric tables were excluded from public excerpts, those ratios should be understood as agency-reported operational claims rather than independently audited shares [\[14\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). Nonetheless, HSI’s written doctrine explicitly instructs JTTF agents to assume "case agent" or "co-case agent" leadership whenever ICE customs, financial, export, or immigration statutes offer the most effective lever to disrupt a national security threat [\[64\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf).
Independent inspector general audits reveal that JTTF integration is far less seamless in practice than agency brochures suggest. **DHS OIG-17-49** (March 2017\) found persistent field-level friction: FBI field leadership complained to headquarters that HSI encroached on FBI counterterrorism jurisdiction, while HSI officials felt the FBI failed to recognize HSI’s investigative capabilities [\[63\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-49-Mar17.pdf). Three years later, **DHS OIG-20-59** (August 2020\) documented an internal October 2019 HSI assessment finding a shortfall of 97 JTTF positions nationwide, criticized reliance on an outdated May 2003 DOJ-DHS Terrorism Financing MOA (which dissolved ICE’s Operation Green Quest and still referenced obsolete FBI units), and identified acute information silos: a DHS-State agreement barred HSI JTTF agents from sharing passport records with FBI partners without prior approval, while TSA policy trapped HSI JTTF requests for Secure Flight data behind multi-layered chief counsel, privacy, and intelligence sign-offs [\[14\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). DHS concurred with two OIG recommendations but non-concurred with three—including updating the 2003 MOA [\[14\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf).
Outside JTTFs, HSI’s Office of Intelligence embeds analysts across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise—operating the Illicit Finance Unit, the Illicit Trade Unit, the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), and El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) drug desks—while placing HSI representatives in state fusion centers (such as Louisiana’s LA-SAFE) and co-locating HSI analysts alongside FBI Field Intelligence Groups inside High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) intelligence centers [\[81\]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf). At the federal-state operational tier, HSI also co-leads the DHS-DOJ **Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)**—spanning **more than 30 federal agencies and over 440 state and local partners**—which on November 18, 2026 launched an HSTF **Threat Disruption Center** inside its National Coordination Center under Executive Order 14390, powered by blockchain-analytics contractor **TRM Labs** (awarded a \$94.66 million federal contract in July 2026 running through August 29, 2027\) to trace crypto-enabled scam and transnational networks [\[85\]](https://www.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-11-19-us-launches-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-help-trace-crypto-tied-to-scams-443599).
To extend federal criminal reach directly onto city streets, HSI leverages **more than 4,000 task-force partners** (per April 2023 ICE House Appropriations testimony) through **HSI Directive 18-02** and **19 U.S.C. § 1589a** [\[8\]](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20230418/115689/HHRG-118-AP15-Wstate-JohnsonT-20230418.pdf). Under these provisions, HSI SACs cross-designate vetted state, local, and federal officers as **Customs Officers (Excepted)** for renewable 12-month periods—granting them federal investigative credentials, ICE system access, alternate confidential-informant control authority, and power to enforce the **full range of federal criminal offenses**, while **explicitly excluding authority to enforce civil administrative immigration violations** [\[65\]](https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16). Parent agencies must certify good standing, submit to ICE OPR background checks, and report any *Giglio* derogatory history [\[65\]](https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16). Conversely, HSI’s own dependence on DEA cross-designation for **Title 21** Controlled Substances Act enforcement triggered sustained interagency breakdown: **GAO-26-107414** (September 30, 2026\) documented stalled DEA-HSI joint training since 2021, a defunct Headquarters Review Team, vague HSI operational deconfliction notices, cases where DEA arrested deconflicted HSI targets without warning, and continuing uncertainty even after a January 2025 DOJ Office of Legal Counsel opinion and a **May 26, 2026 Acting Attorney General memorandum** authorizing HSI Title 21 enforcement subject to monthly DHS training reports [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf).
### **Verified Domestic Non-Immigration Cases Involving U.S. Persons**
Because federal press releases frequently credit multi-agency task forces without isolating individual agents’ investigative steps, verified court records and DOJ disclosures offer the clearest empirical view of how HSI operates domestically against U.S. persons across counterterrorism, finance, export enforcement, domestic extremism, and political protest domains.
| Mission Domain | Representative Verified Case / Operation | U.S.-Person Nexus & Legal Status | HSI & Interagency Investigative Mechanism | Outcome / Documentary Record |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Counterterrorism / HVE** | *U.S. v. Ahmad Khalil Elshazly* (D. Conn., 2019–2026) | **U.S. citizen** (West Haven, CT) attempting travel to Syria to fight for ISIS [\[91\]](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/connecticut-man-who-attempted-travel-middle-east-join-and-fight-isis-sentenced-over-seven). | FBI JTTF (including HSI, CBP, IRS-CI, NCIS, State, local police); \$500 payment to believed ISIS smuggler; arrested at Stonington boat dock [\[91\]](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/connecticut-man-who-attempted-travel-middle-east-join-and-fight-isis-sentenced-over-seven). | Guilty plea Nov 2022; sentenced **Sept 28, 2026** to \>7 years prison (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) [\[91\]](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/connecticut-man-who-attempted-travel-middle-east-join-and-fight-isis-sentenced-over-seven). |
| **Counterterrorism / HVE** | *U.S. v. Kabir & Deleon* (C.D. Cal.); *Khan* & *Edmonds* (N.D. Ill.) | **U.S. citizens** (Kabir, Khan, Army Guard soldier Edmonds) & **LPR** (Deleon) [\[92\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isil). | Riverside and Chicago JTTFs with HSI participation; O’Hare airport arrest (*Khan*) and highway interdiction en route to Mexico (*Deleon*) [\[92\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isil). | Convictions/guilty pleas for material support to Al-Qaeda/ISIL [\[92\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isil). |
| **Counterterrorism / JTTF Sting** | *U.S. v. Mustafa Mousab Alowemer* (W.D. Pa., 2019–2022) | **Syrian refugee** admitted Aug 2016 (*not* a U.S. citizen) plotting Pittsburgh church bombing [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). | Pittsburgh JTTF (FBI, HSI, USCIS, Secret Service, IRS-CI, USPIS, local police); FBI UCE \+ CHS held 4 in-person meetings; Alowemer supplied IED manuals, nails, marked satellite maps, 10-point plan [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). | Guilty plea Sept 2021; sentenced Nov 2022 to **208 months** \+ lifetime supervised release [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). |
| **Counterterrorism / Collateral Disruption** | *Dayton Family JTTF Case* (S.D. Ohio, 2013\) | Three Dayton residents (naturalization applicant \+ family; noncitizen/mixed status) [\[98\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/three-dayton-family-members-plead-guilty-immigration-and-firearms-violations). | FBI JTTF \+ HSI \+ USCIS \+ USDA; non-terrorism disruption using naturalization false statement, unlawful alien firearm possession, and address-update violation [\[98\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/three-dayton-family-members-plead-guilty-immigration-and-firearms-violations). | Guilty pleas Nov 2013 \+ judicial removal provisions; underlying terrorism link undisclosed in DOJ release [\[98\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/three-dayton-family-members-plead-guilty-immigration-and-firearms-violations). |
| **Domestic NVE / Cyber** | *"764" NVE Network* (W.D. Mo., July 2026; W.D. Tex., Dec 2025; D. Ariz.) | **U.S.-based members** (Independence, MO; San Antonio, TX) of online Nihilistic Violent Extremist child-exploitation network [\[71\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/independence-mo-man-connected-nihilistic-violent-extremist-nve-group-charged-sexual). | **HSI standalone investigation** (W.D. Mo.) and joint FBI/HSI investigations into CSAM, sextortion, and RICO conspiracies [\[52\]](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/09.10.26_Final-Report_National-Security-Improvements-and-the-Domestic-Threat-Landscape-25-Years-After-91101.pdf). | Federal complaints and RICO/CSAM guilty pleas (2025–2026); House Homeland Security Committee cited HSI-FBI NVE work (Sept 2026\) [\[52\]](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/09.10.26_Final-Report_National-Security-Improvements-and-the-Domestic-Threat-Landscape-25-Years-After-91101.pdf). |
| **FTO-Cartel Material Support** | *U.S. v. Valencia-Soriano* (W.D. Mo., May 2026); SDCA CJNG Tunnel (Oct 2026\) | Domestic U.S. criminal cells (Kansas City, MO; cross-border tunnel engineering) charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign). | HSTF, HSI, USBP, JTFA, and OCDETF Strike Forces leveraging Jan 2025 FTO designations of CJNG, Michoacán cartels, and Tren de Aragua [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign). | First cartel material-support indictments/guilty pleas (2025–2026); up to \$50M rewards for TdA leaders (Nov 2026\) [\[16\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign). |
| **Terrorist Financing & Cyber** | *2020 Global Cyber Terror-Finance Disruption* (D.D.C., Aug 2020\) | **U.S.-based Hamas donors** hit with criminal warrants; American PPE buyer targeted by ISIS fraud [\[103\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). | HSI Philadelphia, IRS-CI, FBI, Chainalysis, Excygent; **HSI undercover agents** negotiated SAM purchases with Al-Qaeda Telegram admin; **covert U.S. operation of alqassam.net** diverting donor BTC [\[103\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). | \>300 crypto accounts, 4 websites, 4 Facebook pages seized; largest U.S. terrorism crypto seizure to date [\[103\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). |
| **Export Control & Sanctions** | *U.S. v. Puzyreva, Goltsev & Nasriddinov* (E.D.N.Y., 2023–2025) | **Brooklyn resident** (Nasriddinov) & NY front firms (SH Brothers, SN Electronics) shipping \>\$7M in U.S. UAV/missile chips to Russia [\[104\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). | Disruptive Technology Strike Force & Task Force KleptoCapture (HSI, FBI, Commerce BIS); intercepted texts, structured NY cash deposits, Hong Kong wires [\[104\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). | Guilty plea; **\$1.68M seized**; shipped U.S. components recovered inside Russian weapons in Ukraine [\[104\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). (Parallel HSI Phoenix Boeing 737 case: 70 mos, \$4.58M forfeiture, Apr 2025 [\[105\]](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-export-control-evasion-scheme-sentenced-70-months-prison).) |
| **Domestic Unrest & Protest Operations** | *Portland (2020)*; *Minnesota Operation Metro Surge / Sant (2026)*; *Maine Hilton (2026)*; *EPIC v. Mullin (2026)* | **U.S. citizen protesters, church/union attendees, legal observers, and journalists** [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). | 40 U.S.C. § 1315 deployment (2020); **CUC Op Keyhole** / *Operation Puppet Master* & *Project Whipple Shield* undercover infiltration, Clearview AI, LPRs, union/PAC tracing (2026); ICM-to-TECS border flags & Trusted Traveler revocations [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). | Active criminal discovery challenges (*Sant*) and federal Privacy Act / First Amendment suits (*Hilton*, *EPIC v. Mullin*); 3 I\&A OSIRs recalled in 2020 [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). |
| **Election / Voter Operations** | *HSI 9-State Voter Fraud Surge* (Aug–Oct 2026\) | State voter rolls (\>50M DOJ-transferred records), nonprofits, and individual voters [\[80\]](https://democracyforward.org/work/research/exposing-and-disrupting-federal-attempts-to-interfere-in-the-2026-midterm-elections/). | EO 14248 implementation; bulk voter-roll vetting, planned \$5M voter-history contract, internal consideration of **HSI undercover agents** (June 2026\) per FOIA records [\[17\]](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/EMBARGO-DFF-DHS-ICE-26-0510-0511-0512-LIT-A_.pdf). | 68 cases referred for prosecution, 36 criminal & 56 administrative arrests reported Oct 2026; FOIA suits & Senate HSGAC pushback [\[17\]](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/EMBARGO-DFF-DHS-ICE-26-0510-0511-0512-LIT-A_.pdf). |
Two specialized statutory domains underpin HSI’s leverage in domestic U.S.-person cases. First, HSI is the sole federal law enforcement agency with full statutory criminal jurisdiction over all U.S. export-control and sanctions laws—the Arms Export Control Act (AECA/ITAR), Export Control Reform Act (ECRA/EAR), International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)—operating the Counterproliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit, the Counterproliferation Mission Center (CPMC, which supported 194 investigations and processed over 1.5 terabytes of data in FY 2024), the interagency Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf), Executive Order 13558), and **Project Shield America** outreach to U.S. manufacturers and academic researchers [\[9\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). Between 2012 and 2018, CPI initiated over 17,000 cases leading to 4,006 arrests and 8,288 seizures, and by January 2024 HSI and its partners had seized 4.8 million barrels of Iranian petroleum (\$289 million), \$11 million in OFAC-frozen proceeds, and \$35 million in IRGC-linked currency—eroding over 4% of the IRGC’s estimated annual oil revenue allocation [\[114\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/mancuso-testimony-01-23-2024/). Second, HSI’s financial-crimes architecture—including the New York **El Dorado Task Force (EDTF)** (which trains financial institutions on crafting terrorist-financing Suspicious Activity Reports \[SARs\]) and the **Trade Transparency Unit (TTU)** (exchanging trade declarations with 19 foreign partner countries; 444 criminal arrests and over \$356 million seized in FY 2019–2021)—allows HSI to trace domestic money movement ranging from online elder-fraud laundering (*Babajide Adesayo*, convicted August 2026 in Atlanta for laundering over \$2.7 million) to union and Political Action Committee wire records examined during Minnesota’s *Project Whipple Shield* [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance).
