# Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment - [[wiki/Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment|TIDE (Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment)]] - [[wiki/Dragnet|Dragnet]] - [[wiki/Homeland Security Investigations|Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)]] - [[wiki/ICE|ICE]] - [[wiki/ODEN, ODIN, and ODNI|ODEN, ODIN, and ODNI]] - [[wiki/Information Awareness Office|Information Awareness Office]] - [[wiki/Total Information Awareness|Total Information Awareness]] - [[research/Homeland Security Investigations, TIDE, Dragnets, and the Civilian ODIN Architecture|Homeland Security Investigations, TIDE, Dragnets, and the Civilian ODIN Architecture]] - [[research/Domestic Watchlisting and HSI Operations|Domestic Watchlisting and HSI Operations]] **TIDE was already feeding federal watchlisting by 2009. The 2009–2010 turning point was the expansion of screening and lead-sharing around it.** The National Counterterrorism Center used TIDE to consolidate identity information concerning international terrorism, including names, aliases, biographical details, and available biometrics. The FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center received eligible international-terrorism nominations through NCTC and purely domestic terrorism nominations through the FBI’s Terrorist Review and Examination Unit. The center consolidated the two streams in what was then called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), now the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSD), and distributed records to screening programs according to their purposes. In January 2010, NCTC Director Michael Leiter told the Senate that approximately **2 percent of the people in TIDE were U.S. persons**, an estimate specific to the upstream international-terrorism repository at that time. [DOJ Inspector General, 2009 nomination audit](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/09-25.pdf) · [2010 Senate hearings on intelligence reform](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56838/html/CHRG-111shrg56838.htm) · [NCTC TIDE fact sheet](https://archive.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/features_documents/TIDEfactsheet10FEB2017.pdf) **The watchlist gained reach when common activities began generating federal screening encounters.** In January 2009, TSA began taking over airline passenger matching through **Secure Flight**, starting with a limited number of domestic flights. Coverage reached all flights operated by U.S. carriers in June 2010 and covered foreign carriers in November 2010. State and local police could already encounter terrorism records during ordinary queries through the FBI’s **National Crime Information Center** (NCIC). The FBI’s firearms and explosives background-check system (**NICS**) furnished another domestic screening point. GAO counted 1,225 transactions or checks involving valid watchlist matches from February 2004 through February 2010, of which 1,116 were allowed to proceed because the checks found no legal disqualification. In July 2010, the government finalized revised nomination guidance, and GAO later found that the number of U.S. persons on the No Fly List had more than doubled immediately following the December 2009 security failure and subsequent review. [GAO on aviation screening in 2009–2010](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a123979.html) · [GAO on completion of Secure Flight rollout](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a322911.html) · [GAO on NICS screening in 2010](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a124585.html) · [GAO on the July 2010 guidance and list changes](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-476.pdf) **Guardian and eGuardian are the closest parallel for everyday inquiries into domestic extremist activity.** Watchlist screening starts with a person’s identifiers and asks whether they match a listed identity. **Guardian** starts with a report about conduct, a person, or a possible threat and gives the FBI a place to assign, assess, and close the lead or advance it to further investigation. The FBI developed **eGuardian** to allow state and local agencies to share unclassified reports, and DOJ stood up the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative’s program office in March 2010 to support standardized sharing, including through fusion centers. A 2008 DOJ Inspector General audit carried into the 2009 oversight record found that some routine Guardian leads sat for months and that 27 of 218 sampled incidents were closed without the required supervisory review. The audit follows routine work that rarely surfaces in a prosecution announcement, from the arrival and evaluation of a tip to the expected supervisory review of its disposition. [DOJ Inspector General, Guardian audit](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/FBI/a0902/exec.htm) · [DOJ Inspector General, 2009 report to Congress](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/semiannual/0905/fbi.htm) · [GAO on nationwide suspicious-activity reporting](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-233.pdf) The systems in use in 2009 also explain how a domestic investigation could eventually produce a watchlist entry. FBI case