# **Homeland Security Investigations, TIDE, Dragnets, and the Civilian ODIN Architecture** Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)—the principal criminal-investigative directorate of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—provisions the human, statutory, and operational-technology layer that converts federal identity-screening dragnets into preemptive threat disruption [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). Fielding a total workforce exceeding 10,400 employees (including roughly 6,950 to 7,100 special agents, approximately 800 criminal analysts, mission support personnel, and contractors, supplemented domestically by over 4,000 cross-designated task force officers and abroad by over 700 vetted foreign-partner unit personnel) across 237 domestic cities (expanded to over 250 domestic offices in ICE recruiting publications) and 94 international offices in 56 countries, HSI operates a civilian functional analogue to the U.S. Army’s Task Force ODIN (*Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize*) [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). Although HSI neither owns nor administers the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) classified Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) or the FBI Threat Screening Center’s (TSC) Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS), HSI personnel act simultaneously as upstream nominators, downstream consumers, and primary field effectors [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). By pairing watchlist hits, offshore visa and biometric interdiction, and financial-trade analytics with exclusive customs, immigration, and export-control statutes, HSI accounts for roughly 3% of FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) manpower according to internal HSI leadership assessments yet participates in over 89% of JTTF investigations and leads 45% to 50% of annual JTTF disruptions [\[11\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). This preemptive model relies on continuous coupling between automated screening systems and human investigative tradecraft rather than technology alone. Offshore platforms such as the Visa Security Program’s PATRIOT engine and the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) push observation and detection beyond U.S. territory, while domestic units—including the Counter Threat Lead Development Unit (CTLD), the Trade Transparency Unit (TTU), the Cyber Crimes Center (C3), and JTTF-embedded special agents—execute identification and neutralization through confidential informants, certified undercover operations, criminal prosecutions, asset forfeitures, visa revocations, and administrative removals [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). In FY 2024, HSI executed 32,608 criminal arrests and seized more than \$886 million in criminally derived currency and assets, approximately \$192 million in virtual currency, and 41,351 weapons [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). As of late 2026, however, federal audits and litigation records expose acute structural strain across every layer of this apparatus. Following Executive Order 14159 (January 2025), mass reassignments of HSI special agents into routine interior immigration enforcement expanded HSI immigration investigative hours by more than 800% (over 1.7 million additional hours) in FY 2025 while reducing HSI fentanyl investigative hours by roughly 30% to 31% and fentanyl seizures by 39% [\[19\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). Concurrently, HSI began decommissioning its flagship custom analytics platform—the Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized Environment (RAVEn)—in 2025 just three years after launch despite spending over \$150 million, accelerating DHS’s reliance on commercial surveillance and AI contractors such as Palantir, Clearview AI, and TRM Labs [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). At the same time, persistent watchlist redress opacity, domestic protest and voter-roll surveillance disputes, and the March 2025 hollowing of DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) have widened the gap between HSI’s preemptive reach and its statutory and constitutional guardrails [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). ## **1\. Disambiguation and Doctrinal Architecture: From Task Force ODIN to the Civilian Dragnet** Rigorous analysis of federal counterterrorism screening requires untangling phonetically similar names (*Oden*, *Odin*/*ODIN*, *ODNI*) and overlapping organizational labels that are frequently conflated in public commentary. Within the federal executive branch, HSI sits strictly along the **DHS → ICE → HSI** chain of command [\[2\]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf). Congress created DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296), consolidating legacy investigative authorities from the U.S. Customs Service (Treasury) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Justice) into ICE in 2003; ICE subsequently realigned its Office of Investigations, Office of International Affairs, and Office of Intelligence into HSI on June 9, 2010 [\[2\]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf). Public discourse routinely equates ICE with **Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)**, which enforces civil immigration statutes through administrative arrests, detention, and removal of noncitizens (conducting 113,430 administrative arrests and 3,032 criminal arrests in FY 2024, per USAFacts reporting of ICE and Office of Homeland Security Statistics data) [\[31\]](https://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-does-ice-arrest/country/united-states/). By contrast, HSI enforces more than 400 criminal, customs, trade, and immigration statutes against both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals—investigating terrorism financing, illicit technology procurement, sanctions evasion, cybercrime, money laundering, narcotics, child exploitation, and human trafficking [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). | Term / Entity | Parent Institution | Operational Domain & Mandate | Institutional Distinction | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | **Task Force ODIN** (*Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize*) | U.S. Army (FORSCOM / INSCOM / PEO IEW\&S) | Multisensor manned/unmanned ISR and human-network counter-IED unit formed at Fort Hood in 2006; deployed in Iraq (2007–2011) and Afghanistan (2009–2017) [\[7\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | Military doctrinal precursor and *functional analytical analogue* for civilian preemptive threat disruption—not a DHS or HSI program name [\[7\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). | | **IARPA Odin** | ODNI / Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity | Multi-year R\&D program (launched 2017\) developing biometric Presentation Attack Detection (anti-spoofing), targeting 97% average detection accuracy at a 0.2% false alarm rate [\[36\]](https://www.iarpa.gov/research-programs/odin). | Pure Intelligence Community biometric security research program; distinct from Army Task Force ODIN and independent of HSI field operations [\[36\]](https://www.iarpa.gov/research-programs/odin). | | **ODNI** (*Office of the Director of National Intelligence*) | U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) | Integrates IC agencies, houses IARPA, and administers NCTC, which establishes and manages TIDE [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Strategic IC oversight body; holds no domestic criminal arrest or customs enforcement authority [\[38\]](https://archive.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-features/2691-terrorist-identities-datamart-environment-tide-fact-sheet-2). | | **TIDE** (*Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment*) | NCTC (ODNI) | Central classified U.S. repository of international terrorist identities (\~2.5 million individuals as of Oct 2020); exports unclassified identifiers to FBI TSC’s TSDS [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Upstream classified identity backbone, not the operational watchlist itself; excludes purely domestic terrorism [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | | **ICEPIC** (*ICE Pattern Analysis and Information Collection*) | Legacy DHS / ICE | Legacy DHS link-analysis tool identifying non-obvious relationships; formerly housed the Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) Service [\[41\]](https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf). | Separate DHS analytical system replaced beginning in 2012 (by the independent LEIS Service and FALCON) and slated for retirement in 2016—never TIDE [\[41\]](https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf). | | **HSI** (*Homeland Security Investigations*) | DHS → ICE | Principal DHS criminal-investigative directorate (\>400 statutes across Titles 8, 18, 19, 21, and export-control laws); arrests citizens and noncitizens for criminal conduct [\[3\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/25_0613_ice_fy26-congressional-budget-justificatin.pdf). | Distinct criminal-investigative mandate from **ERO**, though shared data pipelines and 2025–2026 EO 14159 directives have diverted HSI agents into Title 8 interior enforcement [\[19\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). | The doctrinal lineage behind the civilian ODIN framework traces to the U.S. Army’s counter-IED evolution between 2006 and 2017\. Developed in 2006 at Fort Hood, Texas with engineering and sustainment from the Army’s Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW\&S), Task Force ODIN fused manned medium-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (such as Beechcraft King Air 300 platforms collecting communications intelligence, signals intelligence, and full-motion video), unmanned aerial vehicles, ground intelligence stations, biometrics units, and captured-material exploitation laboratories [\[7\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). Programs transferred from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) into Army INSCOM and Task Force ODIN-East—notably the Saturn Arch aerial ISR capability launched in 2010—further institutionalized distributed reachback between forward collection platforms and remote analytical cells [\[46\]](https://www.army.mil/article/98474/inscom_assumes_responsibility_of_saturn_arch_program). When Task Force ODIN cased its colors at Bagram Airfield on March 26, 2017 and transferred the Afghanistan theater ISR mission to Task Force Lightning (525th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade), its two-battalion structure combined persistent aerial overwatch with ground biometrics and material exploitation supporting both kinetic strikes and evidentiary convictions in Afghan courts [\[35\]](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1131834/task-force-odin-transfer-of-authority/). As PEO IEW\&S chief engineer Richard Wittstruck summarized ODIN’s operating logic in 2011, *"the device itself is not the threat. It’s the tool used by the threat. So we have to address the tool. But if we don’t also address the threat, then they just come up with a different tool"* [\[7\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). Getting *"left of boom"* required shifting intelligence collection backward from emplacement into the transit, connection, financial, and planning cycles—identifying the financiers, money launderers, builders, and facilitators sustaining an attack network before a bomb could be laid [\[7\]](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds). Translated into domestic and transnational homeland security, the **dragnet** substitutes for ODIN’s persistent aerial stare. In counterterrorism scholarship, "dragnet" serves as tradecraft shorthand and critical description—not NCTC’s formal definition of TIDE—for casting a wide screening net across high-volume movement or transaction chokepoints (visas, aviation, land ports, routine policing encounters, trade manifests, and financial flows) to isolate anomalous identities for targeted investigative review [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). Yet the civilian ODIN loop diverges from battlefield targeting in two constitutional respects. First, **Neutralize** entails lawful, non-kinetic interventions—criminal prosecution, asset forfeiture, sanctions, visa refusal, or administrative removal—governed by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). Second, because wide nets inevitably capture innocent bycatch through name similarity or clerical error, a lawful civilian ODIN system requires a fifth institutional track absent from combat ISR: **prompt clearance, record correction, and due-process redress** [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). ## **2\. The Upstream Identity Backbone: TIDE, the Threat Screening Center, and Encounter Pipelines** At the foundation of the U.S. counterterrorism screening dragnet sits a two-tier identity architecture built after September 11, 2001 through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6, September 2003), Executive Order 13354 (August 2004), and Section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Upstream, NCTC maintains **TIDE**, the U.S. government’s central *classified* repository of international terrorist identities and derogatory intelligence, linking names and aliases to biographic, biometric, documentary, and relationship records [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Purely domestic terrorism identities fall outside TIDE’s international-terrorism scope and are held instead in the FBI’s Sentinel system, processed by the Terrorist Review and Examinations Unit (TREX) [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). TIDE expanded substantially as nomination pipelines matured, growing from roughly 1.6 million individuals in February 2017 (including approximately 16,000 U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents) to approximately **2.5 million individuals** by October 2020, with U.S. persons representing less than 1% of the total [\[39\]](https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf). According to Combating Terrorism Center at West Point analysis, NCTC reviews roughly 30 million new travel and immigration applications annually, while NCTC fact sheets document ongoing pruning—deleting over 228,000 TIDE records over six years through 2017 and roughly 100,000 person records over five years through October 2020 [\[39\]](https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf). Crucially, TIDE is not the operational watchlist queried at airports or roadside traffic stops. Following daily analyst review of nominations, NCTC exports a sensitive-but-unclassified subset of terrorist identifiers in **near real-time** to the FBI-administered **Threat Screening Center (TSC)**—officially renamed from the *Terrorist Screening Center* in late March 2025—which serves as final arbiter for inclusion in the consolidated **Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS)** (formerly TSDB) [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). The TSDS itself resides within the broader **Threat Screening System (TSS)**, which under National Security Presidential Memorandum-7 (NSPM-7) also incorporates military-detainee and transnational-organized-crime datasets [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Interpreting public watchlist totals requires distinguishing raw *records* (including multiple aliases) from *unique persons*. A December 2023 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) report traced watchlist expansion from roughly 150,000 records in 2004 to approximately **1.8 million records** by November 2022 [\[58\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf). Subsequently, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s (PCLOB) January 2025 unclassified oversight report documented that as of August 26, 2024, the TSDS contained approximately **1.1 million unique persons**, of whom fewer than **6,000 (under 0.5%)** were U.S. persons [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Under the *2023 Watchlisting Guidance*, inclusion generally requires *reasonable suspicion*—articulable intelligence or information, under the totality of circumstances, indicating an individual is engaged in, has engaged in, or intends to engage in terrorism or its furtherance—paired with minimum identifying data [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). However, both GAO-25-108349 (August 2025\) and Senate HSGAC confirm that TSDS exports also include **Watchlist Exceptions**: relatives or associates who do not themselves satisfy reasonable suspicion yet trigger enhanced immigration, transportation-credential, or TSA PreCheck vetting [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Historical data hygiene has also proved fragile: a foundational September 2007 DOJ Office of Inspector General audit (Report 07-41) found that 38% of tested watchlist records contained inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent, or outdated data [\[59\]](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038&context=mlr). From the TSC, tailored TSDS subsets—the **No Fly List**, **Selectee List**, **Expanded Selectee List**, **Other Known or Suspected Terrorists (KSTs)**, and **Watchlist Exceptions**—propagate outward to federal screening platforms (CBP’s Automated Targeting System and TECS via the DHS Watchlisting Service, TSA’s Secure Flight, the Department of State’s Consular Consolidated Database and CLASS, and DoD base-access checks), foreign partners, more than **18,000 state, local, tribal, and campus law-enforcement agencies** via the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and over **500 private-sector police and security entities** (such as hospital, university, and prison forces) [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Mapping this interagency architecture onto the civilian ODIN cycle clarifies precisely where HSI provisions operational sensors, triage systems, human corroboration, and upstream nomination feedback—and where erroneous hits must exit into clearance and redress. | Civilian ODIN Stage | Interagency Backbone | HSI Technology & Sensor Provisioning | HSI Personnel & Operational Execution | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | **1\. Observe** | NCTC **TIDE** (classified international identities), FBI Sentinel/TREX (domestic), FBI **TSDS** inside TSS [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Offshore **VSP** consular data feeds, **BITMAP** mobile biometric devices, **ADIS** overstay lists, 19-country **DARTTS** trade data, FinCEN BSA/SARs, commercial data brokers, and cyber/blockchain telemetry [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). | Embedded overseas **VSP Special Agents**, **HSI Attachés & BITMAP Advisors**, **Project Shield America** industry outreach, **Project Campus Sentinel** university liaisons, and domestic field/TFO networks [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). | | **2\. Detect** | CBP **ATS / ATS-P** via DHS Watchlisting Service, TSA Secure Flight, DOS CCD/CLASS, FBI **NCIC** alerts, **IDENT / HART**, FBI NGI, DoD ABIS [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). | **PATRIOT** automated 36-point visa screening, **VSPTS**, **CTLD LeadTrac** risk scoring (Priority 1–9 vs. Non-Priority 10), **ICE NTC** positive TIDE-match tracking, **ICM** case hub, and commercial analytics (Palantir, Clearview AI, TRM Labs) [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | Co-located **HSI & CBP NTC analysts** vetting flagged visa hits across \>40 databases; **CTLD analysts** querying 20 databases; **ICE NTC** officers issuing TIDE notifications to SAC Areas of Responsibility; **TTU** and **C3** specialists [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | | **3\. Identify** | FBI **Threat Screening Center** identity confirmation, FBI-led **JTTFs**, Disruptive Technology Strike Force, Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | **ICM** link records, **Technical Enforcement Officer (TEO)** court-ordered wiretaps, consensual body wires, cell-site simulators (CSS), pole cameras, covert browsing infrastructure, and digital forensics (Cellebrite, Magnet) [\[23\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). | **HSI Special Agents** serving as JTTF case/co-case agents, primary **Confidential Informant (CI)** Control Agents (with TFO alternates), and operatives inside **Certified Undercover Operations (CUCs)** corroborating intent and mapping networks [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | | **4\. Neutralize** | DOJ U.S. Attorneys’ Offices & National Security Division, Commerce BIS/OEE, Treasury OFAC, DOS Consular Affairs, Executive Office for Immigration Review [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). | Seizure and covert operation of illicit websites/wallets, **AVU/TECS** entry-bar lookouts, asset forfeiture tracking, and **upward TIDE / TSDS / DoD BEWL nominations** feeding back to Stage 1 [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). | Criminal arrests and prosecutions (Titles 8, 18, 19, 21, AECA/ECRA/IEEPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B), visa refusal recommendations and revocations, administrative removals, currency/crypto forfeitures, and host-nation offshore interdictions [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | | **Parallel Track: Clearance & Redress** | FBI **TSC** encounter resolution, **DHS TRIP**, TSA Cleared List, **DHS I\&A** redress monitoring, federal judicial review [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). | Manual **BITMAP** compliance review and expungement across IDENT/HART, NGI, and ABIS; **CSS** post-mission non-target identifier deletion; ATS cleared-match retention limits (7 years) [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). | ICE **BITMAP analysts** purging improper U.S.-person records; **OBIM Privacy Officer** and **ICE FOIA** redress channels; **ICE OPR** audits; judicial *Brady/Giglio* enforcement [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). | In day-to-day operation, the dragnet’s frontline observation layer exhibits substantial reporting leakage. A January 2026 Government Accountability Office audit (**GAO-26-108650**) established that **2,198 nonfederal law-enforcement entities** across all 50 states reported positive terrorist-watchlist encounters to the FBI from FY 2019 through FY 2024 [\[49\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Yet across 26 structured interview groups representing 55 nonfederal law-enforcement entities (including state and urban fusion centers) in California, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia, **12 of 26 groups** reported that officers do not consistently report potential watchlist encounters or call the TSC as advised by NCIC responses, and **13 of 26** did not believe all officers were prepared to handle a watchlist encounter [\[49\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Because NCIC messages *advise* rather than *mandate* calling the TSC—and because the FBI redacted annual encounter counts, top-10 agencies, and citizenship splits as law-enforcement sensitive—the true scale of nonfederal watchlist encounters and subsequent investigative contact remains publicly unquantified [\[49\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf). Inside DHS, HSI bridges this intelligence pipeline through its **National Security Unit (NSU)** within the National Security Investigations Division (NSID) [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). NSU operates an **ICE National Targeting Center (ICE NTC)** section tasked specifically with documenting all positive TIDE matches and national-security matters in the ICE NTC database [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). Under HSI’s *National Security Investigations Handbook* and HSI Directive 12.02 ("Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment"), whenever ICE NTC identifies a positive TIDE match or national-security subject inside a Special Agent in Charge’s (SAC) Area of Responsibility (AOR) outside a port of entry, it must notify the relevant SAC or designee for field follow-up [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). Simultaneously, HSI’s offshore VSP and BITMAP platforms feed newly collected biographic and biometric data *upward* into TIDE, TSDS, and the Department of Defense’s Biometrically Enabled Watchlist (BEWL), transforming HSI from a passive consumer into an active producer of upstream identity intelligence [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). ## **3\. The HSI Workforce: Personnel Architecture, Statutory Leverage, and JTTF Force Multiplication** Because automated dragnets yield leads rather than admissible courtroom proof, the preemptive capacity of a civilian ODIN system depends directly on the scale, specialization, and statutory reach of its human investigators. Publicly reported HSI headcount figures vary slightly by scope and reporting vintage. ICE’s official *FY 2024 Annual Report* documents more than **6,950 HSI special agents** and over **1,800 additional federal personnel** (criminal analysts and mission support—totaling roughly 8,750 federal employees, matching a September 2025 DHS regional fact sheet citing more than 8,700 personnel), augmented abroad by more than **700 foreign personnel** across 14 Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) and three international task forces in 17 countries [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). Official ICE recruitment pages and DHS leadership biographies from 2024–2025 cite a broader total workforce exceeding **10,400 employees**—including approximately **7,100 special agents**, **800 criminal analysts**, mission support staff, and contract personnel—plus more than **4,000 federal, state, local, and tribal Task Force Officers (TFOs)** nationwide [\[4\]](https://www.ice.gov/hsi/careers). By contrast, the FY 2027 ICE Congressional Budget Justification itemizes **7,967 positions and 7,965 FTE** (5,844 Special Agent FTEs and 2,121 operational/administrative FTEs) strictly within HSI’s *Domestic Investigations* appropriation—excluding International Operations, Intelligence, and fee-funded or reimbursable billets such as SEVP, which accounts for the difference relative to enterprise-wide headcount [\[81\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf). Structurally, HSI deploys across a domestic network parallel to the FBI’s field-office map: **30 regional principal field offices** led by SACs (as reported across ICE FY 2024 disclosures and contractor program documentation) overseeing **237 domestic cities** in FY 2024 (over 250 domestic offices in current ICE recruiting materials), linked globally to **94 international offices in 56 countries** [\[1\]](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf). From headquarters in Washington, D.C., HSI organizes specialized human and technical capabilities across Domestic Operations, International Operations (managing attachés, TCIUs, VSP/PATRIOT, and BITMAP), the **National Security Investigations Division (NSID)** (overseeing NSU, CTLD, SEVP, Human Rights Violators and War Crimes, and Counter-Proliferation Investigations), the **Office of Intelligence** (housing the Illicit Finance Unit, Illicit Trade Unit, El Paso Intelligence Center \[EPIC\] analysts, and the interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center \[HSTC\]), and the **Cyber Crimes Center (C3)** in Fairfax, Virginia (integrating the Cyber Crimes Unit, Computer Forensics Unit, and Child Exploitation Investigations Unit) [\[2\]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf). Budget disclosures from the April 2026 *FY 2027 ICE Congressional Budget Justification* highlight a striking resource asymmetry inside ICE: despite HSI’s global criminal and national-security mandate, HSI accounts for less than one-third of combined annual Operations and Support (O\&S) funding across ICE’s two directorates [\[81\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf). | ICE Operations & Support (O\&S) Program | FY 2025 Full-Year CR (\$K) | FY 2026 Annualized CR (\$K) | FY 2027 President's Budget (\$K) | FY 2026 → FY 2027 Change | Share of Directorate / Staffing Detail | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | **HSI — Domestic Investigations** | \$2,138,131 | \$2,138,131 | \$2,270,289 | \+\$132,158 (+6.18%) | | | **HSI — International Operations** | \$214,323 | \$214,323 | \$230,424 | \+\$16,101 (+7.51%) | | | **HSI — Intelligence** | \$106,651 | \$106,651 | \$111,398 | \+\$4,747 (+4.45%) | | | **Total HSI Operations & Support** | **\$2,459,105** | **\$2,459,105** | **\$2,612,111** | **\+\$153,006 (+6.22%)** | | | **ERO — Custody Operations** | \$3,840,500 | \$3,840,500 | \$3,687,350 | \-\$153,150 (-3.99%) | | | **ERO — Transportation & Removal** | \$830,642 | \$830,642 | \$747,778 | \-\$82,864 (-9.98%) | | | **ERO — Alternatives to Detention** | \$390,989 | \$390,989 | \$474,682 | \+\$83,693 (+21.41%) | | | **ERO — Criminal Alien Program & Fugitive Ops** | \$506,334 | \$506,334 | \$456,069 | \-\$50,265 (-9.93%) | | | **Total ERO Operations & Support** | **\$5,568,465** | **\$5,568,465** | **\$5,365,879** | **\-\$202,586 (-3.64%)** | | Note: Separate from annual O\&S appropriations (and \$28.1 million in FY 2025–FY 2026 PC\&I funding for ICM, dropping to \$0 in the FY 2027 request [\[81\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo_fy27-budget-immigration-and-customs-enforcement.pdf)), two congressional reconciliation statutes—Public Law 119-21 (2025) and the Secure America Act (Public Law 119-98, June 2026)—injected massive multi-year mandatory funding through September 2029\. An October 2026 American Immigration Council analysis of ICE SF-133 and OMB execution data calculates that ICE retained \$91 billion in unspent reconciliation funds as of October 2026 (including \$75 billion directly from P.L. 119-21: \$45 billion for detention and \$29.8 billion for enforcement and hiring), with roughly 12,000 new officers already hired [\[84\]](https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-funding-mass-deportation/). HSI’s outsized impact inside FBI-led JTTFs derives from statutory leverage rather than sheer headcount. While the FBI holds primary federal jurisdiction over terrorism crimes (18 U.S.C. § 2332b(f)) and maintains operational control over all JTTF cases—even when an HSI special agent serves as lead case agent—charging early-stage plots under pure material-support statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) is frequently premature or dependent on classified intelligence that cannot be exposed in court [\[11\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). According to figures presented by HSI NSID Deputy Assistant Director Louis Rodi at a Washington Institute policy forum (and echoed in congressional hearing testimony), HSI represents roughly **3%** of total JTTF manpower—across a nationwide task-force network exceeding 4,100 federal, state, and local personnel, where HSI fields the largest external partner federal contingent (second-largest federal contingent overall after the FBI, per Congressional Research Service analysis)—yet participates directly in **over 89%** of JTTF investigations and leads **45% to 50%** of annual JTTF disruptions [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). No independent public audit reproduces those exact percentages because the FBI classifies agency-by-agency JTTF staffing, though DHS OIG-20-59 (August 2020\) independently reviewed HSI’s JTTF arrest and indictment metrics, found the data reliable, and affirmed that HSI effectively contributes to JTTF counterterrorism operations [\[44\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). HSI’s *National Security Investigations Handbook* instructs SACs to designate HSI agents as case or co-case agents whenever ICE statutory authorities offer the primary legal avenue to disrupt a threat, and forbids SAC offices from reducing JTTF staffing below reported baselines without prior NSU Unit Chief concurrence [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). The table below details the statutory pillars that enable HSI to open parallel criminal or administrative disruption tracks early in an adversary’s planning cycle. | Statutory Pillar | Core Code Citations | Investigative & Disruptive Capability | Operational Constraints & 2025–2026 Developments | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | **Customs & Border Enforcement** | 19 U.S.C. § 1589a; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1481, 1484, 1628 [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf) | Broad federal felony enforcement authority; warrantless border search of persons, cargo, and electronic devices; international biometric/customs data sharing (BITMAP); cross-designation of TFOs as *Customs Officers (Excepted)* under HSI Directive 18-02 [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). | Electronic border searches remain split across federal circuits: the 9th Cir. (*Cano*, 2019\) limits forensic exams to reasonable suspicion of *digital contraband*; the 1st Cir. (*Alasaad*, 2021\) allows evidence searches; the 2nd Cir. (*Alisigwe*, Sept 2026\) upheld suspicionless manual phone checks, while months-long warrantless forensic imaging continues to draw legal challenge [\[89\]](https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-133/united-states-v-cano/). | | **Immigration & Administrative Disruption** | 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1363a; INA § 274A; 2007 DHS–FBI MOA [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf) | Visa and benefit fraud prosecutions, overstay enforcement, administrative detention, and removal of *Aliens of National Security Interest* when criminal terrorism charges are unavailable [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | TFO cross-designations under 19 U.S.C. § 1589a explicitly exclude administrative immigration enforcement [\[86\]](https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16); however, EO 14159 (Jan 2025\) pulled core HSI special agents heavily into Title 8 enforcement [\[19\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). | | **Export Controls & Counterproliferation** | AECA/ITAR, ECRA/EAR, IEEPA, TWEA [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf) | HSI serves as the primary—and by agency characterization, sole—federal law enforcement body with full criminal jurisdiction across all U.S. military, dual-use, and sanctions export statutes [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). | Anchors HSI’s Counter-Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit, Counterproliferation Mission Center (CPMC, formerly Exodus Command South), and the HSI-led Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C [\[2\]](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf), EO 13558\) [\[72\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/mancuso-testimony-01-23-2024/). | | **General Criminal, Smuggling & Terrorism** | 18 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 545, 554, 555, 1956, 2339B [\[76\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support) | Smuggling, cross-border tunnels, money laundering, wire fraud, and material support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—extended in 2025–2026 to FTO-designated cartels and transnational gangs [\[76\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support). | Domestic wiretaps require Title III judicial orders; JTTF-detailed HSI agents may request FBI-issued National Security Letters (NSLs) in international terrorism cases while retaining independent administrative subpoena authority [\[9\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf). | | **Controlled Substances (Title 21\)** | 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, 963, 967 [\[45\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf) | Border-nexus drug and fentanyl investigations, historically executed under DEA cross-designation agreements (1994 MOU, 2009 Agreement, 2021 Joint Letter) [\[45\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf). | Following a Jan 2025 DOJ OLC opinion, a **May 26, 2026 Acting Attorney General Memorandum** delegated Title 21 authority to ICE subject to monthly CSA training reports; GAO-26-107414 (Sept 2026\) found unresolved ambiguity over prior DEA coordination rules [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). | | **Certified Undercover Exemptions** | 19 U.S.C. § 2081; 8 U.S.C. § 1363a [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf) | Statutory exemption from Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) to run proprietary commercial fronts, covert accounts, and backstopped cover identities [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). | Certification authority cannot be delegated below the HSI/OI Director; operations face biennial ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) financial audits [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). | Even inside task-force structures, legacy bureaucratic boundaries impede speed. DHS OIG-20-59 (August 2020\) documented four operational bottlenecks: (1) an internal October 2019 HSI assessment concluded **97 additional JTTF positions** were needed nationwide to cover HSI’s task-force responsibilities; (2) the **May 2003 DHS–DOJ Terrorism Financing MOA**—which dismantled Customs’ Operation Green Quest and mandated FBI deconfliction—was severely outdated, referencing defunct units such as the Joint Vetting Unit, yet DHS non-concurred with renegotiating it; (3) an existing DHS–State Department agreement barred HSI JTTF agents from sharing passport data with FBI partners without prior State approval, creating information silos; and (4) TSA policy forced HSI JTTF agents through multi-layered written approvals (TSA Chief Counsel, Privacy Officer, and Intelligence) to access time-sensitive **Secure Flight** passenger data [\[44\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). A parallel friction surfaced in counternarcotics: GAO-26-107414 (September 2026\) found DEA and HSI failed to finalize mandatory joint Title 21 training or sustain their Headquarters Review Team, with DEA agents occasionally arresting mutual targets after deconfliction meetings without notifying HSI, while HSI submitted vague operational plans lacking target or intelligence specifics [\[45\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf). ## **4\. Provisioning the "Observe" and "Detect" Layers: Offshore Screening, Biometrics, Overstay Triage, and Commercial Data** HSI extends the civilian ODIN observation and detection layers well outside U.S. territory while integrating overstay, trade, cyber, and commercial data domestically. Empirically, these pipelines demonstrate both the selectivity of automated triage and the acute collapse in outcomes when field staffing, policy rules, or analytics software fracture. ### **Offshore Pre-Travel Screening: The Visa Security Program (VSP) and PATRIOT** Authorized under Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and initiated in Saudi Arabia in 2003, HSI’s **Visa Security Program (VSP)** embeds special agents and locally employed staff inside high-risk U.S. embassies and consulates to screen foreign applicants before travel [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). VSP expanded from 20 operational posts in FY 2014 to 36 posts in 27 countries by FY 2019, reaching **45 consular posts in 29 countries** as audited in DHS OIG-22-70 (September 2022\) [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). Prior to FY 2014, overseas VSP agents screened visa applications manually. In FY 2014, HSI International Operations and CBP deployed the **Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT)** workflow (DHS/ICE/PIA-052) [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). Under PATRIOT, 100% of online nonimmigrant visa applications (DS-160 submitted via State’s Consular Electronic Application Center) at VSP posts are routed through CBP’s **Automated Targeting System–Passenger (ATS-P)**, which automatically screens 36 applicant data points against TECS, the FBI’s TSDS/TSDB (via the DHS Watchlisting Service), NCTC’s TIDE, and State’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). Applications showing no derogatory matches receive an automated "no objection" clearance; potential hits route to U.S.-based ICE and CBP analysts co-located at CBP’s **National Targeting Center (NTC)**, who manually vet flagged applicants across **more than 40 classified, law-enforcement, and open-source systems** before passing intelligence packages to embedded overseas HSI VSP agents [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). Those field agents interview applicants, coordinate with host-nation police, open visa-fraud or counterterrorism investigations, and submit refusal recommendations to Department of State consular officers, who retain final statutory authority over visa issuance [\[14\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf). Audit and testimony figures quantify the high selectivity of this offshore dragnet. Across FY 2019 through FY 2021, VSP/PATRIOT screened **4,510,561 visa applications**, automatically clearing **4,331,384 (96.03%)** and routing **179,177 (3.97%)** to manual analyst vetting [\[65\]](https://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf). Earlier FY 2018 figures presented in Senate Finance Committee testimony illustrate downstream yields: out of **2,196,708 applications** screened in FY 2018, VSP issued **9,007 visa refusal recommendations (0.41%)**, conducted **5,101 overseas agent interviews**, generated **1,251 watchlist nominations or enhancements (0.057%)** (a workflow GAO-18-314 directly links to upstream TIDE nominations and record enhancements), and initiated **348 formal criminal investigations** [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). Nevertheless, DHS OIG-22-70 identified technical seams: ATS-P did not log individual screening transactions for all 36 data points; character limits and programming bugs in ICE’s **Visa Security Program Tracking System (VSPTS)** truncated analyst notes transferred from ATS-P; and while ICE estimated FY 2021 VSP costs at \~\$64million,CBP(~\$203 million NTC budget) did not track its VSP support costs separately [\[65\]](https://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf). ### **Offshore Biometric Interdiction: BITMAP and the IDENT-to-HART Bottleneck** Where VSP filters legal consular traffic, HSI’s **Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP)**—established in 2011 under 19 U.S.C. § 1628 and HSPD-6, HSPD-11, and HSPD-24—targets irregular migration and smuggling corridors well ahead of U.S. borders [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). Structured as a host-country-led program supervised by HSI Attachés and BITMAP Advisors, HSI equips vetted foreign police units with mobile biometric capture devices to enroll fingerprints and biographic details of third-country nationals reasonably suspected of terrorism ties, transnational crime, or migration violations [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). Foreign partners tag enrollments with one of four Targeting Selection Criteria (including *International and National Security*) and transmit records to HSI for screening against DHS’s **IDENT** biometric repository, which interoperates with the FBI’s **Next Generation Identification (NGI)** and DoD’s **Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS)** [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). Derogatory