## **3\. HSI’s Domestic Data-Fusion, Link-Analysis, and Commercial Surveillance Stack**
### **Case Management Evolution: From ICEPIC and FALCON to RAVEn’s Collapse and the Palantir Lakehouse**
Public reporting often portrays HSI’s investigative software stack as a seamless automated dragnet. Primary DHS PIAs, OIG audits, and 2026 procurement records reveal a more complicated pattern: **vast data-ingestion ambitions undermined by custom-engineering failures, pushing HSI aggressively toward commercial vendor consolidation—led by Palantir—and generative AI.**
HSI’s original link-analysis platform, the ICE Pattern Analysis and Information Collection (**ICEPIC**) system (2008 PIA), analyzed disparate datasets to reveal non-obvious relationships among investigative targets [\[113\]](https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi). According to DHS/ICE/PIA-051 (updated April 2025), ICEPIC was replaced in 2012 by the DHS Pattern and Information Collaboration Sharing System (DPICS2), which was retired in 2014 (with legacy ICEPIC decommissioning continuing into 2016\) [\[120\]](https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf). Its underlying data-exchange conduit, however, survived independently as the **Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) Service**—a non-public "super highway" allowing domestic state and local police with signed DHS agreements to query DHS holdings while granting DHS analysts reciprocal queries into local records [\[121\]](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service).
To unify investigative operations, HSI launched the Palantir-built **FALCON** environment in 2012 (including FALCON Search & Analysis \[FALCON-SA\] and FALCON-DARTTS for trade transparency) and deployed Palantir-built **Investigative Case Management (ICM)** in 2016 (DHS/ICE/PIA-045) to replace legacy TECS case management [\[59\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf). ICM stores Reports of Investigation (ROIs), pole-camera footage, LPR hits, electronic surveillance approvals (ELSUR), and Subject Records for domestic Title 18 and Title 19 prosecutions as well as ICE OPR internal misconduct probes [\[59\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf). Its back-end **Interface Hub** queries CBP TECS, ICE EID, and the **Telecommunications Linking System (TLS/Pen-Link)**—which routinely shares bulk telecommunications link data with DEA—while exporting every 24 hours to the **HSI Data Warehouse** (and onward to FALCON-SA) and **continuously publishing ICE Subject Records directly into CBP TECS as border lookouts** [\[59\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf).
Beginning in May 2020 (DHS/ICE/PIA-055, with an appendix updated June 18, 2025, though the updated appendix text is not publicly detailed in available summaries), HSI’s Innovation Lab spent **more than \$150 million between FY 2022 and FY 2025**—involving multi-year contracts tracked by the Brennan Center with Booz Allen Hamilton (\$76 million total; 18millionin2021–2026),Acuity(50.8 million total; 21millionin2022–2025),andAlethix(46.7 million total; \$16 million in 2021–2024)—to construct the **Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized Environment (RAVEn)** as an internal cloud AI analytics layer ingesting ICM ROIs, FinCEN BSA subsets (via its CORE tool), migrated DARTTS trade records (April 2023 PIA), foreign treaty data, and ad hoc open-source uploads [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Two DHS OIG audits documented RAVEn’s operational collapse. **OIG-23-41** (August 2023\) found that DARTTS-on-RAVEn possessed **no automated anomaly-detection capability**, forcing an understaffed TTU (one permanent chief and three permanent criminal research specialists, padded by 18-month temporary details) to manually search **more than 1.9 billion import records** [\[119\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf). **OIG-26-23** (August 2026\) then revealed that agents and analysts in 6 of 11 interviewed field offices abandoned RAVEn because it crashed, failed to connect criminal networks, and demanded heavy manual effort—with one officer calling it "atrocious" [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Across roughly 6,800 potential HSI users in FY 2025, adoption reached only **66.0%** (4,491 unique users) for Lead Tracker and just **33.4%** (2,271 users) for its flagship CORE analytics application, forcing HSI to **begin decommissioning RAVEn tools in 2025** just three years after launch to transition to a commercial replacement estimated at \$39 million [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf).
RAVEn’s failure accelerated a decisive shift toward commercial AI and enterprise data consolidation. DHS contract obligations to **Palantir** surged from **\$20.4 million in 2024 to \$162.2 million through mid-2026** (\$335.4 million since January 2021), encompassing ERO targeting platforms such as **ELITE** and **ImmigrationOS** (\$30 million in April 2025\) alongside HSI’s criminal infrastructure [\[15\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). In **June 2026**, according to procurement justifications reported by *Biometric Update*, ICE awarded Palantir a **\$45.8 million** order to consolidate ICM and investigative analytics into a unified **Enterprise Lakehouse**—migrating all historical case records and "derived analytical data" into an authoritative repository interoperable with CBP, DOJ, FBI CJIS, **Nlets**, and DHS OBIM [\[60\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-observer-lawsuit-shows-how-palantir-records-can-feed-border-screening-analytics). (In October 2026, ICE likewise canceled a competitive Visa Security Program system recompete in favor of Palantir Foundry [\[128\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/palantir).) Simultaneously, on **August 10, 2026**, ICE issued a market-research Request for Information (RFI) for an HSI **"Telecommunications Analysis System"** layering **ICE-controlled Microsoft Azure generative AI** over **at least 10 terabytes and billions of records** for 500+ concurrent HSI users—unifying live Title III wiretaps, pen-trap/WhatsApp/IP metadata, historical CDRs, cell-tower dumps, web browsing, financial histories, platform returns (Google, Microsoft, Meta, X, Snapchat), and mobile forensic extractions (Cellebrite, Magnet Axiom, Oxygen Forensics, Susteen, XRY) for conversational natural-language querying, 3D geo-temporal mapping, and live GPS geofence alerts [\[26\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-ai-platform-to-analyze-billions-of-investigative-records).
Upstream visa, overstay, and offshore biometric pipelines—though primarily noncitizen-facing—illustrate both HSI’s identity-fusion reach and its conversion bottlenecks. HSI’s **Counter Threat Lead Development Unit (CTLD)** (relaunched from the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit \[CTCEU\] on February 24, 2022, also managing Project Campus Sentinel outreach to university Designated School Officials) runs **LeadTrac**, querying 20 government and commercial systems on daily CBP overstay feeds [\[129\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). Yet **DHS OIG-26-38** (September 29, 2026\) revealed that out of **3,145,375** overstay leads in FY 2021–2024, CTLD rated 104,049 (3.31%) Priority 1–9 and 1,769 (0.056%) Priority 1, opened only 496 investigations across 21,885 viable leads (2.27%), and made just **8 lead-initiated arrests** (2 Priority 1 arrests; plus 446 arrests from prior-year leads or collateral cases)—down starkly from 1,808 CTCEU arrests in FY 2018—owing to September 2021 enforcement-priority limits, bad address records, and staffing shortages [\[76\]](http://docs.google.com/unknown_url). Offshore, HSI’s **Visa Security Program (VSP)** across 45 posts in 29 countries (using CBP’s ATS-P under **PATRIOT**, which auto-cleared 96.03% of 4.51 million FY 2019–2021 applications while suffering VSPTS note-truncation bugs per OIG-22-70, and generated 1,251 watchlist nominations/enhancements in FY 2018 per Senate testimony; FY 2014–2016 annual TIDE counts in GAO-18-314 Figure 3 are omitted from available excerpts)116 and **BITMAP** (deployed to 18 countries by 2020 and expanding to Chile, Colombia, and Peru’s prison system in 2025–2026; enrolling \>41,000 encounters and 31 KSTs in FY 2018\) feed DHS’s biometric repository (**IDENT**), FBI NGI, and DoD ABIS, with manual ICE analyst reviews mandated to purge U.S.-person encounters absent a legitimate law enforcement purpose [\[135\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). Meanwhile, DHS’s \$1 billion+ **Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART)** replacement for IDENT missed its original December 2018 deadline by nearly eight years; although GAO-26-108118 (June 2026\) listed a September 2026 IOC, October 2026 procurements—including an \$11.2 million Thales support award through September 2027—still classify IDENT as DHS’s current repository and HART as under development [\[139\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes).
### **Commercial Data Brokers, Technical Surveillance, and Covert Browsing Applied to U.S. Persons**
According to a July 2026 Brennan Center review of federal procurement records, DHS committed **more than \$2.9 billion** to surveillance, data collection, and analytics tools between January 20, 2021 and mid-2026—including over **\$1.1 billion** for biometrics, **\$228.6 million** for commercial data purchases, and **\$130.4 million** for phone-content access (itemized HSI-only shares of DHS-wide commercial broker totals are not isolated in public contract tables) [\[126\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). Because these commercial and technical layers collect data indiscriminately on U.S. persons—frequently without judicial warrants—they form the operational backbone of HSI’s domestic surveillance reach.