agents documented the investigation in **Automated Case Support**, and the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit processed purely domestic nominations for the screening center. The 2009 Inspector General audit documented missed nominations and inadequate updates or removals, making the case agent’s recordkeeping part of the watchlist’s accuracy problem. **Sentinel** was deployed in phases, including a partial deployment in July 2010, and became available to all FBI users in July 2012. GAO’s 2026 description identifies Sentinel and TIDE as the two principal sources of watchlist information in the later architecture. [DOJ Inspector General, 2009 nomination audit](https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/09-25.pdf) · [DOJ Inspector General on Sentinel’s 2010 deployment](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/semiannual/1105/fbi.htm) · [FBI on Sentinel’s 2012 rollout](https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-announces-deployment-of-sentinel) · [GAO’s 2026 watchlist architecture](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108650/index.html) **ICE had agents doing routine terrorism-task-force work before it formed HSI in 2010.** The DOJ Inspector General interviewed an ICE agent on the St. Louis JTTF who said that a 2003 headquarters instruction invoking an old INS agreement forced him to close most of his existing assignments so they could be reassigned. The agent said he had previously been eligible to lead such cases and that ICE lifted the restriction three months later. Other ICE agents told auditors they continued to work intelligence cases despite disagreement between the agencies about assignments. The accounts establish that ICE participation could entail taking ownership of ordinary investigative assignments and that authority to do so varied with task-force arrangements. The report leaves the individual subjects’ citizenship and case classifications unresolved. [DOJ Inspector General, terrorism task-force evaluation](https://oig.justice.gov/archives/reports/plus/e0507/results.htm) · [Joint DOJ–DHS Inspector General review, including HSI’s formation](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-08/OIG-19-57-Jul19.pdf) **ICEPIC was the ICE system closest to the relationship-analysis work.** Its original privacy assessment dates to January 2008, and GAO subsequently documented its use to search across data sources for previously unknown connections involving people under investigation. GAO distinguished this subject-based search from pattern screening in CBP’s **Automated Targeting System**, which compared traveler and cargo data with intelligence and law-enforcement information. In practical terms, a records analyst might start with a person already material to a case and look for related people or records, while a screening system would start with a flow of transactions or encounters. ICE’s later **FALCON Search & Analysis** supported research and link analysis by HSI agents and analysts, and **Investigative Case Management** supported agency case records and reports. The privacy documentation establishes what users could do with the systems, while the publicly described cases below illustrate how far a reader can attribute specific acts to individual investigators. [GAO on ICEPIC and ATS](https://www.gao.gov/assets/a585289.html) · [DHS privacy assessment of FALCON](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_ice_falconsa_january2014.pdf) · [DHS privacy assessment of Investigative Case Management](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-icm-june2016.pdf) For a routine police encounter, the operational handoff runs through the **Threat Screening Center**. A local officer’s query can generate a possible match, which the center can confirm or rule out using additional identity information. GAO says the center notifies appropriate law-enforcement stakeholders and shares intelligence gathered during a confirmed encounter. The FBI has described routing incidents to an existing case agent or to a local JTTF for response, where an HSI officer can participate according to the assignment and the authorities involved. HSI officers may serve on a JTTF full-time, part-time, or as liaisons, and a DHS audit documented their work seeking TSA aviation-screening information for investigations, subject to access and sharing rules. Which agency handles the follow-up depends on the source of the lead and the investigating team. [GAO’s 2026 encounter review](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108650/index.html) · [FBI testimony on referral and case-agent follow-up](https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/terrorist-screening-center-capabilities-and-operations) · [DHS Inspector General on HSI assignments and data access](https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-59-Aug20.pdf) **Domestic case records show three levels of attribution.