hits are shared back on a case-by-case basis to enable host-nation interdiction [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). By November 2020, BITMAP operated in **18 countries** [\[98\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/final_hsac_biometrics_subcommittee_report_11-12-2020.pdf). According to June 2019 Senate HSGAC testimony by ICE leadership, cumulative FY 2011–FY 2018 BITMAP enrollments exceeded **94,000 persons of interest**, producing **over 450 KST enrollments**, **more than 230 matches to the DoD BEWL**, and **1,500 new identities added to the DoD BEWL** (with FY 2018 alone accounting for \>41,000 enrollments, 31 KST enrollments, and 81 biometric enhancements to existing KST records) [\[75\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Nevano-2019-06-26.pdf). *Biometric Update* reporting on U.S. diplomatic releases in January 2026 documented continuing Latin American expansion, including a March 2025 biometric cooperation statement with Colombia, a July 2025 BITMAP Letter of Intent with Chile, and a January 2026 HSI deployment inside Peru’s prison system (enrolling 241 foreign inmates at Lima’s Lurigancho Prison and surfacing U.S. criminal records, alias usage, and suspected transnational or terrorist ties) [\[99\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202601/us-expands-biometric-security-cooperation-abroad). Under DHS/ICE/PIA-065 (March/April 2025), BITMAP incorporates mandatory State Department **Leahy Law** human-rights vetting (22 U.S.C. § 2378d) before deployment, manual ICE analyst compliance review of every enrollment (requiring expungement of U.S. persons or Special Protected Classes absent a valid law-enforcement purpose), and remote device-deactivation controls if misuse occurs [\[16\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf). Yet BITMAP and domestic DHS screening remain tethered to legacy biometric infrastructure. DHS’s Level-1 (\$1 billion-plus) acquisition to replace IDENT with the cloud-based, multimodal **Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART)** system slipped more than seven years past its original December 2018 target [\[101\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes). Although GAO-26-108118 (June 2026\) listed HART Increment 1 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for September 2026 (following FY 2026 appropriations lapses), *Biometric Update* noted that an October 8, 2026 OBIM solicitation and a September 30, 2026 \$11.2 million Thales maintenance award covering both IDENT and HART through September 2027 still described IDENT as DHS’s active central repository and HART as in-development [\[101\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes). Domestically, DHS OIG-24-27 (June 2024\) documented parallel port-of-entry vulnerabilities: CBP lacked biometric capture for vehicle lanes at land ports of entry, officers frequently queried only drivers rather than passengers to reduce wait times (with 29 supervisors admitting they consistently directed driver-only queries), and USCIS left over 400,000 affirmative asylum applicants without interim screening past the 180-day mark [\[103\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-06/OIG-24-27-Jun24-Redacted.pdf). ### **Domestic Overstay and Academic Triage: CTCEU to CTLD and Enforcement Attrition** Inside the United States, HSI’s visa-compliance dragnet historically resided in NSID’s **Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU)**, which DHS formally relaunched on **February 24, 2022 as the Counter Threat Lead Development Unit (CTLD)** [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). CTLD works alongside ICE’s **Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)**—tracking over 1.13 million active F-1 and M-1 nonimmigrant students (including 558,784 STEM students in May 2019)—and operates **Project Campus Sentinel** (over 4,000 academic outreaches connecting university Designated School Officials directly with local HSI agents) and the **Domestic Mantis** program (semiannually vetting nonimmigrant students from elevated-risk countries who shift into sensitive STEM fields against Intelligence Community holdings) [\[10\]](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf). Daily, CBP’s **Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS)** feeds automated lists of suspected in-country visa overstays to HSI CTLD [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). CTLD analysts run queries across 20 government and commercial databases (historically supplemented by open-source social-media vetting contractors such as Giant Oak) and manage leads inside the subject-centered **LeadTrac** application (DHS/ICE/PIA-044, maintained under multi-million-dollar O\&M contracts with Strategic Operations Solutions) [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). Under March 2021 *Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel Guidance*, CTLD categorizes leads into **Priority 1–9** (national security and public safety risk weighted by age, country-of-origin tier, and gender) versus **Non-Priority 10** (96.7% of volume, verified and routed to ERO’s National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center) [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). A September 29, 2026 audit (**DHS OIG-26-38**) reveals how dramatically a screening dragnet’s yield collapses when field capacity and enforcement policy disconnect from automated detection [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). Between FY 2021 and FY 2024, ICE received **3,145,375** nonimmigrant overstay leads from CBP. CTLD categorized **104,049 (3.31%)** as Priority 1–9 threats—including **1,769 Priority 1** highest-threat leads—and identified **21,885** viable leads [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). Yet across all four fiscal years combined, HSI initiated only **496 lead-driven investigations (2.27% of viable leads)** and made just **8 lead-initiated arrests** (averaging two annually)—including only **84 investigations (4.75%)** and **2 arrests** from 1,769 Priority 1 leads (alongside 446 additional overstay arrests originating from prior-year leads or unrelated gang/criminal investigations) [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). ERO’s processing of 2,837,188 Non-Priority 10 leads produced just 5 investigations and 2 arrests [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). By comparison, under the FY 2018 CTCEU baseline (documented in DHS’s *Comprehensive Strategy for Overstay Enforcement and Deterrence*), out of more than 1.4 million suspected overstay leads, CTCEU referred **8,968 investigative leads** to HSI field offices, yielding **1,808 arrests (20.16% conversion), 117 indictments, and 57 convictions** [\[74\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ice_-_comprehensive_strategy_for_overstay_enforcement_and_deterrence_1.pdf). OIG-26-38 attributed the FY 2021–2024 drop to three drivers: a September 2021 *Civil Enforcement Priorities Memo* limiting HSI field offices to Priority 1 leads, inaccurate address records obstructing physical location, and insufficient agent resources [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). ### **Trade Transparency, Blockchain Tracing, and Commercial Data Brokers** Beyond traveler and overstay feeds, HSI provisions three additional high-volume observation networks covering illicit finance, cybercrime, and commercial telemetry. **Trade Transparency and Export Early Warning**: HSI’s **Trade Transparency Unit (TTU)** exchanges bilateral customs import/export records with **19 foreign partner nations** (including Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia) and cross-analyzes FinCEN Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) financial data inside the **Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency System (DARTTS)** (migrated from legacy FALCON-DARTTS into RAVEn in 2022–2023) to detect trade-based money laundering (TBML) anomalies such as over-invoicing, under-invoicing, and ghost shipping [\[62\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf). Yet DHS OIG-23-41 (August 2023\) found the TTU severely under-resourced—staffed by only **one full-time section chief and three full-time criminal research specialists** (supplemented by rotating 18-month detailees requiring six months of ramp-up) and lacking any automated targeting algorithms to scan **more than 1.9 billion import records** manually [\[62\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf). Even under manual constraints, TTU-supported investigations produced 444 criminal arrests and over \$356 million in seizures across FY 2019–FY 2021 [\[62\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf). In parallel, HSI’s El Dorado Task Force trains private financial institutions to flag terrorist financing and trafficking in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), while **Project Shield America** conducts industry and academic briefings to enlist semiconductor, aerospace, and defense exporters as early-warning sensors against illicit foreign procurement [\[42\]](https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi). **Cybercrime and Public-Private Blockchain Tracing**: HSI’s **Cyber Crimes Center (C3)** anchors digital forensics, darknet investigations, and cyber-financial tracing [\[66\]](https://cina.gmu.edu/cina-federal-internship-research-project-opportunities-dhs-cyber-crimes-center-fairfax-va/). Marking a major structural shift on **November 18, 2026**, the DHS- and DOJ-co-led **Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)**—linking more than 30 federal agencies and over 440 state and local partners under Executive Order 14390 (March 2026)—launched a standing **Threat Disruption Center** powered by blockchain-analytics vendor **TRM Labs** (operating under a \$94.66 million federal contract through August 2027, per procurement filings reported by *The Block* and *MLQ.ai*) [\[22\]](https://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/). Responding to \$20.9 billion in reported 2025 FBI IC3 cybercrime losses—including 181,565 cryptocurrency complaints and \$7.2 billion in crypto investment fraud largely run by Southeast Asian syndicates exploiting trafficked labor—acting HSI Executive Associate Director John A. Condon framed the center as a real-time public-private fusion model enabling exchanges, payment processors, and social media firms to freeze wallets and remove accounts proactively alongside court-authorized seizures [\[22\]](https://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/). **Commercial Data Brokers, Biometrics, and Telemetry**: To fill gaps in government repositories, DHS has scaled commercial surveillance procurement sharply. A **July 2026 Brennan Center for Justice procurement tracker** compiled **more than \$2.9 billion** in DHS contract obligations for surveillance, biometric, and data-analytics tools between January 2021 and mid-2026—led by **\$1.1 billion** in biometrics (General Dynamics \$443.9M, Amentum \$310.3M, NEC’s *Mobile Fortify* field facial-recognition app \$42.4M, BI2 iris scanners \$29.7M), **\$675 million-plus** for CBP General Atomics drones, **\$228.6 million** for commercial data brokers (Relx/LexisNexis \$53.7M, Thomson Reuters \$35.5M, Whooster), and **\$130.4 million** for phone-content access and wiretaps (Cellebrite \$60M, Magnet Forensics \$19.1M, JSI Telecom wiretaps \$24.2M[\$7M ICE\], and a ≥\$2M ICE contract with Israeli spyware maker **Paragon**) [\[23\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). Pre-award records compiled by the Immigration Policy Tracking Project additionally document a **\$9.2 million September 2025 HSI contract with Clearview AI** for access to a proprietary database exceeding 50 billion facial images [\[21\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). HSI also utilizes commercial location and social-media suites (Babel Street’s *Webloc* and Penlink’s *Tangles*), Flock license-plate reader queries routed through local police, and over 292,000 ICE Nlets queries in the 12 months ending October 2025 (per National Immigration Forum analysis) [\[23\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). Internally, **DHS OIG-23-61** (September 2023\) established that ICE held nine contracts across two **Commercial Telemetry Data (CTD)** mobile-advertising location databases and ran **over 16,000 queries in FY 2020** continuously since September 2018 *without an approved Privacy Impact Assessment*; OIG interviews across CBP, ICE, and the Secret Service further uncovered shared logins, ad hoc recordkeeping, and absent supervisory reviews, yet ICE non-concurred with OIG’s recommendation to halt CTD use pending PIA approval [\[112\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf). ## **5\. Provisioning the "Identify" and "Neutralize" Layers: Human Sources, Certified Undercover Tradecraft, and Multi-Modal Disruption** A TIDE notification, PATRIOT alert, or anomalous trade cluster only opens an investigative lead; converting detection into lawful preemption relies on HSI’s human investigative disciplines—confidential informants, certified undercover operations, and technical surveillance—bounded by federal evidentiary and constitutional rules. ### **Confidential Informants, Certified Undercover Operations, and Technical Enforcement Officers** At the case level, HSI operates **Confidential Informants (CIs)**—distinct from Cooperating Defendants and Sources of Information—tracked in the Confidential and Other Sources of Information repository (DHS/ICE-010) and governed by the *HSI Informants Handbook* [\[17\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). Under HSI Special Agent training standards, while other employees may cultivate leads, **only sworn HSI Special Agents** are authorized to document and serve as primary **Control Agents** (HSI TFOs may act as alternate control agents) [\[17\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). Every CI requires standardized documentation on **ICE Form 73-045** (retained for five years), an in-person initial and annual suitability evaluation by both the Control Agent and Group Supervisor, signed and witnessed instructions (Appendix D) affirming that the informant is neither an ICE employee nor permitted to carry firearms or break the law, and witnessed taxable payment/moiety receipts on **ICE Form 73-049** [\[17\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). Restricted informant categories require written SAC or Deputy Assistant Director (Investigative Services) approval, and