| Technology Layer | Key Systems / Vendors & Verified Spending | Domestic U.S.-Person Operational Mechanics | Documented Governance, Audit, or Legal Findings |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Commercial Data Brokers** | **LexisNexis / RELX** (\$53.7M DHS; Aug 2026 \$6.7M sole-source bridge for up to **11,200 ICE users**); **Thomson Reuters (TRSS)** (\$35.5M DHS; \$125M sole-source pulled Aug 2026 for competition); **Whooster** [\[126\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). | LexID links **82B+ public/proprietary records** across 10,000+ sources (addresses, SSNs, credit, vehicles, jail bookings) with Palantir API integration; records obtained by Just Futures Law show **HSI ran \~500,000 Accurint searches and \>132,000 reports** in Mar–Sept 2021 alone [\[142\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-expanded-lexisnexis-investigative-data-access-with-palantir-integration). | Agencies claim open-market purchases sit outside *Carpenter*; LexisNexis itself warns records may contain errors requiring independent verification [\[142\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-expanded-lexisnexis-investigative-data-access-with-palantir-integration). |
| **Commercial Location Telemetry (CTD)** | **Babel Street (Webloc)**, **Penlink** (*Tangles*; plus March 2026 no-bid PLX reported by *Prism*, real-time tracking disputed by Penlink), **Edge Ops (Project SAFEHAVEN, \$12.2M in 2026\)**; 9 ICE contracts across 2 CTD databases (FY19–20) [\[126\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). | Smartphone app SDK Advertising ID (AdID) historical/real-time geolocation; ICE executed **\>16,000 CTD queries** in FY 2020 (single-vendor log) and correlated masked AdIDs to named persons via secondary techniques [\[145\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf). | **DHS OIG-23-61 (Sept 2023):** ICE used CTD since Sept 2018 **without an approved PIA** (violating E-Gov Act / 6 U.S.C. § 142), lacked CTD-specific policies, exhibited DHS-wide shared-account/supervisory gaps, and **non-concurred** with halting use [\[144\]](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency). |
| **ALPRs & Vehicle / DMV Networks** | ICE-owned LPRs; **Thomson Reuters** (\$1.2M LPR proposal, Nov 2026); **Flock Safety** (via local police); **Nlets** (\~\$2M DHS since 2021\) [\[59\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf). | ICE submitted **\>292,000 Nlets queries** (driver’s licenses/plates) in the 12 months ending Oct 2025; municipal audits (e.g., Yakima PD) documented local Flock camera network sharing with HSI starting May 19, 2025 [\[148\]](https://forumtogether.org/article/the-expansion-of-ai-driven-biometric-systems-in-immigration-enforcement/). | Warrantless nationwide motorist tracking; \>300 municipalities severed Flock ties by 2026 per Institute for Justice; House lawmakers demanded ICE authority records by Nov 20, 2026 [\[150\]](https://signalcleveland.org/flock-vs-axon-what-changes-if-cleveland-switches-license-plate-readers/). |
| **Covert GPS & HSI National Tracking Program (NTP)** | **Ensurity Mobile Corp.** (\$135K sole-source Sept 2026; 311,250Sept2025for3254Gtrackers+100chipsets;\~300K in 2023); CovertTrack; GPS Intelligence [\[152\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program). | Proprietary GPS/cellular/satellite trackers connect directly to centralized **NTP TechOps General Support System** servers (alongside ICE’s Lorton, VA Title III cluster: 7 physical, 45 virtual servers) [\[152\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program). | PIA requires 30-day warrants and server-side warrant-expiration shutoffs, yet in *U.S. v. Ignjatov* (2018) a federal court struck down HSI’s policy allowing warrantless 48-hour border GPS tracking under *U.S. v. Jones* [\[152\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program). |
| **Cell-Site Simulators (CSS / Stingrays)** | Operated by HSI Technical Enforcement Officers (TEOs) under DHS Policy Directive 047-02 (Oct 2015\) and DHS/ICE/PIA-061 (Jan 2022\) [\[123\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). | Locates/identifies target mobile devices via non-content identifiers; requires Rule 41 warrant \+ 18 U.S.C. § 3121 pen-register order (48-hr emergency filing under § 3125\) and immediate post-mission deletion of non-target data [\[123\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). | **DHS OIG-23-17 (Feb 2023):** HSI operated CSS without an approved PIA until Jan 2022 and **failed to apply for 48-hour emergency pen-register orders** during partner deployments; 047-02 also adds an ungrounded "exceptional circumstances" warrant exception [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). |
| **Facial Recognition & Mobile Biometrics** | **Clearview AI** (\$9.2M HSI contract Sept 9, 2025, 50B+ images; Feb 2026 CBP SOW cites 60B+ images); **NEC Mobile Fortify** (\$42.4M); **BI2 Technologies** (\$29.7M iris; \$25M May 2026\) [\[15\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). | Field facial/iris matching integrated into ICM intelligence files; Mobile Fortify captures on **any individual (including U.S. citizens)** generate CBP ATS encounter records **retained for 15 years even on non-matches** [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). | DHS rescinded/took down its 2023 Facial Recognition Directive and 2016 mobile privacy policy; Clearview returned false matches (including unrelated family photos) in *U.S. v. Sant* protest filings [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). |
| **Spyware, Device Extraction & Wiretaps** | **Paragon** spyware (≥\$2M, 2024); **Cellebrite** (\$60M); **Magnet Forensics** (\$19.1M); **Grayshift** (\>\$1M); **JSI Telecom** wiretaps (\$24.2M DHS / \$7M ICE) [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). | Full extraction of messages, contacts, photos, app histories; Paragon enables remote undetected device compromise (cited for TCOs but technically unrestricted); JSI Telecom powers Title III intercepts [\[126\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). | ICE redacted nearly its entire Paragon contract in June 2026 FOIA litigation (*404 Media*); forensic tools widely deployed via warrantless border-device seizures [\[126\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). |
| **Covert Browsing & Social Media AI** | **Authentic8 SILO** (since 2020; \$31,773 Aug 2021 order); **Chameleon** (leaked ICE inventory, July 2026); **Hootsuite Wisdom / Talkwalker** (Oct 2026\) [\[18\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity). | Managed-attribution browsers mask government signatures inside social platforms, dark web forums, and Signal groups; Hootsuite Wisdom spans 30+ networks & \~150M sites in 187 languages with visual scene/logo AI [\[18\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity). | Contracting pathways frequently obscured behind resellers; ICE’s Nov 2024 social-media PIA **explicitly exempts undercover operations** from First Amendment retention bans [\[18\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity). |
### **Border Electronic-Device Searches as a Domestic Investigative Vector**
For U.S. citizens crossing international borders, HSI’s border-search authority operates as a potent warrantless bypass of domestic Fourth Amendment rules. Under **ICE Directive 7-6.1** (August 2009), as modified by **May 11, 2018 ICE Supplemental Guidance**, HSI agents may conduct a **basic manual search** of any traveler’s phone or laptop without a warrant or individualized suspicion, and an **advanced forensic search** (using Cellebrite or Magnet extraction hardware) upon reasonable suspicion—detaining devices for up to 30 days without supervisory approval, extendable as warranted [\[158\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_cbp_laptop.pdf). Unlike domestic searches incident to arrest under *Riley v. California* (2014), federal prosecutors can coordinate with CBP and HSI to interdict targets at ports of entry. In a summer 2025 encounter documented by Holland & Knight (October 2026), federal prosecutors instructed CBP and HSI to seize an arriving international executive’s two laptops and cell phone despite discussing the prior day that they lacked reasonable suspicion; agents shipped the devices **800 miles** to an HSI lab, forensically imaged **more than one terabyte** of data (including attorney-client communications), and searched the mirror for six months without judicial authorization [\[155\]](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/does-privacy-exist-at-the-us-border).
Federal appellate precedent remains sharply split, making U.S. citizens’ digital privacy dependent on their port of arrival. The **Ninth Circuit** (*United States v. Cano*, 934 F.3d 1002 (2019)) permits suspicionless manual searches and reasonable-suspicion forensic searches, but restricts border searches strictly to **digital contraband** rather than general criminal evidence [\[162\]](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-133/united-states-v-cano/). The **Fourth Circuit** (*United States v. Kolsuz*, 890 F.3d 133 (2018)) requires individualized suspicion for forensic searches [\[164\]](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-135/alasaad-v-mayorkas/). The **First Circuit** (*Alasaad v. Mayorkas*, 988 F.3d 8 (2021)) and **Fifth Circuit** (*Castillo* / *Malik*) reject warrants and contraband-only limits, while the **Eleventh Circuit** holds that neither a warrant nor reasonable suspicion is required even for a forensic border search [\[159\]](https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/immigration-allowed-to-copy-immigration-attorneys-cell-phone.pdf). Most recently, on **September 17, 2026**, the **Second Circuit** in *United States v. Alisigwe* (an HSI/CBP JFK Airport case involving an LPR) overturned earlier New York federal district court warrant rulings (*United States v. Smith*, S.D.N.Y. 2023; *United States v. Sultanov*, E.D.N.Y. 2024\) and held that **no suspicion whatsoever** is required for manual cellphone border searches—even when driven by a domestic criminal investigative motive—while leaving forensic searches and Fifth Amendment passcode compulsion unresolved [\[167\]](https://whitecollarwatch.sidley.com/2026/09/24/no-suspicion-required-second-circuit-permits-warrantless-manual-cellphone-searches-at-the-border/). Judge Eunice Lee concurred on warrantlessness but warned that the majority’s rule allows suspicionless searches "for any reason, including political or discriminatory ones" [\[171\]](https://pacificlegal.org/reason-are-warrantless-phone-searches-at-the-border-constitutional-the-supreme-court-may-soon-decide/). On **September 29, 2026**, the Supreme Court requested the government’s response to the certiorari petition in *Anibowei v. Blanche*—brought by a naturalized U.S.-citizen Texas immigration lawyer whose phone was searched five times without a warrant and copied wholesale—putting the border-search circuit split squarely before the Court during October Term 2026 [\[172\]](https://www.abramslaw.com/media/thought-leadership/border-phone-searches-holiday-travel).
## **4\. Evaluating HSI Domestic Operations Against the ODIN Analytical Framework**
Evaluating HSI’s domestic architecture through the **Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize (ODIN)** framework clarifies how its disparate task forces, databases, and covert units align functionally—while keeping its military origin strictly distinct from domestic legal limits. **Task Force ODIN** was established by the U.S. Army in August 2006 at Fort Hood, Texas, deployed to Iraq in 2007 and Afghanistan from 2009 until March 26, 2017 (when it transferred authority to the 525th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade / Task Force Lightning) [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). (Task Force ODIN is entirely unrelated to IARPA’s separate *Odin* biometric research program targeting presentation-attack/spoofing detection [\[180\]](https://www.iarpa.gov/research-programs/odin).) Task Force ODIN’s doctrinal breakthrough was operating **"left of the boom"**: as Army PEO IEW\&S chief engineer Richard Wittstruck stated, *"the device itself is not the threat... if we don’t also address the threat, then they just come up with a different tool"* [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). Fusing manned and unmanned persistent aerial ISR, ground intelligence, biometrics, captured-material exploitation labs, and sensor-to-shooter links, ODIN shifted from defusing individual bombs to mapping and dismantling entire human supply chains—financiers, launderers, planners, and facilitators [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds).
HSI does not field a literal military Task Force ODIN inside the United States, and constitutional law bars battlefield targeting of U.S. persons. Yet HSI’s formal performance doctrine—**"disrupt and dismantle" entire networks** by combining persistent intelligence fusion with early collateral enforcement—and the **December 4, 2025 NSPM-7 implementing directive** instructing JTTFs to *"map the full network of culpable actors"* and *"disrupt and dismantle entire networks"* mirror ODIN’s four-stage operational sequence closely [\[62\]](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20260211/118951/HHRG-119-JU00-20260211-SD032.pdf).
| ODIN Stage | Military Doctrinal Logic (Task Force ODIN) | HSI Domestic U.S.-Person Equivalents (Verified Mechanisms) | Empirical Bottlenecks & Operational Friction | Constitutional & Statutory Boundaries |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Observe** | Persistent wide-area manned/unmanned ISR capturing pattern-of-life baselines [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | Commercial data brokers (LexisNexis 82B records), AdID telemetry (\>16K FY20 queries), ALPRs (Flock/Nlets 292K queries), NTP covert GPS, pole cameras, drones, SILO/Chameleon covert browsing, Hootsuite Wisdom AI [\[18\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity). | Fragmented compliance and vendor lock-in (OIG-23-61 CTD without PIA; OIG-23-17 CSS 48-hr lapses; \>300 municipal Flock cancellations; RAVEn failure) [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). | Fourth Amendment (*Carpenter*, *Jones*, *Chatrie* geofence ruling, unresolved data-broker loophole); Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) First Amendment bar [\[152\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program). |
| **Detect** | Surfacing subtle behavioral anomalies to isolate threat networks prior to attack [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | TSDS/WLS automated matching across NCIC/ATS/TECS/Secure Flight; FinCEN SARs & DARTTS trade-discrepancy queries; CTLD LeadTrac vetting; Aug 2026 10 TB Azure GenAI RFI over CALEA/forensic data [\[26\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-ai-platform-to-analyze-billions-of-investigative-records). | Acute signal-to-noise and reporting attrition: DARTTS lacked automation over 1.9B rows; 3.14M overstay leads produced 8 lead-initiated arrests; \~50% nonfederal NCIC non-reporting; LLM hallucination/automation bias risk [\[3\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). | TSDS reasonable-suspicion standard (diluted by Watchlist Exceptions); DHS I\&A IA-1000 First Amendment limits; HSI lacks binding public predication tiers [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). |
| **Identify** | Biometrics, material exploitation labs, and link analysis tying anonymous actors to named networks [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | Clearview AI (50–60B+ images), Mobile Fortify (15-yr ATS retention), IDENT/HART, Palantir ICM / Enterprise Lakehouse entity resolution, TEO cell-site simulators, border Cellebrite/Magnet extractions, CUC/CI infiltration [\[15\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). | Biometric false positives (unrelated family photos in *Sant* Clearview report); HART 8-yr delay; JTTF passport/Secure Flight silos (OIG-20-59); 38% legacy TSDB error rate [\[14\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). | *Riley* vs. border-search split (*Alisigwe*/*Anibowei*); Fifth Amendment passcode compulsion; Rule 41 CSS warrant mandate; sensitive-circumstance undercover rules [\[123\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). |
| **Neutralize** | Kinetic strikes or capture targeting financiers, planners, and logistics nodes "left of boom" [\[176\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | Multi-statute felony prosecution (18 U.S.C. § 2339B, RICO, export/sanctions, NVE), JTTF collateral disruptions, crypto/asset forfeiture & covert site takeovers (alqassam.net), TECS lookouts, Trusted Traveler revocations [\[12\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). | FY 2025 immigration diversion cut complex fentanyl hours \>30%; DEA-HSI Title 21 deconfliction clashes (GAO-26-107414); OIG-26-23 informant/evidence fund disbursement delays [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). | Entrapment (*Jacobson*), *Massiah* Sixth Amendment bar, *Brady*/*Giglio*/*Roviaro*, 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 & 1512, Fifth Amendment Due Process (*Latif*, *Fikre*) [\[27\]](https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/law-reviews/ilr/pdf/vol59p355.pdf). |
Applying ODIN to domestic policing highlights a fundamental constitutional paradox. In counterinsurgency warfare, moving "left of the boom" is doctrinally sound because association, logistics, and pattern-of-life anomalies justify military targeting. Inside the United States, however, pushing investigative collection "left of the boom" moves law enforcement out of predicated criminal investigation and into anticipatory surveillance of political association, protest planning, and nonprofit funding—the exact friction point exposed in 2025–2026 by **Operation Puppet Master**, **Project Whipple Shield**, **NSPM-7’s five-year retrospective probes**, and **Trusted Traveler revocations** [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance).