** A 2009 federal sentencing account describes Torrance police connecting two suspects to a gas-station robbery and investigators finding documents that revealed a locally organized extremist group. DOJ identified the four defendants as three U.S. nationals and one lawful permanent resident. The FBI-led Long Beach JTTF took the case, and DOJ listed ICE among its participating agencies. In a later case involving a white-supremacist network that organized through an online forum, DOJ explicitly identified HSI as one of the investigating agencies and documented guilty pleas on firearms and conspiracy charges. At the individual investigator level, a 2024 federal affidavit identifies its author as an HSI special agent assigned to the FBI’s Tampa JTTF and shows the agent assembling public video, security footage, and interview evidence into a sworn account of alleged federal offenses in a domestic case. That affidavit supports attribution to the agent at the charging stage, while the two agency-level accounts support attribution to the team. [DOJ on the Long Beach investigation](https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2009/024.html) · [DOJ’s contemporaneous identification of the defendants](https://media.defense.gov/2005/Aug/31/2001711097/-1/-1/1/fourmen_090105.pdf) · [DOJ on the firearms and conspiracy cases](https://www.justice.gov/usao-id/pr/last-five-defendants-ties-white-supremacy-and-who-were-charged-targeting-idaho-energy) · [Federal affidavit of an HSI task-force officer](https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/media/1350326/dl?inline=) **LeadTrac gives a direct answer about an alleged HSI database connection.** DHS’s privacy assessment describes the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit using LeadTrac to vet referrals and send viable leads to field agents in cases principally involving the terms of admission. The same assessment expressly says that the unit decided against ingesting the Terrorist Screening Database into LeadTrac. It also says U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents could appear in the system as people material to a lead, including family members, employers, school officials, or associates. That makes LeadTrac relevant to how information about U.S. persons can enter an HSI system through relationships, while its documented purpose and data sources give it a different role from Guardian, ICEPIC, and the terrorism watchlist. [DHS privacy assessment of LeadTrac, pp. 1–2 and § 2.2](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice044-leadtracappendicesupdate-june2020_0.pdf) **The encounter figures describe reach, and oversight records identify where errors can enter.** The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reported approximately **1.1 million people on the federal watchlist as of August 26, 2024**, and said U.S. persons had consistently represented **less than 0.5 percent** of the watchlist population. Its review describes protections for U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and people treated as U.S. persons while their status is uncertain. GAO’s January 2026 report counted **2,198 nonfederal law-enforcement entities** that reported encounters yielding confirmed matches in fiscal years 2019–2024, with citizenship breakdowns withheld from the public version and inconsistent reporting discussed in the findings. A confirmed match resolves the identity question, while the original nomination and the legal basis for any further action require their own review. In *Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security*, an erroneous FBI nomination affected the correctly identified traveler and propagated across government records, illustrating why redress has to reach the underlying data as well as the point of screening. [Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 2025 report](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/94cd55e0-4df0-464d-b731-2b467c2f2fd8/PCLOB%20Terrorist%20Watchlist%20Report%20Unclassified%20-%20Completed%20508%20-%20Feb%205%2C%202025.pdf) · [GAO on nonfederal encounters](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108650/index.html) · [Ninth Circuit, *Ibrahim*](https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/01/02/14-16161.pdf) The distinction between a report, an identity match, and actionable evidence also matters for First Amendment protections. The Attorney General’s domestic FBI guidelines bar using investigative or information-gathering powers solely to monitor protected activity, and the confidential-source rules cover FBI agents and FBI-assigned task-force officers operating sources under FBI authority. The public records above establish HSI’s participation in task-force investigations and the existence of tools for opening, documenting, and corroborating leads. They provide no count of HSI-run sources, watchlist-triggered HSI inquiries, or U.S.-person cases closed after routine review. In the functional comparison with the Army’s **Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize** sequence, the domestic record is clearest about the observable handoffs between receiving information, checking identity, assessing conduct, and taking whatever action the evidence and the law support, including closing an unfounded lead. [Attorney General’s guidelines for domestic FBI operations](https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf) · [Attorney General’s confidential-source guidelines](https://www.justice.gov/usdoj-media/oip/media/1254421/dl) · [U.S. Army on Task Force ODIN](https://www.army.mil/article/38667/task_force_odin_a_changes_command)