formal identity disclosure requires Executive Associate Director authorization—subject in criminal proceedings to constitutional impeachment disclosures under the ***Giglio*** **Doctrine** and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 [\[17\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf). However, **GAO-15-807** found ICE’s written policies only *partially consistent* with Attorney General Guidelines regarding advance 90-day written authorizations, documented risk-benefit findings, signed scope acknowledgments, and revocation procedures when authorizing CIs to commit **Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA)**—weakening ICE’s ability to prosecute informants who exceed authorized bounds [\[114\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-807.pdf). For deeper network penetration, HSI deploys **Certified Undercover Operations (CUCs)** authorized under **19 U.S.C. § 2081** and **8 U.S.C. § 1363a** [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). A CUC provides an umbrella administrative and fiscal certification exempting covert operations from standard FAR and FTR rules, authorizing proprietary commercial front companies, covert bank accounts, backstopped identity documents, leased civilian vehicles, and stripped covert browsing infrastructure capable of monitoring dark-web forums and encrypted apps (such as Signal) without leaving U.S. government digital signatures [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). Approval tiers scale with risk and duration: Group Supervisors approve routine undercover contacts; SACs authorize localized projects and non-FAR cover-agent travel; the HSI/OI Director holds non-delegable certification authority and approves 6-to-12-month projects; **ICE and DHS Undercover Review Committees (URCs)** review operations involving sensitive circumstances; and highly intrusive conduct (illegal wiretapping, mail openings, trespass, or breaking and entering) is barred without U.S. Attorney’s Office approval [\[18\]](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf). Undercover proceeds (capped below \$500,000 where feasible) undergo biennial financial audits by ICE’s **Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)**, and ICE retains contract psychologists to mitigate operative trauma [\[77\]](https://www.ice.gov/opr). Covert administrative records themselves carry operational-security vulnerabilities: media reporting (*WIRED*, *BBC*, *Nextgov*) on the October 28, 2026 "Icepick" leak published by DDoSecrets documented the exposure of work records for 41,191 DHS personnel and contractors (including \~6,600 to 10,000 ICE staff), with *WIRED* identifying **39 HSI employees** associated with internal permission groups referencing certified undercover operations [\[116\]](https://guptadeepak.com/dhs-icepick-leak-okta-identity-lessons/). Complementing human operatives, HSI **Technical Enforcement Officers (TEOs)** execute electronic surveillance under DHS/ICE/PIA-061 (January 2022\) [\[51\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). Consensual body wires worn by undercover agents or informants require one-party consent, written Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) concurrence, and supervisor plus SAC approval via an Electronic Surveillance Request (ELSUR) inside **Investigative Case Management (ICM)** for up to 90 days (renewable), followed by a Report of Use within five business days [\[51\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). **Cell-site simulators (CSS / Stingrays)**—which capture relative signal strength and direction without intercepting communications content—require a Rule 41 probable-cause search warrant approved by a first-level supervisor under normal conditions; exigent warrantless use requires second-level supervisory approval, duty-AUSA coordination, a Pen Register Statute (18 U.S.C. § 3125\) court application within 48 hours, and immediate deletion of non-target mobile identifiers upon mission completion [\[51\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf). Yet **DHS OIG-23-17** (February 2023\) found that during FY 2020–FY 2021, although HSI secured warrants in routine deployments, agents operated CSS in exigent multi-agency cases *without* applying for 48-hour pen register orders—improperly assuming partner agencies handled court filings—and operated CSS without an approved PIA until January 2022 [\[119\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-03/OIG-23-17-Feb23-Redacted.pdf). ### **Operational Proof and Legal Boundaries: Comparative Case Matrix** Federal prosecutions and appellate decisions demonstrate both how HSI’s personnel-technology fusion neutralizes plots before harm occurs and where human-source tradecraft crosses constitutional and evidentiary limits. | Case / Operation | Agencies & Human/Tech Layer | Preemptive ODIN Mechanism & Outcome | Legal & Institutional Lesson | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | **Pittsburgh ISIS Church Plot** (*U.S. v. Mustafa Mousab Alowemer*, 2019–2022) [\[120\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support) | Pittsburgh JTTF: FBI (UCE \+ CHS), **HSI**, USCIS, IRS-CI, USSS, USPIS, \+ 7 state/local agencies [\[120\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). | Detected after subject distributed IED instructions to an FBI operative; 4 in-person meetings with UCE/CHS captured bomb supplies (nails, acetone), annotated Google satellite maps, and a 10-point plan to bomb a Pittsburgh church; arrested June 19, 2019 before July target date; sentenced to **208 months** (Nov 2022\) [\[120\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). | Textbook civilian ODIN preemption: inside human visibility corroborates intent and stops a mass-casualty attack left of boom across an HSI-supported JTTF [\[120\]](https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2022/11/man-sentenced-more-17-years-prison-attempting-provide-material-support). | | **Global Terror-Finance Crypto Disruption** (Aug 2020\) [\[73\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns) | **HSI Philadelphia**, IRS-CI, FBI, \+ Chainalysis & Excygent analytics [\[73\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). | Blockchain tracing \+ **undercover HSI agents** engaging Al-Qaeda charity ("Reminder for Syria") admin negotiating surface-to-air missile prices \+ covert U.S. operation of seized alqassam.net redirecting donor bitcoin to U.S.-controlled wallets; seized **\>300 crypto accounts**, 4 websites, and 4 Facebook pages across Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS PPE fraud (FaceMaskCenter.com) [\[73\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). | Demonstrates tight coupling of private blockchain telemetry, HSI undercover cyber tradecraft, and civil forfeiture to sever terrorist financing [\[73\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/global-disruption-three-terror-finance-cyber-enabled-campaigns). | | **Russian Dual-Use Tech Laundering** (*U.S. v. Puzyreva, Goltsev, Nasriddinov*, 2023–2024) [\[68\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile) | Disruptive Technology Strike Force / Task Force KleptoCapture: **HSI**, FBI, Commerce OEE [\[68\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). | Traced structured NY cash deposits, \$700K Hong Kong wires, and two Brooklyn front firms (SH Brothers / SN Electronics) shipping **\>\$7M** in U.S. microelectronics recovered in Russian missiles/UAVs in Ukraine; **\~\$1.68M** seized; money-laundering conspiracy guilty plea [\[68\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). | Underscores HSI’s customs, export-control, and financial leverage against state-backed procurement (alongside HSI’s seizure of 4.8M barrels / \$289M of IRGC-linked petroleum [\[72\]](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/mancuso-testimony-01-23-2024/)) [\[68\]](https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/canadian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-launder-money-scheme-send-uav-and-missile). | | **Non-Traditional JTTF, Cartel-FTO & Cross-Border Fraud** (2013–2026) [\[76\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support) | Dayton JTTF (2013); HSTF/JTFA Cartel cases (2025–2026); Atlanta Fraud (*U.S. v. Adesayo*, Aug 2026): **HSI**, FBI, Secret Service [\[76\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support). | Used immigration false statements, alien address violations, and alien firearm possession to remove Dayton JTTF targets (2013); brought 18 U.S.C. § 2339B FTO material-support charges against CJNG tunnel engineers and cartel facilitators (2025–2026); convicted Atlanta launderer moving **\>\$2.7M** in romance-scam funds to China/Hong Kong/Nigeria (Aug 2026), distinguishing cross-border HSI jurisdiction from purely domestic scams [\[76\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support). | Illustrates HSI’s multi-modal neutralization toolkit—deploying Title 8, 18, 19, and 21 charges interchangeably as FTO designations expand to cartels and transnational gangs [\[93\]](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign). | | **Environmental-Extremism Cautionary Cases** (*U.S. v. McDavid* \[2006–2015\]; *Operation Backfire* \[2005–2006\]) [\[124\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid) | FBI \+ JTTFs (no HSI lead documented in records) [\[124\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid). | In *Backfire*, grand-jury pressure and flipping insider Jacob Ferguson (who wore a wire in exchange for immunity and \$50,000,perjournalisticaccounts)dismantled"TheFamily"(>40ELF/ALFarsons,>\$45M damages, 17 indicted); claims that planted rumors broke up the cell lack documentary proof [\[125\]](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain). In *McDavid*, paid informant "Anna" supplied bomb recipes, cash, and lodging; sentence was reduced to time served in Jan 2015 after the FBI admitted withholding **\~2,500 pages of potentially exculpatory evidence** [\[124\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid). | Exposes core evidentiary and legal risks of human sources: undisclosed *Brady/Giglio* records collapse convictions, and aggressive inducement triggers entrapment reversal under ***Jacobson v. United States*** (503 U.S. 540 \[1992\]), requiring proof of independent predisposition beyond reasonable doubt [\[124\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid). | Historical domestic intelligence abuses define the legal floor separating legitimate disruption from unlawful interference. The Senate’s 1975–1976 **Church Committee** documented that FBI **COINTELPRO** operations intentionally sought to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" domestic political and civil-rights movements via anonymous defamation, infiltration, and "bad-jacketing"—reforms that produced the 1976 Levi Guidelines and modern Justice Department and DHS rules forbidding any investigative or intelligence activity conducted *solely* to monitor First Amendment-protected expression or lawful dissent [\[52\]](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf). Under criminal law, **18 U.S.C. § 1512** likewise prohibits threats, intimidation, misleading conduct, or *corrupt persuasion* aimed at interfering with official testimony or reporting of federal offenses—affirming that undercover authority confers no license to coerce witnesses or silence lawful reporting [\[134\]](https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/t18/s1512/). ## **6\. The 2025–2026 Structural Shock: Mission Realignment, Analytics Collapse, and Oversight Erosion** Between January 2025 and November 2026, four converging shifts reshaped how HSI provisions the civilian ODIN architecture: an unprecedented diversion of special agents into interior immigration enforcement, the failure of HSI’s flagship custom AI platform, aggressive expansion into commercial surveillance and politically contested domestic probes, and the gutting of DHS’s internal civil-rights watchdogs. ### **Workforce Diversion Under EO 14159** On January 20, 2025, Section 4 of **Executive Order 14159** (*Protecting the American People Against Invasion*) instructed DHS to make Immigration and Nationality Act enforcement HSI’s primary mission [\[19\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). Because HSI’s \~7,000 special agents represent a finite pool of experienced criminal investigators, shifting them to routine deportation operations imposed an immediate, documented cost on transnational threat disruption. In **DHS OIG-26-23** (August 20, 2026), auditors measured the resulting operational displacement across HSI’s counter-fentanyl mission [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). From FY 2024 to FY 2025, HSI agent hours logged on **immigration enforcement surged by more than 1.7 million hours (over 800%)**—reaching nearly 2 million hours—while **fentanyl investigative hours fell by more than 250,000 hours (approximately 30% to 31%)**, declining from roughly 824,000 hours to under 570,000 hours [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Initiated fentanyl investigations dropped **24%**, and HSI fentanyl seizures fell **39.1%** (from 33,316 in FY 2024 to 20,292 in FY 2025—down 51.9% from FY 2023’s 42,166 seizures), even as DEA reported an approximate 25% nationwide increase in fentanyl powder seizures during 2025 (from nearly 8,000 to nearly 10,000 pounds) [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Special agents in **9 of 11 interviewed HSI field offices** confirmed reduced capacity for complex criminal investigations under an "all hands on deck" immigration posture; one office reported dedicating **approximately 99% of its work** to immigration, while another saw a seven-agent narcotics team stripped down to two or three agents [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). *The New York Times* reported in November 2025 (as summarized by the Immigration Policy Tracking Project) that DHS-wide reassignments coincided with a 73% plunge in weapons seizures, an 11% decline in narcotics arrests, and a 15% drop in new drug investigations as immigration arrests climbed from roughly 5,000 to over 94,500, alongside weakened capacity for child-exploitation, money-laundering, and terrorism-financing cases [\[19\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/). OIG-26-23 also documented delays in disbursing operational funds to purchase informant information and evidence, causing active criminal leads to expire [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). In response, congressional appropriators and 30 