## **5\. Domestic HUMINT, Confidential Informants, and Undercover Disruption**
### **HSI Undercover (CUC) and Confidential Informant (CI) Governing Architecture**
Human intelligence—conducted by badged undercover agents or recruited civilian informants—represents HSI’s most invasive domestic investigative method. Unlike the FBI’s published Attorney General Undercover Guidelines, HSI’s undercover and informant rules reside in non-public, law-enforcement-sensitive manuals disclosed piecemeal through FOIA litigation, leaks, and federal audits.
Under **19 U.S.C. § 2081** and **8 U.S.C. § 1363a**, HSI may secure written certification—non-delegable below the Director of the Office of Investigations (HSI’s predecessor title in the manual)—exempting a **Certified Undercover Operation (CUC)** from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) whenever "reasonable and necessary" for operational security and covertness [\[187\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). As documented in the leaked 227-page *ICE Undercover Operations Handbook* (OI HB 08-04) and August 2026 court filings involving **CUC Op Keyhole**, a CUC serves as a certified administrative umbrella under which multiple investigations can be placed to fund leased civilian sedans, dedicated covert phones, stripped computers, backstopped email and internet accounts, proprietary commercial front businesses, undercover bank accounts, and operational "proceeds" retained as no-year funds [\[106\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens). Reporting by Unicorn Riot on the full leaked handbook notes that Chapter 9 covers fake federal, state, foreign, and private identification and backstopped financial histories, that operational proceeds are generally kept below \$500,000 where possible, and that Chapter 11 details ICE’s employment of **undercover contract psychologists** to manage psychological trauma among operatives and informants to keep them deployed [\[192\]](https://unicornriot.ninja/2018/icebreaker-pt-5-confidential-homeland-security-undercover-operations-handbook/). ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducts biennial financial audits of CUCs [\[106\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens). Illustrating the sensitivity of this cadre, reporting by WIRED, BBC, and Nextgov summarized from the October 28, 2026 DDoSecrets "Icepick" leak of 41,191 DHS personnel records (containing an estimated 6,600 to 10,000 ICE records) identified **39 HSI employees** assigned to internal permission groups referencing certified undercover operations [\[194\]](https://guptadeepak.com/dhs-icepick-leak-okta-identity-lessons/).
Approval authority escalates sharply with duration and risk. Short-term undercover projects without sensitive circumstances may be approved by Group Supervisors or SACs, whereas operations exceeding six months require Director-level approval, and any operation implicating **DHS or ICE Sensitive Circumstances** requires review by the **ICE and DHS Undercover Review Committees (URCs)** (with DOJ and DEA Title 21 non-concurrence mechanisms) [\[187\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). Excerpts from the Handbook and predecessor INS undercover guidelines confirm that **Sensitive Circumstances** include investigations involving **religious organizations, political organizations, news media**, or government officials; operations lasting over one year; proprietary businesses dealing with the general public; extraterritorial operations; uncontrolled transfers of weapons, munitions, or CBRN materials; undercover off-site locations or bank accounts; and any § 2081/§ 1363a exemption [\[187\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). Both the Handbook and FOIA-released HSI Academy training materials strictly prohibit undercover operatives from participating in acts of violence (except self-defense), initiating or instigating plans for violent crime, or using unlawful investigative techniques—wiretapping, breaking and entering, mail opening, and trespass remain barred absent local U.S. Attorney’s Office approval [\[106\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens). Authorized *malum prohibitum* **Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA)** requires prior approval, while **Section 3.4** restricts inducing criminal activity unless approved by the SAC and federal prosecutors—though reporting on the leaked handbook by *The Independent* and Unicorn Riot highlights that waivers permit inducement based on a relatively low threshold ("a reasonable expectation that offering the inducement will produce evidence of other illegal activities") [\[106\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens).
HSI’s **Confidential Informant (CI)** regime is governed by the *HSI Informants Handbook*, the February 2017 *HSI Confidential Informants Student Guide*, and Privacy Act System of Records Notice **DHS/ICE-010 (COSI)** [\[89\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). HSI classifies human sources as Cooperating Defendants (CDs), Confidential Informants (CIs), or Sources of Information (SOIs); while cross-designated TFOs may act as *alternate* control agents, **only an HSI Special Agent** may document and control a CI [\[89\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). A Group Supervisor and Special Agent must conduct in-person initial and annual suitability evaluations recorded on **ICE Form 73-045** (retained five years), accompanied by witnessed, initialed **Appendix D Instructions** stipulating that the CI is neither an ICE employee nor a law enforcement officer, may not violate any laws or possess contraband, acts voluntarily, and holds **no authority to carry a firearm or weapon** even if permitted under state law [\[89\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). IRS-taxable payments are documented on **ICE Form 73-049** (witnessed by two agents, recording moiety offsets), and formal identity disclosure requires **Executive Associate Director (EAD) HSI approval** [\[89\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). Critically, **GAO-15-807** audited ICE’s informant controls against the Attorney General’s Guidelines and identified concrete gaps: ICE’s written policies were only *partially consistent* with requiring advance written OIA authorization (capped at 90 days) and documented risk-benefit findings, failed to require signed CI acknowledgments of OIA boundaries—impairing ICE’s ability to prosecute informants who commit unauthorized crimes—and lacked complete procedures for suspending or revoking OIA authority [\[200\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-807.pdf). In addition, **DHS OIG-26-23** (August 2026\) noted that delays in disbursing HSI funds to pay informants and buy evidence caused investigative leads to expire before operations could proceed [\[21\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf).
### **Comparative Case Analysis: Lawful Infiltration Versus Manipulative Overreach**
Five documented historical and contemporary case baselines demarcate lawful covert disruption from manipulative or unconstitutional overreach.
The **Pittsburgh JTTF/HSI bombing case (*United States v. Mustafa Mousab Alowemer*, W.D. Pa., 2019–2022)** illustrates proactive JTTF undercover methodology grounded in independent overt acts. Investigated by the Pittsburgh JTTF—including FBI, HSI, USCIS, Secret Service, IRS-CI, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and state/local police—the case targeted a Syrian national admitted as a refugee in August 2016 (not a U.S. citizen) who initially contacted an online ISIS supporter later convicted in Wisconsin [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). After Alowemer transmitted explosives manuals in May 2019 to an FBI employee posing as a fellow ISIS supporter, an **FBI Undercover Employee (UCE)** and **Confidential Human Source (CHS)** met him in person four times [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). Before his June 19, 2019 arrest, Alowemer independently purchased nails and acetone, delivered Google satellite maps of a Pittsburgh church marked with approach and escape routes, and handed over a 10-point handwritten plan for a July 2019 backpack bombing, leading to a September 2021 guilty plea and a 208-month sentence [\[96\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support).
By contrast, ***United States v. Eric McDavid*** **(E.D. Cal., 2004–2015)** demonstrates how emotional manipulation paired with discovery suppression corrupts undercover prosecutions. Paid FBI informant **"Anna" (Zoe Elizabeth Voss)** infiltrated eco-anarchist activists starting in 2004 (reportedly earning over \$65,000), cultivating McDavid’s romantic infatuation while supplying bomb-making instructions, cash, transportation, and an FBI-wired cabin in Dutch Flat, California [\[202\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid). Convicted in 2007 and sentenced to 20 years after jurors had deadlocked 7–5 on entrapment before returning a guilty verdict, McDavid later used FOIA requests to unearth **2,449 pages (\~2,500 pages)** withheld by the FBI (with another 868 withheld as exempt) [\[202\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid). As detailed in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas motion and *Guardian* reporting, the suppressed files exposed three severe *Brady*/*Giglio* failures: an internal FBI request for Anna to take a **polygraph** that her handler waived without administering; **51 informant reports** transmitted from FBI Miami to Sacramento (16 mentioning McDavid, of which only 5 were produced in discovery); and **10 emails plus a handwritten letter** between McDavid and Anna sent to the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit [\[203\]](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/fbi-informant-anna-eric-mcdavid-eco-terrorism). On January 8, 2015, Chief Judge Morrison C. England Jr. accepted a final settlement vacating McDavid’s 2008 conviction and releasing him after nearly nine years in custody on a plea to general conspiracy [\[202\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid).
**Operation Backfire (FBI, 2005–2018)** illustrates a third model: overt investigative pressure and strategic informant flipping without a sting plot. Targeting "The Family," a \~20-member Earth Liberation Front / Animal Liberation Front arson cell responsible for 25 to more than 40 criminal acts and \$45 million to \$48 million in damages between 1995 and 2001 (including the \$26 million 1998 Vail ski resort arson), federal agents overcame years of sparse physical evidence through sustained **grand jury pressure** (including repeated subpoenas and house raids on publicists and associates; fugitive Joseph Dibee fled the U.S. immediately after receiving a grand jury subpoena in early 2006\) [\[206\]](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain). According to retrospective investigative reporting, after linking cell member **Jacob Ferguson** through a coincidental truck-theft lead, investigators subjected him to conspicuous tailing and subpoenaed his friends to intensify paranoia before confronting him in the U.S. Attorney’s Office—leveraging his fear of separation from his young son alongside **immunity and \$50,000** [\[207\]](https://ourchangingclimate.buzzsprout.com/2611340/episodes/19298190-how-environmentalists-became-the-fbi-s-1-threat-elf-part-2). Wearing a wire to record former conspirators, Ferguson dismantled the network, producing 17 federal indictments and 15 convictions carrying sentences from 37 to 188 months [\[206\]](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain).
The historical baseline for unlawful domestic covert disruption remains the FBI’s **COINTELPRO** era (1956–1971), investigated in Book III of the **1976 Senate Church Committee Final Report**. DOJ OIG historical reviews citing the Church Committee document **more than 2,000 COINTELPRO operations** launched by Director J. Edgar Hoover to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" domestic civil-rights, anti-war, and political organizations specifically because Supreme Court rulings restrained overt criminal prosecution [\[211\]](https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1976Churchcommittee.pdf). Beyond surveillance, COINTELPRO weaponized psychological warfare: anonymous letters targeting dissidents’ employers and spouses (including an FBI-sourced blackmail tape and letter sent to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.), forged publications, pretextual legal harassment, and **"snitch-jacketing" / "bad-jacketing"**—deliberately fabricating suspicions that genuine activists were police informants to fracture organizations and provoke internal violence, in some instances with lethal outcomes [\[211\]](https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1976Churchcommittee.pdf). Those abuses spurred the 1976 Levi Guidelines, which reduced pending FBI domestic security investigations from 4,868 in 1976 to only a few dozen by 1982 [\[217\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Domestic_Intelligence_Powers_Risks.pdf).
Contemporary HSI covert filings show how modern umbrella CUCs risk re-entering that contested borderland. August 2026 defense discovery motions in ***United States v. Isaac Sant*** (one of 15 defendants charged in Minnesota with conspiring to impede federal immigration officers during *Operation Metro Surge*) revealed that HSI placed **Operation Puppet Master** (opened January 28, 2026\) and **Project Whipple Shield** (opened February 2026\) under the broader **CUC Op Keyhole** umbrella [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). According to court records reviewed by *Biometric Update*, undercover HSI personnel infiltrated community gatherings at churches (Prince of Peace Lutheran in Minnesota; Zion Lutheran in Ann Arbor, Michigan), labor unions (SEIU, CWA), schools, parks, and Signal chats (under the handle "peanutbutterjelly"), logging attendee license plates to generate intelligence dossiers and probing union and PAC wire transfers [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). At a peaceful Sunrise Movement meeting, an undercover HSI agent allegedly offered his construction skills to build items for more aggressive direct action while boasting jail did not bother him—an offer the participant declined [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). Defense counsel have demanded full disclosure of Keyhole’s authorization scope and at least five withheld *Project Whipple Shield* ROIs to test whether HSI violated sensitive-circumstance URC safeguards governing political and religious organizations [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance).
### **Psychological Triangulation Tactics Versus Hard Legal Boundaries**
Federal criminal doctrine permits far more psychological deception during undercover investigations than lay observers expect, while reserving hard felony and suppression remedies for four specific red lines. Under ***Illinois v. Perkins***, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), *Miranda* warnings do not apply to undercover agents or informants because strategic deception exploits misplaced trust rather than the police-dominated coercion of overt custodial interrogation—even inside a jail cellblock [\[218\]](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/496/292/). Pre-indictment consensual recording (requiring one-party consent, written AUSA concurrence, and SAC ELSUR approval for up to 90 days under HSI PIA-061), cover personas, and overt grand-jury pressure to flip co-conspirators (as in *Operation Backfire*) are routinely upheld [\[123\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf).