U.S. Senators demanded component-level reassignment disclosures and introduced proposed FY 2027 bill language restricting Title 8 diversions of specialized border and investigative staff [\[138\]](https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/download/hs-explanatory-stmt). ### **Collapse of RAVEn and Pivot to Commercial Surveillance Platforms** Simultaneously, HSI’s marquee internal analytics program failed in the field. Built by the HSI Innovation Lab (DHS/ICE/PIA-055, May 2020; appendix updated June 2025\) under contracts with Booz Allen Hamilton (\$76Mtotalobligations),Acuity(\$50.8M), and Alethix (\$46.7M, per Brennan Center tracking) to supersede legacy FALCON modules and run AI across HSI Reports of Investigation, **RAVEn** cost **more than \$150 million** between FY 2022 and FY 2025 [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Yet DHS OIG-26-23 revealed that agents and analysts in **6 of 11 interviewed offices** abandoned RAVEn because its tools crashed, could not link criminal networks, and forced manual searches—with one officer characterizing the platform as *"atrocious"* [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Out of roughly 6,800 potential HSI users, only **4,491 (66.0%)** accessed RAVEn’s basic Lead Tracker by FY 2025, and just **2,271 (33.4%)** used its primary analytical engine (*Collaborate, Organize, Research, Explore* \[CORE\]) [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Just three years after deployment, HSI began **decommissioning RAVEn’s analytical tools in 2025**, shifting to a contracted commercial platform estimated to cost an additional \$39 million [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Across ICE more broadly, obligations to **Palantir**—developer of ICM, FALCON-SA, ImmigrationOS (\$30M, April 2025), and the new **ELITE** enforcement-targeting software—surged nearly eightfold from **\$20.4 million in 2024 to \$162.2 million in 2026** (\$335.4 million since January 2021, per Brennan Center tracking) [\[21\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/). ### **Domestic Mission Creep, First Amendment Friction, and the Data-Broker Loophole** As HSI’s covert and commercial surveillance apparatus expanded, 2025–2026 litigation and FOIA releases exposed intensifying collisions with domestic constitutional limits. In August 2026, *Biometric Update* reporting on federal court filings in Minnesota revealed that HSI placed an undercover investigation of groups opposing federal immigration operations (**"Operation Puppet Master"**) inside an umbrella certified undercover structure titled **"CUC Op Keyhole"** [\[28\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens). Defense filings documented undercover agents operating across state lines—including recording an immigration-resistance presentation inside a Michigan church—and alleged that undercover operatives offered to construct direct-action materials or join noncooperation action teams, while the government withheld five *Project Whipple Shield* reports of investigation as belonging to a separate active probe [\[28\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens). In a parallel civil suit filed in July 2026 (*EPIC v. Mullin*, S.D. Cal.), EPIC and legal observers alleged that DHS deployed drones, facial-recognition apps (such as NEC’s *Mobile Fortify*, whose privacy documentation acknowledges it can capture biometric images of anyone, including U.S. citizens, and retain photos for 15 years), and license-plate scanners to maintain dossiers on peaceful observers and retaliate by revoking Trusted Traveler privileges [\[23\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools). A separate domestic expansion emerged in October 2026, when ICE FOIA records obtained by Democracy Forward disclosed that pursuant to Executive Order 14248, HSI conducted a nine-state *"coordinated criminal voter fraud surge initiative"*—obtaining over 50 million voter-roll records (per media reporting on the release), examining voter-registration groups, weighing undercover deployments, presenting 68 cases for prosecution, and logging 36 criminal and 56 administrative arrests in 2026 [\[146\]](https://democracyforward.org/work/research/exposing-and-disrupting-federal-attempts-to-interfere-in-the-2026-midterm-elections/). DHS and Secretary Markwayne Mullin (confirmed 54–45 by the Senate on March 23, 2026 and sworn in March 24, succeeding Kristi Noem) defended HSI’s actions as lawful criminal enforcement against noncitizen voting, whereas Senate Democrats and civil-rights plaintiffs challenged their legal foundation and chilling effect ahead of the 2026 midterms, noting consistent empirical studies showing noncitizen voting is rare [\[27\]](https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/documents-show-dhs-probed-nonprofits-obtained-millions-records-hunt-noncitizen-voters). Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment boundary governing commercial telemetry remained unsettled even after the Supreme Court’s landmark **June 29, 2026** decision in ***Chatrie v. United States*** [\[152\]](https://knightcolumbia.org/litigation/chatrie-v-united-states). Ruling 6–3, the Court extended *Carpenter v. United States* to hold that law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment search when acquiring cell-phone geolocation records via a geofence warrant, regardless of limited duration [\[153\]](https://www.fmglaw.com/cyber-privacy-security/supreme-court-rules-geofence-warrants-are-fourth-amendment-searches/). Yet *Chatrie* did not decide whether federal agencies bypass the warrant requirement simply by *purchasing* comparable location histories from commercial data brokers [\[154\]](https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2026/jul/1/surveillance-for-sale-the-data-broker-loophole-and-the-fourth-amendment-after-chatrie/). Following FBI Director Kash Patel’s March 2026 confirmation that federal agencies purchase commercially available information for operational use, nearly 70 Democrats in Congress (led by Sen. Ron Wyden and Rep. Adriano Espaillat) called on the DHS Inspector General to investigate why DHS still had not adopted a formal commercial location-data policy nearly three years after OIG-23-61 [\[156\]](https://fedscoop.com/fbi-data-broker-loophole-purchase-dhs/). ### **Watchlist Redress Deficits and Eroded Internal Guardrails** A lawful civilian ODIN system depends on reliable error correction and independent oversight—precisely the institutional mechanisms that degraded most severely during 2025–2026. On the **watchlist redress** front, empirical data reveals both widespread traveler confusion and stubborn institutional inertia when genuine errors occur. Across all inquiries filed with the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), DHS reports that only about **2%** of petitioners actually match a watchlist record (in 2022, just 9 of 370 complainants who specifically believed they were watchlisted were listed) [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). Yet when clerical or analytical errors do enter the TIDE–TSDS pipeline, automated propagation creates severe, lasting harm. In ***Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security*** (912 F.3d 1147, 9th Cir. en banc 2019), an FBI special agent’s checkbox mistake on a nomination form propagated into the TSDB, IBIS, and the No Fly List, resulting in Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim’s handcuffing at San Francisco International Airport, revocation of her student visa under terrorism-inadmissibility rules, permanent exclusion from the United States, and nearly a decade of litigation—during which the government cycled her on and off watchlists despite determining in February 2006 that she had "no nexus to terrorism" and failed to inform the agent of his error for eight years [\[158\]](https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-circuit/1973923.html). Similarly, in ***FBI v. Fikre*** (601 U.S. 234, March 19, 2024), the Supreme Court unanimously barred the government from mooting No Fly List lawsuits via terse declarations stating a citizen would not be relisted "based on the currently available information"—a precedent already preserving challenges such as *Long v. Garland* in the Fourth Circuit [\[159\]](https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/law-reviews/ilr/pdf/vol59p355.pdf). Even after *Fikre*, PCLOB (January 2025), Senate HSGAC (December 2023), and GAO-25-108349 (August 2025\) documented continuing structural gaps: only U.S. persons on the **No Fly List** receive status confirmation and three-tier administrative review, whereas U.S. persons on the **Selectee List** or Watchlist Exceptions receive non-confirming letters, a single TSC review, no access to classified derogatory bases, and no participation by security-cleared counsel [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). DHS TRIP reports no error or correction statistics to Congress, travelers encounter at least 22 overlapping secondary-screening mechanisms across TSA and CBP, and out of **24 recommendations** GAO issued across seven watchlisting agencies in March 2025 (GAO-25-106333SU)—including annual NCTC U.S.-person nomination reviews and standardized removal timeframes—**23 remained open** as of August 2025, with only DHS I\&A’s redress-monitoring recommendation closed [\[8\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf). Compounding watchlist opacity is an abrupt contraction of **DHS-internal accountability**. As the Brennan Center highlighted in 2023, unlike the FBI, HSI operates without a comprehensive statutory investigative charter or publicly binding domestic operations guidelines [\[30\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download). Between January and October 2025, departmental oversight thinned further across three fronts. First, following a January 20, 2025 freeze on advisory memberships, DHS formally terminated discretionary Federal Advisory Committees effective March 7, 2025 under Executive Order 14217 (90 FR 11995), dismantling both the **Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee (DPIAC)** and the **Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security Board** [\[162\]](https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ). Second, on March 21, 2025, DHS issued Reduction in Force (RIF) notices to virtually the entire non-SES workforce of **CRCL** (\~140–150 staff), the **Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO)** (\~100 staff), and the **CIS Ombudsman** (\~40 staff) [\[25\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/). Although DHS retreated from formal statutory abolition amid federal litigation (*Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights v. DHS*; GAO Impoundment Control Act Decision B-337366), WOLA’s analysis of court filings and depositions—corroborated by *The Guardian*—shows CRCL reduced to a skeleton core (\~2–9 full-time federal employees plus \~25–30 contractors), stalling roughly 550 open investigations and issuing **zero formal recommendation memoranda** between March 2025 and February 2026, while OIDO complaint intake collapsed from 12,664 in FY 2023 to 280 between March and December 2025 [\[25\]](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/). Third, DHS took down its public facial-recognition policy [\[23\]](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools), dissolved its department-level major acquisition oversight office in October 2025 before reconstituting at least part of it in May 2026 (GAO-26-108118) [\[102\]](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108118.pdf), and rejected a GAO recommendation to deploy automatic body-camera activation for ICE [\[28\]](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens)—precisely as \$91 billion in largely unconditioned multi-year reconciliation funds accelerated hiring and technology acquisition [\[84\]](https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-funding-mass-deportation/). ## **7\. Strategic Synthesis: Structural Fault Lines in the Civilian ODIN Model** Assessing HSI’s workforce and dragnet ecosystem as of late 2026 yields a clear institutional conclusion: **the civilian ODIN loop rarely fails for lack of observation—it succeeds or breaks inside the narrow human, technical-integration, and governance corridor linking detection to lawful neutralization.** Four structural fault lines now determine whether HSI remains an effective, constitutionally durable preemptive instrument. First is **human-sensor bandwidth versus mandate diversion**: automated feeds like TIDE, PATRIOT, ADIS, and DARTTS generate millions of signals, yet sworn special agents remain the binding operational constraint. Just as FY 2021–2024 policy restrictions and staffing shortages collapsed domestic CTLD overstay conversion to 8 lead-initiated arrests across 3.15 million leads, FY 2025–2026 Title 8 reassignments under EO 14159 hollowed out HSI’s complex fentanyl, weapons, and financial-crime capacity [\[15\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf). A corps of roughly 7,000 criminal investigators cannot simultaneously function as a mass interior deportation workforce and sustain the deep JTTF, export-control, and undercover network penetration that underpins its outsized counterterrorism disruption share [\[11\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). Second is **data-fusion hygiene versus failed federal builds and commercial lock-in**. With HART still failing to fully retire IDENT more than seven years behind schedule, RAVEn entering decommissioning after absorbing over \$150 million, DARTTS lacking automated TBML detection, and VSPTS exhibiting data-transfer truncation, DHS and HSI have pivoted aggressively toward commercial surveillance ecosystems (Palantir, Clearview AI, TRM Labs, and mobile-location brokers) whose proprietary matching models and third-party data provenance are substantially harder for courts, inspectors general, and Congress to audit [\[20\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf). Third is **statutory leverage versus interagency friction**. HSI’s unmatched utility inside multi-agency task forces rests on its combination of Title 19 customs, Title 8 immigration, Title 18 criminal, Title 21 narcotics, and plenary export-control powers [\[11\]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0). Yet obsolete interagency frameworks—the 2003 DHS–DOJ terrorism-financing MOA, State passport-sharing restrictions, TSA Secure Flight approval bottlenecks, and unresolved post–May 2026 DEA Title 21 coordination ambiguities—repeatedly inject latency into time-critical JTTF and transnational investigations [\[44\]](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf). Fourth is **preemptive reach versus statutory charters and redress integrity**. Sustaining "left-of-boom" disruption inside a constitutional democracy requires legal guardrails proportional to covert and data-fusion power. Without a congressional investigative charter defining HSI’s domestic boundaries, statutory closure of the post-*Chatrie* commercial data-broker loophole, enforceable OIA and undercover authorization rules, meaningful Selectee-tier DHS TRIP redress, and restored internal oversight capacity across CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office, the same dragnet-to-undercover architecture designed to stop terrorist plots and sanctions evasion remains structurally exposed to mission creep, evidentiary collapse, and eroding public legitimacy [\[24\]](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf). #### **Works cited** 1. Fiscal Year 2024: ICE Annual Report, [https\://www\.