Meanwhile, **entrapment** and **outrageous government conduct** offer remarkably thin protection in terrorism-related stings. Under *Sorrells v. United States* (1932), *Sherman v. United States* (1958), *United States v. Russell* (1973), and *Jacobson v. United States*, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), federal courts enforce a **subjective test**: once inducement is shown, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was **predisposed prior to first government contact** [\[188\]](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/540/). Yet empirical legal scholarship documents that **no post-9/11 federal terrorism defendant has won acquittal via entrapment or Fifth Amendment outrageous-government-conduct defenses** [\[222\]](https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7566&context=jclc&ref=compactmag.com). In *United States v. Cromitie* (2d Cir. 2013), even though the district judge declared at sentencing that *"there would have been no crime here except the government instigated it, planned it, and brought it to fruition"* after an informant offered an impoverished defendant \$250,000, luxury cars, and fake explosives, the Second Circuit affirmed 2–1 over Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs’ dissent [\[222\]](https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7566&context=jclc&ref=compactmag.com).
Against that permissive backdrop, four hard legal boundaries constrain covert triangulation, psychological manipulation, and informant misconduct. First, under the **Sixth Amendment (*Massiah v. United States*, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); *United States v. Henry*, 447 U.S. 264 (1980))**, once formal criminal charges attach for an offense, neither undercover officers nor government-directed informants may **deliberately elicit** incriminating statements about the charged offense outside defense counsel’s presence, whether the defendant is incarcerated or on bail—leaving only strictly passive listening admissible under *Kuhlmann v. Wilson* (1986) [\[225\]](https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/One%20Minute%20Brief%202025-08%20Sixth%20Amendment.pdf). Second, **disclosure doctrines (*Roviaro v. United States*, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); *Brady v. Maryland*; *Giglio v. United States*; Fed. R. Crim. P. 16\)** override the qualified informer’s privilege whenever an informant was an active participant whose identity or impeachment file is material to the defense, mandating disclosure of payment receipts (Form 73-049), immigration benefits, waived polygraphs, and emotional manipulation records [\[89\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). Third, **federal witness-tampering law (18 U.S.C. § 1512\)** prescribes up to 20 years’ imprisonment (30 years for physical force; life or death for killing) for knowingly using intimidation, threats, misleading conduct, or **"corrupt persuasion"** to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or evidence in an official proceeding (§ 1512(b)(1)–(2)) or obstruct reporting of a federal offense to federal law enforcement (§ 1512(b)(3)), alongside up to three years for intentional harassment (§ 1512(d)) [\[230\]](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s1512/). In *Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States*, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), the Supreme Court held that "knowingly... corruptly persuades" requires **consciousness of wrongdoing** tied to a contemplated official proceeding [\[232\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/544/696.html); in *Fowler v. United States*, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), the Court required a **"reasonable likelihood"** (more than remote, outlandish, or hypothetical) that impeded communications would reach a federal officer [\[235\]](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/563/668/); and § 1512(e)’s narrow affirmative defense shields only *solely* lawful conduct with the *sole* intent to induce truthful testimony [\[233\]](https://www.federallawyers.com/federal-witness-tampering-defense/). While typically prosecuted against defendants threatening informants, § 1512 establishes an absolute felony ceiling barring agents or informants from using deceptive triangulation, intimidation, or corrupt pressure to coach perjury, deter defense witnesses, or suppress exculpatory evidence. Fourth, **18 U.S.C. § 242** criminalizes willful deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law—carrying up to one year imprisonment, escalating to **10 years** for bodily injury, weapons, or explosives, and **life imprisonment or death** if death results (directly implicating lethal COINTELPRO-style bad-jacketing) [\[191\]](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s242/).
## **6\. Constitutional, Statutory, and Redress Safeguards—and the 2025–2026 Oversight Crisis**
### **First Amendment and Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)**
The primary federal statutory shield against domestic political intelligence files is **5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7)** of the Privacy Act of 1974, which prohibits federal agencies from maintaining—defined in § 552a(a)(3) to encompass collecting, maintaining, using, or disseminating—*"any record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity"* [\[185\]](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/600/637627/). Appellate circuits diverge on the breadth of that law-enforcement exception: the Sixth and D.C. Circuits (*Jabara v. Webster*; *Nagel*) allow retention when relevant to an authorized criminal, intelligence, or administrative inquiry, whereas the Ninth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits (*MacPherson v. IRS*; *Becker v. IRS*; *Clarkson v. IRS*) require a concrete tie to investigating past, present, or anticipated violations of statutes the agency enforces, warning that even incidental political files chill First Amendment expression [\[185\]](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/600/637627/). In practice, however, § 552a(e)(7) does not generally mandate criminal evidence suppression and cannot force disclosure of classified sources and methods [\[240\]](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/822/984/2002572/).
In 2026, two major federal lawsuits directly challenge DHS and HSI domestic protest records under § 552a(e)(7) and the First Amendment. In ***EPIC v. Mullin*** (No. 3:26-cv-04232, S.D. Cal., filed July 24, 2026), EPIC and three U.S.-citizen legal observers (Nicole Cleland, Jacquelyn Ivey, and Anna Walker) sued DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin, ICE, and CBP over an alleged secret **"Protester Surveillance Policy"**—citing an internal DHS directive ordering agents to *"capture all images, license plates, identifications, and general information on hotels, agitators, protestors, etc., so we can capture it all in one consolidated form"* via drones, body cameras, and Mobile Fortify into ATS—and alleging retaliatory revocation of plaintiffs’ Global Entry and TSA PreCheck Trusted Traveler status without any law enforcement violation [\[108\]](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-07-24-1-Complaint.pdf). Separately, unsealed September 2026 filings in Maine’s ***Hilton*** observer litigation confirmed that HSI Agent "J.C." photographed peaceful observers during January 2026’s "Operation Catch of the Day," ran facial-recognition queries, and entered eight U.S. persons into Palantir ICM—triggering enhanced Canadian-border screening in March 2026 for plaintiff Carlyn Williams and her spouse Polyxenia Pantos via ICM’s automated TECS lookout feed [\[60\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-observer-lawsuit-shows-how-palantir-records-can-feed-border-screening-analytics). Compounding these vulnerabilities, ICE’s November 2024 social-media PIA explicitly exempts undercover operations from its ban on retaining protected speech, and ICE’s public ICM privacy notices do not clarify whether expunging an erroneous subject record deletes "derived analytical data" generated inside Palantir’s lakehouse or replicated into CBP TECS [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance).
### **The Fourth Amendment After *Chatrie v. United States* (June 2026\)**
On **June 29, 2026**, the U.S. Supreme Court reshaped digital Fourth Amendment law in ***Chatrie v. United States***, 609 U.S. \_\_\_ (No. 25-112; 146 S. Ct. 2205), holding by a **6–3 judgment** (5–1–3 alignment: Justice Kagan writing for Roberts, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson; Justice Gorsuch concurring on a property/"effects" rationale; Justice Jackson concurring joined by Sotomayor that the search violated the Fourth Amendment; Justice Alito dissenting joined in part by Thomas and Barrett; Justice Barrett dissenting separately) that police conduct a **Fourth Amendment search** when acquiring historical Google Location History via a geofence warrant [\[184\]](https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2026/jul/1/surveillance-for-sale-the-data-broker-loophole-and-the-fourth-amendment-after-chatrie/). Extending *Carpenter v. United States* (2018), the Court foreclosed two government arguments routinely deployed in domestic surveillance litigation. First, it refused to create a brief-duration **"grace period,"** holding that obtaining even two hours of precision Location History (logged every two minutes) from an all-encompassing database constitutes a search capable of exposing sensitive visits to medical clinics, rallies, or houses of worship [\[144\]](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency). Second, it narrowed the third-party doctrine in the cloud, concluding that Location History is not "voluntarily shared" like bank slips in *Miller* or dialed numbers in *Smith*, but resembles emails, documents, photographs, and calendars that a user reasonably treats as "his own" (or, in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, constitutionally protected "effects") [\[186\]](https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20260702-the-fourth-amendment-moves-to-the-cloud). The Court vacated and remanded to the Fourth Circuit on probable cause and particularity, leaving unresolved whether geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional general warrants as the Fifth Circuit ruled in *United States v. Smith*, 110 F.4th 817 (2024) [\[184\]](https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2026/jul/1/surveillance-for-sale-the-data-broker-loophole-and-the-fourth-amendment-after-chatrie/).
Crucially for HSI’s commercial data stack, **neither *Carpenter* nor *Chatrie* resolved the "data-broker loophole"** [\[184\]](https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2026/jul/1/surveillance-for-sale-the-data-broker-loophole-and-the-fourth-amendment-after-chatrie/). Federal law enforcement agencies maintain that *Carpenter* and *Chatrie* regulate only *compelled* legal process served on carriers or tech platforms, leaving agencies free to purchase equivalent location telemetry, browsing logs, and personal dossiers on the commercial market without a warrant [\[144\]](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency). In March 2026 Senate Intelligence Committee testimony, FBI Director Kash Patel confirmed the FBI purchases commercially available information for law enforcement operations, while ICE’s refusal to halt CTD queries after OIG-23-61 and its January 2026 commercial-data RFI signal ongoing DHS acquisition [\[144\]](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency). This law enforcement opacity contrasts sharply with ODNI’s **September 2026 Commercially Available Information Report**, which disclosed that seven Intelligence Community elements purchased or accessed **23 "sensitive" datasets** (3.8% of 2025 IC commercial-data spending), with all **6 U.S.-focused datasets** confined to consent-based workforce counterespionage clearance vetting under mandatory risk reviews and U.S.-person masking protocols [\[144\]](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency). Congressional closure of the loophole remains stalled: the *Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act* passed the House in April 2024 but was not taken up in the Senate, and was folded into Title II (alongside Title VI curbs on real-time metadata, compelled broker demands, and state-to-federal record laundering) of the pending **Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026** [\[248\]](https://epic.org/epic-statement-on-house-passage-of-fourth-amendment-is-not-for-sale-act/).
### **FBI Attorney General Guidelines Versus HSI’s Domestic Charter Deficit**
A decisive structural gap separates FBI domestic intelligence and criminal work from HSI’s domestic operations: whereas both the FBI and DHS I\&A operate under Attorney General-approved public guidelines establishing predication tiers and First Amendment walls, **HSI operates without a statutory domestic investigative charter or binding public equivalent** [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download).
| Governance Dimension | FBI (AGG-DOM & DIOG) | DHS I\&A (2017 AG-Approved IA-1000 Guidelines) | ICE HSI (Internal Handbooks & Directives) |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Governing Authority & Transparency** | Publicly released *Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations* (rooted in 1976 Levi Guidelines) \+ DIOG [\[217\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Domestic_Intelligence_Powers_Risks.pdf). | Statutory mandate (9/11 Act § 531), EO 12333, Privacy Act, and AG-approved Intelligence Oversight Guidelines [\[52\]](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/09.10.26_Final-Report_National-Security-Improvements-and-the-Domestic-Threat-Landscape-25-Years-After-91101.pdf). | **No statutory domestic investigative charter** and **no public AG-equivalent guidelines**; internal handbooks are non-public/FOIA-redacted and explicitly disclaim creating enforceable rights [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). |
| **Predication & Duration Tiers** | Three formal tiers: **Assessments** (no factual predication, limited methods); **Preliminary Investigations** (allegation/info, 6-mo cap \+ 6-mo ext., 90-day review); **Full/Enterprise Investigations** (articulable factual basis, 90-day review) [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). | Requires valid national or departmental mission; open-source collection during First Amendment protests requires **extraordinary circumstances** (reasonable belief of violent/terrorist threat) [\[107\]](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/I&A%20and%20OGC%20Portland%20Reports.pdf). | No uniform public predication ladder or mandatory case time limits across 400+ statutes; administrative subpoenas issued internally without probable cause or judicial review [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). |
| **First Amendment & Sensitive Targets** | Prohibits activity based *solely* on First Amendment exercise or protected class; **Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM)** (political/religious groups, media, officials) require CDC review, SAC approval, and HQ/USAO/DOJ notice within 15–30 days [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). | Explicitly barred from affecting U.S. political processes, solely monitoring First Amendment activity, retaliating against whistleblowers, or suppressing dissent [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). | General DHS policy bars sole-First-Amendment targeting, but undercover rules remain non-public, 2024 social-media PIA **exempts undercover ops**, and 2026 litigation (*Sant*, *Hilton*, *EPIC v. Mullin*) challenges protest collection [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance). |
| **Least-Intrusive Means & Commingling** | Mandatory **least intrusive means** rule across DIOG; hard statutory wall barring FISA and NSLs in domestic terrorism cases [\[61\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). | OGC Intelligence Law Division review required (though bypassed during 2020 Portland OBR production, prompting recall of three OSIRs) [\[107\]](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/I&A%20and%20OGC%20Portland%20Reports.pdf). | No binding least-intrusive-means mandate; **routine commingling with ERO** extends HSI surveillance tools and commercial data platforms (e.g., 11,200-user LexisNexis bridge) into civil enforcement [\[11\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). |
### **Watchlist Redress: DHS TRIP Asymmetry, *Ibrahim*, and *Fikre***
Administrative and judicial redress for watchlisting errors remains sharply divided between the No Fly List and all lower watchlist subsets. ***Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security*** (9th Cir. 2008; 2019 *en banc*) exposed the bureaucratic inertia of watchlist propagation: FBI Special Agent Kevin Kelley misread a nomination-form checkbox, inadvertently placing Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim—a Stanford F-1 doctoral scholar who had resided in the U.S. for 13 years—onto the No Fly List and IBIS via TSDB [\[257\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-circuit/1973923.html). After she was handcuffed at San Francisco International Airport in January 2005 and had her F-1 visa revoked under INA § 212(a)(3)(B), the government cleared her in February 2006 as having "no nexus to terrorism," yet **failed to notify Agent Kelley of his error for eight years**, repeatedly cycled her on and off watchlists, reversed assurances not to invoke state secrets, and even barred her U.S.-citizen daughter from flying to testify at trial before finally conceding in 2014 that she posed no threat [\[257\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-circuit/1973923.html). Sitting *en banc* in 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated a \~90% cut to her Equal Access to Justice Act attorneys’ fees and ordered a totality-of-the-circumstances bad-faith review [\[257\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-circuit/1973923.html).
Following *Latif v. Holder*, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014)—which held that the original neither-confirm-nor-deny DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process—DHS revised TRIP in 2015 **exclusively for U.S. persons denied boarding due to the No Fly List** [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Those petitioners receive confirmation of No Fly status, an unclassified summary of reasons where security permits, and up to three tiers of administrative review ending with the TSA Administrator, whose final order is reviewable exclusively in the federal courts of appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (*Kashem v. Barr*, 941 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2019)) [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). By contrast, U.S. persons on the **Selectee List, Expanded Selectee List, or broader TSDS**—within the roughly 2% of all DHS TRIP filers (and 9 of 370 watchlist complainants in 2022\) who actually match a watchlist record—still receive only a single TSC review and a non-confirming form letter, with no access to classified evidence, no security-cleared counsel, and no public reporting of error rates to Congress [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Compounding this disparity, the Fourth Circuit in *Elhady v. Kable*, 993 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2021\) foreclosed procedural due process challenges to TSDS/Selectee placement by holding that travelers lack a protected liberty interest in flying free of enhanced screening [\[261\]](https://holdcbpaccountable.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/khalid-opinion.pdf). PCLOB’s January 2025 Recommendations 6 and 7 urged creating a second review tier and clearer notice for repeatedly screened Selectee-list U.S. persons [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf).
In ***FBI v. Fikre***, 601 U.S. 234 (March 19, 2024), the Supreme Court curtailed TSC’s longstanding practice of insulating watchlist standards from judicial discovery by quietly delisting plaintiffs mid-lawsuit. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Gorsuch held that TSC’s terse declaration stating U.S. citizen Yonas Fikre—who alleged FBI agents lured him to the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum in 2010, offered No Fly removal if he spied on his Portland mosque, and enabled his subsequent detention and torture in the UAE after he refused—would not be relisted "based on the currently available information" failed the voluntary-cessation standard for mootness because it left the government free to relist him for repeating the same undisclosed conduct [\[27\]](https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/law-reviews/ilr/pdf/vol59p355.pdf). Lower appellate courts have actively enforced *Fikre*: in *Long v. Garland*, the Fourth Circuit revived No Fly claims against mootness, affirmed district court jurisdiction over TSC’s initial placement decision (distinct from TSA’s post-TRIP final order under § 46110), and recognized standing to challenge broader TSDS inclusion where it blocks TWIC and HME credentials [\[53\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-4th-circuit/117601742.html).
### **2025–2026 Oversight Developments: Capability Expansion Meets Institutional Hollowing-Out**
The defining institutional shift across 2025–2026 has been the simultaneous expansion of domestic investigative authorities and the dismantling of executive-branch oversight bodies. Days after PCLOB issued its January 23, 2025 Terrorist Watchlist Report, President Trump terminated all three Democratic Board members—Chair Sharon Bradford Franklin, Travis LeBlanc, and Edward Felten—without cause on January 23–27, 2025, leaving only one part-time Republican member (Beth Williams) and depriving PCLOB of its statutory three-member quorum required to issue reports or guidance [\[4\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Although District Judge Reggie Walton ordered LeBlanc and Felten reinstated in May 2025 (*LeBlanc v. PCLOB*, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1), the D.C. Circuit stayed reinstatement on July 1, 2025—concluding PCLOB’s non-adjudicatory statute lacked explicit removal restrictions—and held the appeal in abeyance pending Supreme Court review in *Slaughter v. Trump* [\[265\]](https://clearinghouse.net/case/46179/).
Inside DHS, Reduction in Force (RIF) notices delivered on March 20–21, 2025 targeted nearly the entire non-SES staff of all three statutory civil-rights oversight offices: the **Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)** (cut from roughly 140–150 staff to 2–9 FTEs plus \~25–30 contractors), the **Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO)** (cut from \~100 staff to 5, with complaints plunging from 12,664 in FY 2023 to 280 between March and December 2025), and the **USCIS Ombudsman (CISOMB)** (\~40 staff) [\[22\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/). Although DHS reversed formal "abolition" during *Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights v. DHS* (prompting Judge Ana Reyes to deny a preliminary injunction as moot in July 2025 and deny reconsideration on March 27, 2026, alongside GAO Impoundment Control Act Decision B-337366 in July 2025), a February 6, 2026 DHS court filing confirmed that **CRCL had issued zero final recommendation memoranda** since March 2025 despite inheriting 778 open or pending complaints (\~550 active investigations) [\[23\]](https://www.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/). Over the same period, DHS terminated its **Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee (DPIAC)** and Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security Board effective March 7, 2025 under Executive Order 14217 (90 FR 11995), dissolved its department-level major acquisition oversight office in October 2025 (reconstituting one element in May 2026 per GAO-26-108118), rescinded its 2023 Facial Recognition Directive and 2016 Mobile Application Privacy Policy, rejected a GAO recommendation for automatic ICE body-camera activation, and operated under **NSPM-11** (June 5, 2026), which rescinded Biden’s 2024 AI National Security Memorandum (NSM-25) while leaving concrete AI civil-liberties execution rules undefined [\[24\]](https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ).
With internal executive watchdogs severely curtailed and \$91 billion in multi-year ICE reconciliation funds largely untethered from statutory reporting controls [\[77\]](https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-funding-mass-deportation/), meaningful accountability over HSI and terrorism-identity pipelines in late 2026 rests primarily on three external pillars: independent audit bodies (**GAO** and **DHS OIG**, which continued publishing rigorous compliance exposes through late 2026 across GAO-25-108349, GAO-26-108650, GAO-26-108118, GAO-26-107414, OIG-26-23, and OIG-26-38) [\[2\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf); **federal courts**, actively adjudicating cloud location privacy (*Chatrie*), border device searches (*Anibowei*), watchlist mootness and credential standing (*Fikre*/*Long*), protest dossiers (*EPIC v. Mullin*, *Hilton*), and undercover discovery (*Sant*) [\[20\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance); and **congressional oversight**, reflected in the March 3, 2026 letter by nearly 70 Democrats demanding a new DHS OIG probe into ICE location-data buying, November 2026 House demands regarding ICE’s Flock ALPR access, Senate HSGAC demands to Secretary Markwayne Mullin (confirmed March 23, 2026\) regarding election-related probes, and pending statutory proposals inside the *Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2026* [\[112\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-padilla-durbin-schumer-lead-senate-colleagues-in-demanding-secretary-mullin-halt-2026-election-interference-efforts/). Absent legislative enactment of a binding HSI domestic charter, statutory closure of the commercial data-broker loophole, restoration of a PCLOB quorum and CRCL investigative capacity, and multi-tier Selectee redress, the asymmetry between HSI’s domestic U.S.-person investigative capabilities and enforceable constitutional safeguards will continue to widen.
#### **Works cited**
1. Terrorist Watchlist: Nomination and Redress Processes for ... \- GAO, [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/890/880944.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/890/880944.pdf)
2. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf)
3. GAO-26-108650, TERRORIST WATCHLIST: FBI Should Improve, [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf)
4. PCLOB Terrorist Watchlist Report Unclassified.pdf, [https\://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf)
5. How the Terrorist Watchlist and Government Screening Practices, [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat\_Public\_Report-2.pdf](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf)
6. DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement Strategic Plan, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25\_0912\_oslle-strategic-plan.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0912_oslle-strategic-plan.pdf)
7. Careers with Homeland Security Investigations \- ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/hsi/careers](https://www.ice.gov/hsi/careers)
8. statement \- Document Repository, [https\://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20230418/115689/HHRG-118-AP15-Wstate-JohnsonT-20230418.pdf](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20230418/115689/HHRG-118-AP15-Wstate-JohnsonT-20230418.pdf)
9. [https\://www\.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf)
10. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26\_0403\_ocfo\_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf)
11. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download)
12. The Counterterrorism Role of Homeland Security Investigations, [https\://www\.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0)
13. \- TERRORISM AND DIGITAL FINANCING: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS, [https\://www\.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg45867/html/CHRG-117hhrg45867.htm](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg45867/html/CHRG-117hhrg45867.htm)
14. OIG-20-59 \- HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf)
15. ICE contracts with Clearview AI for facial-recognition technology, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/)
16. Mexican National Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign)
17. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement \- Democracy Forward, [https\://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/EMBARGO-DFF-DHS-ICE-26-0510-0511-0512-LIT-A\_.pdf](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/EMBARGO-DFF-DHS-ICE-26-0510-0511-0512-LIT-A_.pdf)
18. ICE relies on covert browsing infrastructure to monitor online activity, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202607/ice-relies-on-covert-browsing-infrastructure-to-monitor-online-activity)
19. Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence, [https\://www\.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/)
20. [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/court-records-detail-clearview-ais-role-in-ice-protest-surveillance)
21. ICE Homeland Security Investigations Hindered in Countering, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf)
22. Reported: CIS Ombudsman, DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/)
23. Denouncing Into the Void: The Dismantling of Internal Oversight and, [https\://www\.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/](https://www.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/)
24. 2025 Current Fiscal Year Report: Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory, [https\://www\.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ](https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ)
25. LEBLANC et al v. UNITED STATES PRIVACY AND CIVIL, [https\://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv00542/277733/24/](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv00542/277733/24/)
26. ICE seeks AI platform to analyze billions of investigative records, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-ai-platform-to-analyze-billions-of-investigative-records](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-ai-platform-to-analyze-billions-of-investigative-records)
27. Indiana Law Review, [https\://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/law-reviews/ilr/pdf/vol59p355.pdf](https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/law-reviews/ilr/pdf/vol59p355.pdf)
28. Follow-up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center \- EPIC, [https\://archive.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0807/dojig\_tsc\_0907.pdf](https://archive.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0807/dojig_tsc_0907.pdf)
29. Terrorist Identities Datamart Environnment (TIDE) Fact Sheet \- DNI.gov, [https\://archive.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-features/2691-terrorist-identities-datamart-environment-tide-fact-sheet-2](https://archive.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-features/2691-terrorist-identities-datamart-environment-tide-fact-sheet-2)
30. WATCH LISTING GUIDANCE \- Electronic Frontier Foundation, [https\://www\.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance\_1.pdf](https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf)
31. MICHAEL MIGLIORE; NIDAL EL-TAKACH; AHMAD M \- AWS, [https\://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/147214.pdf](https://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/147214.pdf)
32. Audit of the DOJ Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Processes, [https\://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/plus/a0816/final.pdf](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/plus/a0816/final.pdf)
33. TERRORIST IDENTITIES DATAMART ENVIRONMENT (TIDE), [https\://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingScience/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf](https://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingScience/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf)
34. Case 1:19-cv-07079-RER Document 44-8 Filed 02/21/21 ... \- ACLU, [https\://www\.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf](https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf)
35. task force on denying terrorists entry to the united states, [https\://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170503/105917/HHRG-115-HM00-Transcript-20170503.pdf](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170503/105917/HHRG-115-HM00-Transcript-20170503.pdf)
36. Targeting Civilians in the Name of National Security: How the No Fly, [https\://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038\&context=mlr](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038&context=mlr)
37. Terrorist Databases and the No Fly List: Procedural Due Process, [https\://archive.epic.org/crs/R43730.pdf](https://archive.epic.org/crs/R43730.pdf)
38. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination, [https\://www\.hsdl.org/document/36912](https://www.hsdl.org/document/36912)
39. Written Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union Laura W, [https\://www\.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/document/FINAL\_Senate\_HSGAC\_Statement\_on\_Terrorist\_Watch\_Lists\_and\_Guns.pdf](https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/document/FINAL_Senate_HSGAC_Statement_on_Terrorist_Watch_Lists_and_Guns.pdf)
40. Threat Screening Center File \- Illinois State Police, [https\://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4](https://isp.illinois.gov/LawEnforcement/GetFile/24e57227-8497-41ee-beb0-5608dd091af4)
41. NCIC Known or Appropriately Suspected Terrorist (KST) File, [https\://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NCIC-KST.pdf](https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NCIC-KST.pdf)
42. U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal, [https\://www\.openfox.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/TOU\_19-1\_replacement.pdf](https://www.openfox.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/TOU_19-1_replacement.pdf)
43. Threat Screening Center (TSC) File \- Washington State Patrol, [https\://www\.wsp.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Chapter-30-Threat-Screening-Center-TSC-File.pdf](https://www.wsp.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Chapter-30-Threat-Screening-Center-TSC-File.pdf)