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf](https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf) 2. Homeland Security Investigations, a Directorate within U.S., [https\://www\.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110\_R44269\_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20151110_R44269_818e7176c0e468170e572a0cd12424731f3046ae.pdf) 3. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/25\_0613\_ice\_fy26-congressional-budget-justificatin.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/25_0613_ice_fy26-congressional-budget-justificatin.pdf) 4. Careers with Homeland Security Investigations \- ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/hsi/careers](https://www.ice.gov/hsi/careers) 5. statement \- Document Repository, [https\://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20230418/115689/HHRG-118-AP15-Wstate-JohnsonT-20230418.pdf](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20230418/115689/HHRG-118-AP15-Wstate-JohnsonT-20230418.pdf) 6. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Leadership Biographies, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/25\_0306\_PRIV-DHS-Senior-Leadership-Biography-Book-2024-2025.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/25_0306_PRIV-DHS-Senior-Leadership-Biography-Book-2024-2025.pdf) 7. Task force targets human network behind IEDs \| Article \- Army.mil, [https\://www\.army.mil/article/53114/task\_force\_targets\_human\_network\_behind\_ieds](https://www.army.mil/article/53114/task_force_targets_human_network_behind_ieds) 8. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108349.pdf) 9. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi\_handbook\_national\_security\_investigations.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_handbook_national_security_investigations.pdf) 10. [https\://www\.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05JUN2019RodiSMNT.pdf) 11. The Counterterrorism Role of Homeland Security Investigations, [https\://www\.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-role-homeland-security-investigations-0) 12. \- TERRORISM AND DIGITAL FINANCING: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS, [https\://www\.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg45867/html/CHRG-117hhrg45867.htm](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117hhrg45867/html/CHRG-117hhrg45867.htm) 13. Remarks Prepared for delivery by \- The Washington Institute, [https\://www\.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5891](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/5891) 14. BORDER SECURITY Actions Needed to Strengthen Performance, [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf) 15. ICE Took Limited Enforcement Actions on Visa Overstays, Including, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-10/OIG-26-38-Sep26.pdf) 16. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25\_0414\_priv\_pia-ice-065-bitmap\_2.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/25_0414_priv_pia-ice-065-bitmap_2.pdf) 17. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi\_student\_guide\_confidential\_informants\_02.2017.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/hsi_student_guide_confidential_informants_02.2017.pdf) 18. Undercover Operations Handbook \- Unicorn Riot, [https\://www\.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf](https://www.unicornriot.ninja/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ice-undercover-operations.pdf) 19. EO 14159 § 4 directs DHS to ensure Homeland Security, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-setting-homeland-security-investigations-priorities/) 20. ICE Homeland Security Investigations Hindered in Countering, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-08/OIG-26-23-Aug26.pdf) 21. ICE contracts with Clearview AI for facial-recognition technology, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-ice-contracts-with-clearview-ai-for-facial-recognition-technology/) 22. US opens a cybercrime center with TRM Labs to trace crypto from, [https\://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/](https://mlq.ai/news/us-opens-a-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-trace-crypto-from-scams/) 23. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dhss-domestic-surveillance-data-collection-and-analytics-tools) 24. PCLOB Terrorist Watchlist Report Unclassified.pdf, [https\://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/b2f9ecff-99fc-48f9-a559-b486391b0e0a/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified.pdf) 25. Reported: CIS Ombudsman, DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/reported-trump-fires-nearly-all-dhs-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-employees/) 26. Denouncing Into the Void: The Dismantling of Internal Oversight and, [https\://www\.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/](https://www.wola.org/analysis/denouncing-into-the-void-the-dismantling-of-internal-oversight-and-accountability-at-dhs/) 27. Documents show DHS probed nonprofits, obtained millions of, [https\://www\.newsfromthestates.com/article/documents-show-dhs-probed-nonprofits-obtained-millions-records-hunt-noncitizen-voters](https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/documents-show-dhs-probed-nonprofits-obtained-millions-records-hunt-noncitizen-voters) 28. Secret 'Keyhole' program emerges as ICE surveillance of protestors, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/secret-keyhole-program-emerges-as-ice-surveillance-of-protestors-widens) 29. B-337366 \- GAO, [https\://www\.gao.gov/products/b-337366](https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337366) 30. [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download](https://www.brennancenter.org/media/11356/download) 31. How many people does ICE arrest? \- USAFacts, [https\://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-does-ice-arrest/country/united-states/](https://usafacts.org/answers/how-many-people-does-ice-arrest/country/united-states/) 32. Homeland Security Investigations, a Directorate within U.S., [https\://www\.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44269.html](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44269.html) 33. Task Force ODIN welcomes new crew, commander \| Article \- Army.mil, [https\://www\.army.mil/article/26860/task\_force\_odin\_welcomes\_new\_crew\_commander](https://www.army.mil/article/26860/task_force_odin_welcomes_new_crew_commander) 34. New York's aviators gear up for Afghanistan deployment, [https\://www\.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/574064/new-yorks-aviators-gear-up-for-afghanistan-deployment/](https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/574064/new-yorks-aviators-gear-up-for-afghanistan-deployment/) 35. [https\://www\.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1131834/task-force-odin-transfer-of-authority/](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1131834/task-force-odin-transfer-of-authority/) 36. Odin \- IARPA, [https\://www\.iarpa.gov/research-programs/odin](https://www.iarpa.gov/research-programs/odin) 37. IARPA Launches "Odin" Program to Harden Biometric Technology, [https\://www\.iarpa.gov/newsroom/article/iarpa-launches-odin-program-to-harden-biometric-technology-against-attacks](https://www.iarpa.gov/newsroom/article/iarpa-launches-odin-program-to-harden-biometric-technology-against-attacks) 38. Terrorist Identities Datamart Environnment (TIDE) Fact Sheet \- DNI.gov, [https\://archive.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-features/2691-terrorist-identities-datamart-environment-tide-fact-sheet-2](https://archive.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-features/2691-terrorist-identities-datamart-environment-tide-fact-sheet-2) 39. Case 1:19-cv-07079-RER Document 44-8 Filed 02/21/21 ... \- ACLU, [https\://www\.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf](https://www.aclu.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/44-8.-Exhibit-8-TIDE-2.21.21.pdf) 40. WATCH LISTING GUIDANCE \- Electronic Frontier Foundation, [https\://www\.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance\_1.pdf](https://www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf) 41. GLOSSARY AT A GLANCE Immigration Databases, Information, [https\://www\.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf](https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/databases-glossary.pdf) 42. Counter-Proliferation Investigations \- ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi](https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/cpi) 43. DHS/ICE/PIA-051 Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service) 44. OIG-20-59 \- HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf) 45. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107414.pdf) 46. INSCOM assumes responsibility of Saturn Arch Program \- Army.mil, [https\://www\.army.mil/article/98474/inscom\_assumes\_responsibility\_of\_saturn\_arch\_program](https://www.army.mil/article/98474/inscom_assumes_responsibility_of_saturn_arch_program) 47. Saturn Arch \| Article \| The United States Army, [https\://www\.army.mil/article/119068/saturn\_arch](https://www.army.mil/article/119068/saturn_arch) 48. Close ISR support re-organizing the Combined Forces Air ... \- CORE, [https\://core.ac.uk/download/36698068.pdf](https://core.ac.uk/download/36698068.pdf) 49. GAO-26-108650, TERRORIST WATCHLIST: FBI Should Improve, [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108650.pdf) 50. DHS/ICE/PIA-038 FALCON-DARTTS \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038-falcon-dartts-piaappendixupdate-march2021.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038-falcon-dartts-piaappendixupdate-march2021.pdf) 51. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022\_0.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf) 52. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23\_0724\_opa\_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/23_0724_opa_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf) 53. TERRORIST IDENTITIES DATAMART ENVIRONMENT (TIDE), [https\://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingScience/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf](https://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingScience/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf) 54. HTML \- Every CRS Report, [https\://www\.everycrsreport.com/files/2024-05-20\_IF12669\_3d5cf8ceb3c9156dbe22471094b043bc20ff72b0.html](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2024-05-20_IF12669_3d5cf8ceb3c9156dbe22471094b043bc20ff72b0.html) 55. Calibrated Counterterrorism: Actively Suppressing International, [https\://ctc.westpoint.edu/calibrated-counterterrorism-actively-suppressing-international-terrorism/](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/calibrated-counterterrorism-actively-suppressing-international-terrorism/) 56. Terrorist Watchlist: Nomination and Redress Processes for ... \- GAO, [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/890/880944.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/890/880944.pdf) 57. task force on denying terrorists entry to the united states, [https\://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170503/105917/HHRG-115-HM00-Transcript-20170503.pdf](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170503/105917/HHRG-115-HM00-Transcript-20170503.pdf) 58. How the Terrorist Watchlist and Government Screening Practices, [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat\_Public\_Report-2.pdf](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf) 59. Targeting Civilians in the Name of National Security: How the No Fly, [https\://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038\&context=mlr](https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4038&context=mlr) 60. OIG Audit Report 07-41, [https\://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/FBI/a0741/index.htm](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/FBI/a0741/index.htm) 61. [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24\_1210\_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1210_priv-pia-cbp-automatedtargetingsystem006-appendixupdate.pdf) 62. [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-08/OIG-23-41-Aug23.pdf) 63. Designated School Officials: What is Campus Sentinel?, [https\://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2013/03/designated-school-officials-what-is-campus-sentinel](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2013/03/designated-school-officials-what-is-campus-sentinel) 64. Homeland Security Investigations Rebranding of Project Shield, [https\://netchannels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Netchannels-Case-Study-HSI\_261008.pdf](https://netchannels.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Netchannels-Case-Study-HSI_261008.pdf) 65. OIG-22-70 \- ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security ... \- TRAC, [https\://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022\_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf](https://tracreports.org/tracker/dynadata/2022_09/OIG-22-70-Sep22.2.pdf) 66. CINA Federal Internship/Research Project Opportunities: DHS, [https\://cina.gmu.edu/cina-federal-internship-research-project-opportunities-dhs-cyber-crimes-center-fairfax-va/](https://cina.gmu.edu/cina-federal-internship-research-project-opportunities-dhs-cyber-crimes-center-fairfax-va/) 67. TRM Labs Powers New DHS Crypto Crime Disruption Center, [https\://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/trm-labs-dhs-threat-disruption-center](https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/trm-labs-dhs-threat-disruption-center) 68. 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Comprehensive Strategy for Overstay Enforcement and Deterrence, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ice\_-\_comprehensive\_strategy\_for\_overstay\_enforcement\_and\_deterrence\_1.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ice_-_comprehensive_strategy_for_overstay_enforcement_and_deterrence_1.pdf) 75. [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Nevano-2019-06-26.pdf](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Nevano-2019-06-26.pdf) 76. Alleged Engineer of CJNG Cartel's Cross-Border Tunnel Indicted for, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support](https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/alleged-engineer-cjng-cartels-cross-border-tunnel-indicted-providing-material-support) 77. Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) \| ICE, [https\://www\.ice.gov/opr](https://www.ice.gov/opr) 78. Data Analysis & Research for Trade Transparency System, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038a-ravendartts-april2023.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/privacy-pia-ice038a-ravendartts-april2023.pdf) 79. counterterrorism and criminal exploitation investigations handbook, [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/august\_2021\_supplemental\_production.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/august_2021_supplemental_production.pdf) 80. DHS Components & Resources for Region 9 (2025), [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25\_0910\_oslle\_region-9-contact-sheet.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/25_0910_oslle_region-9-contact-sheet.pdf) 81. 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Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-49-Mar17.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-49-Mar17.pdf) 86. AGENDA ITEM REQUEST FORM \- Nye County, [https\://www\.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16](https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/47100/Item16) 87. OIG-13-49 DHS Involvement in OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG\_13-49\_Mar13.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-49_Mar13.pdf) 88. HSI Directive 18-02: Law Enforcement Officers Designated to Act as, [https\://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/10/1025\_HSI-Directive-18-02.pdf](https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/10/1025_HSI-Directive-18-02.pdf) 89. United States v. 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No Suspicion Required: Second Circuit Permits Warrantless Manual, [https\://whitecollarwatch.sidley.com/2026/09/24/no-suspicion-required-second-circuit-permits-warrantless-manual-cellphone-searches-at-the-border/](https://whitecollarwatch.sidley.com/2026/09/24/no-suspicion-required-second-circuit-permits-warrantless-manual-cellphone-searches-at-the-border/) 93. Mexican National Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to, [https\://www\.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/mexican-national-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-cartel-designated-foreign) 94. Reward Offers Up to \$50M for Information Leading to Arrests and/or, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/reward-offers-50m-information-leading-arrests-andor-convictions-foreign-terrorist](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reward-offers-50m-information-leading-arrests-andor-convictions-foreign-terrorist) 95. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records \- Federal Register, [https\://www\.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/04/2017-09025/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/04/2017-09025/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records) 96. Department of Homeland Security \- Office of Inspector General, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG\_13-103\_Jul13.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-103_Jul13.pdf) 97. DHS/ICE/PIA-052 Visa Security Program \- Pre-Adjudicated Threat, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-052-visa-security-program-pre-adjudicated-threat-recognition-intelligence](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-052-visa-security-program-pre-adjudicated-threat-recognition-intelligence) 98. 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DHS biometric overhaul remains tied to Thales as HART deadline, [https\://www\.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes) 102. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108118.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108118.pdf) 103. [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-06/OIG-24-27-Jun24-Redacted.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-06/OIG-24-27-Jun24-Redacted.pdf) 104. DSOs: Read these FAQs About Campus Sentinel \| Study in the States, [https\://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2022/10/dsos-read-these-faqs-about-campus-sentinel](https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/2022/10/dsos-read-these-faqs-about-campus-sentinel) 105. DHS/ICE/PIA-044 LeadTrac System \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-044-leadtrac-system](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-044-leadtrac-system) 106. Social Media Monitoring \| Brennan Center for Justice, [https\://www\.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/social-media-monitoring](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/social-media-monitoring) 107. IDV to STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS INC \| USAspending, [https\://www\.usaspending.gov/award/CONT\_IDV\_75N98119D00004\_7529](https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_IDV_75N98119D00004_7529) 108. Data Analysis & Research for Trade Transparency System (DARTTS), [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-038-data-analysis-research-trade-transparency-system-dartts](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-038-data-analysis-research-trade-transparency-system-dartts) 109. Chasing the Money: Celebrating 25 Years of Homeland Security, [https\://www\.acams.org/en/opinion/chasing-the-money-celebrating-25-years-of-homeland-security-investigations-el-dorado-task-force](https://www.acams.org/en/opinion/chasing-the-money-celebrating-25-years-of-homeland-security-investigations-el-dorado-task-force) 110. US launches cybercrime center with TRM Labs to help trace crypto tied to scams, [https\://www\.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-11-19-us-launches-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-help-trace-crypto-tied-to-scams-443599](https://www.theblock.co/news/regulation/2026-11-19-us-launches-cybercrime-center-with-trm-labs-to-help-trace-crypto-tied-to-scams-443599) 111. The Expansion of AI-Driven Biometric Systems in Immigration, [https\://forumtogether.org/article/the-expansion-of-ai-driven-biometric-systems-in-immigration-enforcement/](https://forumtogether.org/article/the-expansion-of-ai-driven-biometric-systems-in-immigration-enforcement/) 112. OIG-23-61 \- CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy, [https\://www\.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2023-09/OIG-23-61-Sep23-Redacted.pdf) 113. Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security U.S., [https\://www\.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/02/04/2013-02343/privacy-act-of-1974-department-of-homeland-security-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-010](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/02/04/2013-02343/privacy-act-of-1974-department-of-homeland-security-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-010) 114. [https\://www\.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-807.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-807.pdf) 115. 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Mexican National and Alleged Alien Smuggler Indicted on First, [https\://www\.justice.gov/opa/pr/mexican-national-and-alleged-alien-smuggler-indicted-first-material-support-terrorism](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mexican-national-and-alleged-alien-smuggler-indicted-first-material-support-terrorism) 124. Eric McDavid \- Wikipedia, [https\://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric\_McDavid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_McDavid) 125. [https\://www\.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain](https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/operation-backfire-ten-years-later-two-fugitives-remain) 126. The Last Fugitive: Vail's Connection to America's Most Wanted Eco, [https\://www\.vailmag.com/best-of-vail/the-last-fugitive-vail-s-connection-to-america-s-most-wanted-eco-terrorist/](https://www.vailmag.com/best-of-vail/the-last-fugitive-vail-s-connection-to-america-s-most-wanted-eco-terrorist/) 127. 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United States \- Brief (Merits), [https\://www\.justice.gov/osg/brief/arthur-anderson-v-united-states-brief-merits](https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/arthur-anderson-v-united-states-brief-merits) 137. Trump's mass deportations led to a big drop in fentanyl ... \- PBS, [https\://www\.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trumps-mass-deportations-led-to-a-big-drop-in-fentanyl-investigations-report-finds-heres-what-to-know](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trumps-mass-deportations-led-to-a-big-drop-in-fentanyl-investigations-report-finds-heres-what-to-know) 138. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY, [https\://www\.appropriations.senate.gov/download/hs-explanatory-stmt](https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/download/hs-explanatory-stmt) 139. March 20, 2026 \- Jason Crow, [https\://crow.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/crow.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/fy27-homeland-personnel-diversions-crow.pdf](https://crow.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/crow.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/fy27-homeland-personnel-diversions-crow.pdf) 140. EO 14165 § 4 directs DOD, DOJ, and DHS to deploy personnel to, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-directing-dod-and-dhs-to-deploy-personnel-to-ensure-operational-control-of-the-southern-border/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/potus-issues-executive-order-directing-dod-and-dhs-to-deploy-personnel-to-ensure-operational-control-of-the-southern-border/) 141. DHS/ICE/PIA-055 Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-055-repository-analytics-virtualized-environment-raven](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-055-repository-analytics-virtualized-environment-raven) 142. DHS/ICE/PIA-055 RAVEn \- Homeland Security, [https\://www\.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice055-ravenappendixa-bupdate-september2021.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice055-ravenappendixa-bupdate-september2021.pdf) 143. Trump's Wall and Immigrant Detention \= Racist White and Corporate, [https\://www\.immigrantsolidarity.org/Newsletter/Fall19.pdf](https://www.immigrantsolidarity.org/Newsletter/Fall19.pdf) 144. Case 3:26-cv-04232-AJB-MSB Document 1 Filed 07/24/26 PageID.1, [https\://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-07-24-1-Complaint.pdf](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-07-24-1-Complaint.pdf) 145. EPIC v. Mullin – EPIC – Electronic Privacy Information Center, [https\://epic.org/documents/epic-v-mullin/](https://epic.org/documents/epic-v-mullin/) 146. 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Exposing and Disrupting Federal Attempts to Interfere in the 2026, [https\://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/In-the-Records\_Exposing-and-Disrupting-Federal-Attempts-to-Interfere-in-the-2026-Midterm-Elections.pdf](https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/In-the-Records_Exposing-and-Disrupting-Federal-Attempts-to-Interfere-in-the-2026-Midterm-Elections.pdf) 149. ICE Has Obtained Over 50 Million Voter Roll Records ... \- Truthout, [https\://truthout.org/articles/ice-has-obtained-over-50-million-voter-roll-records-from-doj-ahead-of-midterms/](https://truthout.org/articles/ice-has-obtained-over-50-million-voter-roll-records-from-doj-ahead-of-midterms/) 150. Markwayne Mullin confirmed as secretary of homeland security, [https\://news.ballotpedia.org/2026/03/24/markwayne-mullin-confirmed-as-secretary-of-homeland-security/](https://news.ballotpedia.org/2026/03/24/markwayne-mullin-confirmed-as-secretary-of-homeland-security/) 151. Peters, Padilla, Durbin, & Schumer Lead Senate Colleagues in, [https\://www\.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-padilla-durbin-schumer-lead-senate-colleagues-in-demanding-secretary-mullin-halt-2026-election-interference-efforts/](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-padilla-durbin-schumer-lead-senate-colleagues-in-demanding-secretary-mullin-halt-2026-election-interference-efforts/) 152. Chatrie v. United States \- Knight First Amendment Institute, [https\://knightcolumbia.org/litigation/chatrie-v-united-states](https://knightcolumbia.org/litigation/chatrie-v-united-states) 153. Supreme Court rules geofence warrants are Fourth Amendment, [https\://www\.fmglaw.com/cyber-privacy-security/supreme-court-rules-geofence-warrants-are-fourth-amendment-searches/](https://www.fmglaw.com/cyber-privacy-security/supreme-court-rules-geofence-warrants-are-fourth-amendment-searches/) 154. 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Circuit, [https\://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/04/22-1184.pdf](https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2025/04/22-1184.pdf) 162. 2025 Current Fiscal Year Report: Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory, [https\://www\.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ](https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/apex/FACACommitteeLevelReportAsPDF?id=a10t0000001gzkKAAQ) 163. DHS terminates all advisory committee members, [https\://immpolicytracking.org/policies/dhs-terminates-all-advisory-committee-members/](https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/dhs-terminates-all-advisory-committee-members/) 164. 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