44. Review of the Terrorist Screening Center, [https\://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf)
45. Table of Contents \- Arkansas.gov, [https\://media.ark.org/dps/2020-Basic-Telecommunicator-Book.pdf](https://media.ark.org/dps/2020-Basic-Telecommunicator-Book.pdf)
46. Proposed Methodologies to Cure the No-Fly List's Current Violations, [https\://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4264\&context=jalc](https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4264&context=jalc)
47. EL ALI v. BARR (2020) \- FindLaw Caselaw, [https\://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-d-mar/2077602.html](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-d-mar/2077602.html)
48. Overdue Scrutiny for Watch Listing and Risk Prediction, [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/media/11828/download](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11828/download)
49. appendix table of contents \- Supreme Court, [https\://www\.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-91/319662/20240723150546748\_Targeted%20Jusice%20Appx%20E%20FILE%20Jul%2023%2024.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-91/319662/20240723150546748_Targeted%20Jusice%20Appx%20E%20FILE%20Jul%2023%2024.pdf)
50. Petition \- In the Supreme Court of the United States, [https\://www\.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-91/319662/20240723150357620\_Targeted%20Jusice%20Petition%20E%20FILE%20Jul%2023%2024.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-91/319662/20240723150357620_Targeted%20Jusice%20Petition%20E%20FILE%20Jul%2023%2024.pdf)
51. Summary of Resources for State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/23\_0126\_OSLLE\_LE-resource-guide-signed\_508.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/23_0126_OSLLE_LE-resource-guide-signed_508.pdf)
52. THE 25 ANNIVERSARY REPORT \- Committee on Homeland Security, [https\://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/09.10.26\_Final-Report\_National-Security-Improvements-and-the-Domestic-Threat-Landscape-25-Years-After-91101.pdf](https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/09.10.26_Final-Report_National-Security-Improvements-and-the-Domestic-Threat-Landscape-25-Years-After-91101.pdf)
53. Leshauna Daves; Juangjan Daves, Plaintiffs, v. BONDI (2025), [https\://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-4th-circuit/117601742.html](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-4th-circuit/117601742.html)
54. united states district court for the eastern \- Courthouse News Service, [https\://www\.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/abuirshaid-v-garland-complaint.pdf](https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/abuirshaid-v-garland-complaint.pdf)
55. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24\_1210\_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1210_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf)
56. Intelligence Reporting System-Next Generation \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/24\_0130\_priv\_pia-cbp-082-IRS-NG.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/24_0130_priv_pia-cbp-082-IRS-NG.pdf)
57. TECS System: Platform \- DHS/CBP/PIA-021 August 12, 2016, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/privacy-pia-cbp-tecs%20platform-april2022.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/privacy-pia-cbp-tecs%20platform-april2022.pdf)
58. CBP Commercial Telemetry Data Evaluation \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/24\_0812\_priv\_pia-cbp-080-commercial-telemetry.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/24_0812_priv_pia-cbp-080-commercial-telemetry.pdf)
59. ICE Investigative Case Management \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf)
60. ICE observer lawsuit shows how Palantir records can feed border, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-observer-lawsuit-shows-how-palantir-records-can-feed-border-screening-analytics](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-observer-lawsuit-shows-how-palantir-records-can-feed-border-screening-analytics)
61. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23\_0724\_opa\_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf)
62. Office of the Attorney General, [https\://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20260211/118951/HHRG-119-JU00-20260211-SD032.pdf](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20260211/118951/HHRG-119-JU00-20260211-SD032.pdf)
63. Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-49-Mar17.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-49-Mar17.pdf)
64. National Security Investigations Handbook, [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi\_handbook\_national\_security\_investigations.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf)
65. AGENDA ITEM REQUEST FORM \- Nye County, [https\://www\.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16](https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16)
66. NSPM-7 directs JTTFs to investigate and disrupt political violence, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/nspm-7-directs-jttfs-to-investigate-and-disrupt-political-violence-and-intimidation/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/nspm-7-directs-jttfs-to-investigate-and-disrupt-political-violence-and-intimidation/)
67. NSPM-7 \- Wikipedia, [https\://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSPM-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSPM-7)
68. OIG-21-31 \- DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-04/OIG-21-31-Mar21.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-04/OIG-21-31-Mar21.pdf)
69. 25 Jul 2020 16:22:10 \+0000 HSIDomestic (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ICE-HSI, [https\://www\.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2021.12.21-Records-HSI-Seattle-Pt-7-December-2021-Release-of-2021-ICLI-00011.pdf](https://www.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2021.12.21-Records-HSI-Seattle-Pt-7-December-2021-Release-of-2021-ICLI-00011.pdf)
70. Alleged Engineer of CJNG Cartel's Cross-Border Tunnel Indicted for, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support)
71. Independence, Mo. Man Connected to Nihilistic Violent Extremist, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/independence-mo-man-connected-nihilistic-violent-extremist-nve-group-charged-sexual](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/independence-mo-man-connected-nihilistic-violent-extremist-nve-group-charged-sexual)
72. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Leadership Biographies, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/25\_0306\_PRIV-DHS-Senior-Leadership-Biography-Book-2024-2025.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/25_0306_PRIV-DHS-Senior-Leadership-Biography-Book-2024-2025.pdf)
73. DHS Components & Resources for Region 9 (2025), [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25\_0910\_oslle\_region-9-contact-sheet.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0910_oslle_region-9-contact-sheet.pdf)
74. Homeland Security Investigations Rebranding of Project Shield, [https\://netchannels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Netchannels-Case-Study-HSI\_261008.pdf](https://netchannels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Netchannels-Case-Study-HSI_261008.pdf)
75. How many people does ICE arrest? \- USAFacts, [https\://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-does-ice-arrest/country/united-states/](https://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-does-ice-arrest/country/united-states/)
76. [unknown\_url](http://docs.google.com/unknown_url)
77. ICE Has \$91 Billion Left for Mass Deportation. Can Congress Stop It?, [https\://www\.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-funding-mass-deportation/](https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-funding-mass-deportation/)
78. EO 14159 § 4 directs DHS to ensure Homeland Security, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/)
79. Trump's mass deportations led to a big drop in fentanyl ... \- PBS, [https\://www\.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trumps-mass-deportations-led-to-a-big-drop-in-fentanyl-investigations-report-finds-heres-what-to-know](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trumps-mass-deportations-led-to-a-big-drop-in-fentanyl-investigations-report-finds-heres-what-to-know)
80. Exposing and Disrupting Federal Attempts to Interfere in the 2026, [https\://democracyforward.org/work/research/exposing-and-disrupting-federal-attempts-to-interfere-in-the-2026-midterm-elections/](https://democracyforward.org/work/research/exposing-and-disrupting-federal-attempts-to-interfere-in-the-2026-midterm-elections/)
81. Homeland Security Investigations, a Directorate within U.S., [https\://www\.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110\_R44269\_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf)
82. Home \- Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange, [https\://la-safe.org/](https://la-safe.org/)
83. high intensity drug trafficking areas program \- The White House, [https\://www\.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2026-HIDTA-Report-to-Congress-Final.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2026-HIDTA-Report-to-Congress-Final.pdf)
84. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAM 2024, [https\://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024-HIDTA-Annual-Report-to-Congress.pdf](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024-HIDTA-Annual-Report-to-Congress.pdf)
85. US launches cybercrime center with TRM Labs to help trace crypto tied to scams, [https\://www\.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-11-19-us-launches-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-help-trace-crypto-tied-to-scams-443599](https://www.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-11-19-us-launches-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-help-trace-crypto-tied-to-scams-443599)
86. TRM Labs Powers New DHS Crypto Crime Disruption Center, [https\://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/trm-labs-dhs-threat-disruption-center](https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/trm-labs-dhs-threat-disruption-center)
87. US opens a cybercrime center with TRM Labs to trace crypto from, [https\://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/](https://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/)
88. HSI Directive 18-02: Law Enforcement Officers Designated to Act as, [https\://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/10/1025\_HSI-Directive-18-02.pdf](https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/10/1025_HSI-Directive-18-02.pdf)
89. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi\_student\_guide\_confidential\_informants\_02.2017.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf)
90. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf)
91. Connecticut Man Who Attempted to Travel to the Middle East to Join, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/connecticut-man-who-attempted-travel-middle-east-join-and-fight-isis-sentenced-over-seven](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/connecticut-man-who-attempted-travel-middle-east-join-and-fight-isis-sentenced-over-seven)
92. Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support, [https\://www\.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isil](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-attempting-provide-material-support-isil)
93. US Army National Guard Soldier and his Cousin Arrested for, [https\://www\.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-army-national-guard-soldier-and-his-cousin-arrested-conspiring-support-terrorism-isil](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-army-national-guard-soldier-and-his-cousin-arrested-conspiring-support-terrorism-isil)
94. [https\://www\.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-men-who-provided-material-support-terrorists-and-plotted-kill-american-targets](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-men-who-provided-material-support-terrorists-and-plotted-kill-american-targets)
95. Suburban Chicago man arrested for allegedly attempting to support, [https\://www\.ice.gov/news/releases/suburban-chicago-man-arrested-allegedly-attempting-support-terrorism-overseas](https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/suburban-chicago-man-arrested-allegedly-attempting-support-terrorism-overseas)
96. [https\://www\.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support)
97. Syrian Refugee Pleads Guilty To ISIS Bomb Threat At Pittsburgh, [https\://dailyvoice.com/article/syrian-refugee-pleads-guilty-to-isis-bomb-threat-at-pittsburgh-church/](https://dailyvoice.com/article/syrian-refugee-pleads-guilty-to-isis-bomb-threat-at-pittsburgh-church/)
98. [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/three-dayton-family-members-plead-guilty-immigration-and-firearms-violations](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/three-dayton-family-members-plead-guilty-immigration-and-firearms-violations)
99. '764' Extremist Group Leader Pleads Guilty to RICO, Child, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/764-extremist-group-leader-pleads-guilty-rico-child-exploitation-charges](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/764-extremist-group-leader-pleads-guilty-rico-child-exploitation-charges)
100. 22 Defendants Charged with Federal Crimes Involving Child Sex, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-az/pr/22-defendants-charged-federal-crimes-involving-child-sex-abuse-material-october-2023](https://www.justice.gov/usao-az/pr/22-defendants-charged-federal-crimes-involving-child-sex-abuse-material-october-2023)
101. Mexican National and Alleged Alien Smuggler Indicted on First, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/mexican-national-and-alleged-alien-smuggler-indicted-first-material-support-terrorism](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mexican-national-and-alleged-alien-smuggler-indicted-first-material-support-terrorism)
102. Reward Offers Up to \$50M for Information Leading to Arrests and/or, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/reward-offers-50m-information-leading-arrests-andor-convictions-foreign-terrorist](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reward-offers-50m-information-leading-arrests-andor-convictions-foreign-terrorist)
103. [https\://www\.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns)
104. [https\://www\.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile)
105. [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-export-control-evasion-scheme-sentenced-70-months-prison](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-export-control-evasion-scheme-sentenced-70-months-prison)
106. Secret 'Keyhole' program emerges as ICE surveillance of protestors, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens)
107. [https\://www\.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/I\&A%20and%20OGC%20Portland%20Reports.pdf](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/I&A%20and%20OGC%20Portland%20Reports.pdf)
108. Case 3:26-cv-04232-AJB-MSB Document 1 Filed 07/24/26 PageID.1, [https\://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-07-24-1-Complaint.pdf](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-07-24-1-Complaint.pdf)
109. Documents show DHS probed nonprofits, obtained millions of, [https\://www\.newsfromthestates.com/article/documents-show-dhs-probed-nonprofits-obtained-millions-records-hunt-noncitizen-voters](https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/documents-show-dhs-probed-nonprofits-obtained-millions-records-hunt-noncitizen-voters)
110. ICE Has Obtained Over 50 Million Voter Roll Records ... \- Truthout, [https\://truthout.org/articles/ice-has-obtained-over-50-million-voter-roll-records-from-doj-ahead-of-midterms/](https://truthout.org/articles/ice-has-obtained-over-50-million-voter-roll-records-from-doj-ahead-of-midterms/)
111. Exposing and Disrupting Federal Attempts to Interfere in the 2026, [https\://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/In-the-Records\_Exposing-and-Disrupting-Federal-Attempts-to-Interfere-in-the-2026-Midterm-Elections.pdf](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/In-the-Records_Exposing-and-Disrupting-Federal-Attempts-to-Interfere-in-the-2026-Midterm-Elections.pdf)
112. Peters, Padilla, Durbin, & Schumer Lead Senate Colleagues in, [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-padilla-durbin-schumer-lead-senate-colleagues-in-demanding-secretary-mullin-halt-2026-election-interference-efforts/](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-padilla-durbin-schumer-lead-senate-colleagues-in-demanding-secretary-mullin-halt-2026-election-interference-efforts/)
113. Counter-Proliferation Investigations \- ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi](https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi)
114. statement, [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/mancuso-testimony-01-23-2024/](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/mancuso-testimony-01-23-2024/)
115. Remarks Prepared for delivery by \- The Washington Institute, [https\://www\.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5891](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5891)
116. [https\://www\.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf)
117. Chasing the Money: Celebrating 25 Years of Homeland Security, [https\://www\.acams.org/en/opinion/chasing-the-money-celebrating-25-years-of-homeland-security-investigations-el-dorado-task-force](https://www.acams.org/en/opinion/chasing-the-money-celebrating-25-years-of-homeland-security-investigations-el-dorado-task-force)
118. [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/atlanta-man-convicted-laundering-over-27-million-stolen-victims-online-fraud-0](https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/atlanta-man-convicted-laundering-over-27-million-stolen-victims-online-fraud-0)
119. [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf)
120. GLOSSARY AT A GLANCE Immigration Databases, Information, [https\://www\.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf](https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf)
121. DHS/ICE/PIA-051 Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service)
122. Trump's Wall and Immigrant Detention \= Racist White and Corporate, [https\://www\.immigrantsolidarity.org/Newsletter/Fall19.pdf](https://www.immigrantsolidarity.org/Newsletter/Fall19.pdf)
123. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022\_0.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf)
124. DHS/ICE/PIA-055 Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-055-repository-analytics-virtualized-environment-raven](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-055-repository-analytics-virtualized-environment-raven)
125. DHS/ICE/PIA-055 RAVEn \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice055-ravenappendixa-bupdate-september2021.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice055-ravenappendixa-bupdate-september2021.pdf)
126. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools)
127. Data Analysis & Research for Trade Transparency System, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038a-ravendartts-april2023.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038a-ravendartts-april2023.pdf)
128. Palantir \| Biometric Update, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/tag/palantir](https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/palantir)
129. [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf)
130. Designated School Officials: What is Campus Sentinel?, [https\://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2013/03/designated-school-officials-what-is-campus-sentinel](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2013/03/designated-school-officials-what-is-campus-sentinel)
131. DSOs: Read these FAQs About Campus Sentinel \| Study in the States, [https\://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2022/10/dsos-read-these-faqs-about-campus-sentinel](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2022/10/dsos-read-these-faqs-about-campus-sentinel)
132. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ice\_-\_comprehensive\_strategy\_for\_overstay\_enforcement\_and\_deterrence\_1.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ice_-_comprehensive_strategy_for_overstay_enforcement_and_deterrence_1.pdf)
133. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf)
134. [https\://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022\_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf](https://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf)
135. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25\_0414\_priv\_pia-ice-065-bitmap\_2.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf)
136. Final Report of the Biometrics Subcommittee \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/final\_hsac\_biometrics\_subcommittee\_report\_11-12-2020.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/final_hsac_biometrics_subcommittee_report_11-12-2020.pdf)
137. [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Nevano-2019-06-26.pdf](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Nevano-2019-06-26.pdf)
138. [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202601/us-expands-biometric-security-cooperation-abroad](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202601/us-expands-biometric-security-cooperation-abroad)
139. DHS biometric overhaul remains tied to Thales as HART deadline, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes)
140. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108118.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108118.pdf)
141. ICE withdraws \$125M sole-source Thomson Reuters surveillance, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-withdraws-125m-sole-source-thomson-reuters-surveillance-data-deal](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-withdraws-125m-sole-source-thomson-reuters-surveillance-data-deal)
142. ICE seeks expanded LexisNexis investigative data access with, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-expanded-lexisnexis-investigative-data-access-with-palantir-integration](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/ice-seeks-expanded-lexisnexis-investigative-data-access-with-palantir-integration)
143. LexisNexis \- Biometric Update, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/tag/lexisnexis](https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/lexisnexis)
144. After ODNI's First Commercial Data Report, Federal Law, [https\://www\.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency](https://www.jlcw.org/news/odni-commercial-data-report-law-enforcement-data-buying-transparency)
145. OIG-23-61 \- CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf)
146. The record · State of Watch, [https\://stateofwatch.com/claims](https://stateofwatch.com/claims)
147. ICE seeks \$1.2 million contract to maintain nationwide license plate, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202611/ice-seeks-1-2-million-contract-to-maintain-nationwide-license-plate-surveillance](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/ice-seeks-1-2-million-contract-to-maintain-nationwide-license-plate-surveillance)
148. The Expansion of AI-Driven Biometric Systems in Immigration, [https\://forumtogether.org/article/the-expansion-of-ai-driven-biometric-systems-in-immigration-enforcement/](https://forumtogether.org/article/the-expansion-of-ai-driven-biometric-systems-in-immigration-enforcement/)
149. Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose, [https\://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2025/10/21/leaving-the-door-wide-open/](https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2025/10/21/leaving-the-door-wide-open/)
150. Flock vs. Axon: What changes if Cleveland switches license plate readers?, [https\://signalcleveland.org/flock-vs-axon-what-changes-if-cleveland-switches-license-plate-readers/](https://signalcleveland.org/flock-vs-axon-what-changes-if-cleveland-switches-license-plate-readers/)
151. Reps. Pettersen, Krishnamoorthi Lead Effort Demanding Answers on ICE’s Backdoor Access to License Plate Surveillance Network, [https\://pettersen.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1979](https://pettersen.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1979)
152. [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/ice-contract-reveals-nationwide-architecture-behind-hsis-national-tracking-program)
153. Secret Service and ICE Did Not Always Adhere to Statute and, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-03/OIG-23-17-Feb23-Redacted.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-03/OIG-23-17-Feb23-Redacted.pdf)
154. ICE expands Booz Allen analytics contract by \$5.9M to target, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-expands-booz-allen-analytics-contract-by-5-9m-to-target-overseas-scam-networks](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-expands-booz-allen-analytics-contract-by-5-9m-to-target-overseas-scam-networks)
155. Does Privacy Exist at the U.S. Border? \| Insights \| Holland & Knight, [https\://www\.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/does-privacy-exist-at-the-us-border](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/10/does-privacy-exist-at-the-us-border)
156. EPIC Statement 1 Warrantless Smartphone Searches House, [https\://archive.epic.org/testimony/congress/EPIC-HHSC-WarentlessSearchesBorder-July2018.pdf](https://archive.epic.org/testimony/congress/EPIC-HHSC-WarentlessSearchesBorder-July2018.pdf)
157. ICE contract reveals AI social media monitoring capabilities, raises, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-contract-reveals-ai-social-media-monitoring-capabilities-raises-surveillance-questions](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-contract-reveals-ai-social-media-monitoring-capabilities-raises-surveillance-questions)
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159. in the united states district court \- Courthouse News Service, [https\://www\.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/immigration-allowed-to-copy-immigration-attorneys-cell-phone.pdf](https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/immigration-allowed-to-copy-immigration-attorneys-cell-phone.pdf)
160. second-amended-complaint.pdf \- Hold CBP Accountable, [https\://holdcbpaccountable.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/second-amended-complaint.pdf](https://holdcbpaccountable.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/second-amended-complaint.pdf)
161. Every source we rely on \| Phone Seized, [https\://phoneseized.com/sources](https://phoneseized.com/sources)
162. United States v. Cano \- Harvard Law Review, [https\://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-133/united-states-v-cano/](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-133/united-states-v-cano/)
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165. flDevice Searches Absent Reasonable Suspicion Allow Security, [https\://dc.suffolk.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1566\&context=jtaa-suffolk](https://dc.suffolk.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1566&context=jtaa-suffolk)
166. Petition \- In the Supreme Court of the United States, [https\://www\.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-199/278590/20230830175112171\_43937%20Anibowei%20Brief.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-199/278590/20230830175112171_43937%20Anibowei%20Brief.pdf)
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168. Border Searches and Electronic Data, [https\://static.maglaw.com/docs/Border%20Searches%20and%20Electronic%20Data.pdf](https://static.maglaw.com/docs/Border%20Searches%20and%20Electronic%20Data.pdf)
169. Warrantless Cell Phone Searches in United States v. Alisigwe, [https\://dlglearningcenter.com/united-states-v-alisigwe-border-search-cell-phone/](https://dlglearningcenter.com/united-states-v-alisigwe-border-search-cell-phone/)
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171. Reason: Are Warrantless Phone Searches at the Border, [https\://pacificlegal.org/reason-are-warrantless-phone-searches-at-the-border-constitutional-the-supreme-court-may-soon-decide/](https://pacificlegal.org/reason-are-warrantless-phone-searches-at-the-border-constitutional-the-supreme-court-may-soon-decide/)
172. Border Phone Searches & Holiday Travel \| Abrams Fensterman, LLP, [https\://www\.abramslaw.com/media/thought-leadership/border-phone-searches-holiday-travel](https://www.abramslaw.com/media/thought-leadership/border-phone-searches-holiday-travel)
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175. Anibowei v. Blanche Brief: Tightening the Border Search Loophole, [https\://www\.cato.org/blog/anibowei-v-blanche-brief-tightening-border-search-loophole](https://www.cato.org/blog/anibowei-v-blanche-brief-tightening-border-search-loophole)
176. Task force targets human network behind IEDs \| Article \- Army.mil, [https\://www\.army.mil/article/53114/task\_force\_targets\_human\_network\_behind\_ieds](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds)
177. New York's aviators gear up for Afghanistan deployment, [https\://www\.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/574064/new-yorks-aviators-gear-up-for-afghanistan-deployment/](https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/574064/new-yorks-aviators-gear-up-for-afghanistan-deployment/)
178. [https\://www\.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1131834/task-force-odin-transfer-of-authority/](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1131834/task-force-odin-transfer-of-authority/)
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181. IARPA Launches "Odin" Program to Harden Biometric Technology, [https\://www\.iarpa.gov/newsroom/article/iarpa-launches-odin-program-to-harden-biometric-technology-against-attacks](https://www.iarpa.gov/newsroom/article/iarpa-launches-odin-program-to-harden-biometric-technology-against-attacks)
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185. J. Roderick Macarthur Foundation and Lance E. Lindblom, [https\://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/600/637627/](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/600/637627/)
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188. Jacobson v. United States \| 503 U.S. 540 (1992), [https\://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/540/](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/503/540/)
189. Federal Motion to Reveal a Confidential Informant \- L\&L Law Group, [https\://landllawgroup.com/criminal-motions/federal/motion-to-reveal-informant/](https://landllawgroup.com/criminal-motions/federal/motion-to-reveal-informant/)
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191. 18 U.S.C. § 242: Deprivation of rights under color of law, [https\://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s242/](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s242/)
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193. Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) \| ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/opr](https://www.ice.gov/opr)
194. DHS Icepick Leak: 41,000 Staff Records and Okta Claim, [https\://guptadeepak.com/dhs-icepick-leak-okta-identity-lessons/](https://guptadeepak.com/dhs-icepick-leak-okta-identity-lessons/)
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198. ICE handbook for undercover agents details ability to 'induce crime, [https\://www\.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ice-handbook-undercover-agents-law-immigration-crime-a8418281.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ice-handbook-undercover-agents-law-immigration-crime-a8418281.html)
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203. Role of FBI informant in eco-terrorism case probed after documents, [https\://www\.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/fbi-informant-anna-eric-mcdavid-eco-terrorism](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/fbi-informant-anna-eric-mcdavid-eco-terrorism)
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206. [https\://www\.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain)
207. How Environmentalists Became the FBI's \#1 Threat \- ELF Part 2, [https\://ourchangingclimate.buzzsprout.com/2611340/episodes/19298190-how-environmentalists-became-the-fbi-s-1-threat-elf-part-2](https://ourchangingclimate.buzzsprout.com/2611340/episodes/19298190-how-environmentalists-became-the-fbi-s-1-threat-elf-part-2)
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209. FBI — Operation Backfire, [https\://www\.fbi.gov/news/speeches/operation-backfire](https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/operation-backfire)
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